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**Decrypting Human Agglomeration: Crowds and Power
Dynamics in Nathaniel Hawthorne's *The Scarlet Letter*,
George Orwell's *1984*, and Chinua Achebe's *A Man of the
People***

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the Requirements for the PhD Degree in General and Comparative
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Declaration

I hereby declare that the substance of this thesis is entirely the result of my investigation and that due reference or acknowledgment is made, whenever necessary, to the work of other researchers.

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Dedication

To my parents

Acknowledgements

I express my deepest gratitude to Allah on the force HE granted me to finalise this work as it was not easy to fulfil this task.

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Abstract

The individualistic discourse of Western thought has always held an adverse judgement regarding crowds. Fiction and literary readings are inevitably influenced by this prejudicial position. This results in the dissociation of the collective body from the epistemic field of literary criticism. The following research expresses an interest in reading the pair of crowds and power in Nathaniel Hawthorne's *The Scarlet Letter*, George Orwell's *1984*, and Chinua Achebe's *A Man of the People* comparatively. It essays to accord priority to the crowd by coupling its psychological predispositions with the terrain of power. The reading performed throughout the thesis specifies that while the carnivalistic/grotesque style renders the essence of Crowd Psychology aesthetically, it fails to sustain Bakhtin's initial assertion of liberation. In addition, given the servile nature of crowds and the efficiency of mediocre leadership in attracting them, the intellectual experiences a crisis to lead over the masses and instruct them into action. Finally, the intricacy of the domain of violence initiates crowds into a realm of continuous exposure to subjugation. Their most radical actions are relocated into securing power instead of inaugurating a counter-power.

Keywords: Crowd Psychology, Carnavalesque, Grotesque, Power, Intellectual. Leadership, Violence

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General Introduction

General Introduction

Aristotle's *Poetics* marks the emergence of a field that is concerned with the examination and interpretation of literary texts. With the advent of literary scholarship and academic contributions, the ongoing debate on intrinsic and extrinsic approaches to literature is often brought to the surface. On the one hand, there are those who limit the value of a literary work to internal, textual, and linguistic mechanisms. On the other hand, there are those who favour an external, symptomatic reading of literature. The explicit parley between 'mimetic' theorists and 'objective' critics conceals a rather more delicate issue inherent to the intricate theories favouring a focus on external dimensions. If the controversy between the two poles advances rivalry of the inside and the outside, the problem that remains relatively dormant within external approaches is about the orientation of literary reading.

The quest for a relatively accurate reading of literary texts haunts and shapes every school of thought. Certainly, extrinsic theorists like Marxists, Psychoanalysts, and Feminists seek to unveil truths about literary experiences and socio-political implications. However, Modern Critical Theory, being the offspring of Western thought, has apparently been influenced by the discourse of individualism. The orientation of such schools in literary reading attributes primacy to the individual over the collective. Even if the individual and the collective are equally treated in literary craftsmanship, critical readings clash with creative writing in terms of priorities. Therefore, in the light of individualist and elitist philosophy, and despite the cultural, psychological, sociological, and political significance of crowds for external and mimetic critics, one cannot expect readings primarily oriented towards the collective body amid Plato's disdain of crowds (McClelland, 2010), Nietzsche's contemptuous remarks on the "herd instinct of obedience" (93), or the elitist Arnoldian views on the

rise of ‘Barbarians’ and ‘Philistines’ into the social fabric (15). Roberts and Jacobs, for instance, after presenting the classical typology of conflicts, they state that even if literary tensions can possibly be created between “larger groups”, the fictional “conflicts between individuals are *more identifiable* and therefore *more interesting*” (103; emphasis added). In addition, Man (the individual) is always the primary focus of the dichotomy: Man Versus Man/Gods/Machine, etc. And even when the collective is highlighted, as in Man vs. Society conflict, an emphasis on the individual is always present. Critical readings inherit the ochlophobic sentiments of Western thought to corner literary expression into a mere articulation of an individual (author), with analyses directed at individual characters as well. The human agglomeration remains largely distanced.

Gustave Le Bon announces the modern era as “The Era of Crowds” (ix), and therefore, building on efforts of former theorists, Le Bon planted the seeds of Social Psychology followed by Sigmund Freud who commented and developed Le Bon’s theses. However, the appropriation of their ideas by dictators such as Hitler and Mussolini has impacted the reception of their work. This reputation has in fact nurtured the discourse of individualism and undermined the crowd to further degrees. Consequently, the gulf between their ideas and literary criticism is widened, with much attention paid to Individual Psychology, eclipsing the possibility of reading crowds in literature.

Nevertheless, history accounts for the role played by the masses in creating, resisting, negotiating, or being mere puppets to political power. Accordingly, the literary works that, from a mimetic and extrinsic perspective, comment history and the circulation of power, have paid serious attention to the rise of the crowd and their participation in power dynamics. The novels selected for this study are of no less

importance in this regard. Hawthorne's Hester confronts a rigid puritan crowd that is a principal agent of power dynamics, Orwell renders a totalitarian regime that invests in crowd-control, and Achebe's crowd advances queries about the role and crisis of leadership after independence. The interest paid to the crowd and their ties with power might not advance a favourable depiction. Even in accounts of Crowd Psychology, the profile of crowds remains largely negative to rarely digress from their servility. However, the mass is central to power. The puritan order Hawthorne depicts refused 'popular government' since its separatist inception: "we hold it not, we aproue it not, for if the multitude gouern, then who shalbe gouerned?" asks the prominent separatist figure, Henry Ainsworth (Miller 22). Equally, Orwell declares that the Party's power is 'over humans', and so does Achebe in creating a populist world for his novel. The conflictual nature of power in the three novels disintegrates if the mass is excluded.

It would be dishonest to claim that human agglomerations have never been addressed in literary studies. Mills's *The Crowd in American Literature* might be the first monograph to address crowds in the American literary scene. Mills indicates a penchant for the study of individuals in literature and campaigns for an inclusion of crowds in literary criticism. For him, studying the crowd in literature offers a fresh glance on the social dimensions, makes the sources of power more visible, and unveils the formation of the collective identity. His ambitious project covers a large historical period: since Adams and Jefferson and up to 1960s. However, instead of making the crowd his focal point as the title promises, Mills studies his authors' (and painters') perception of the crowd and annexes it to the political atmosphere of their time. He rarely shows careful attention to the crowd as an entity. The long timeline he opts for makes a minute study of the crowd quasi-impossible. Therefore, even if he denies that his work is a survey, he fails to prove the opposite.

In addition, as early as his introduction, Mills announces that there is an instructed image about the crowd being an “irrational mass” that has distanced them from literary criticism (3). This proposes his work as a revision of this so-called ‘stereotype’. He treats Le Bon, Freud, Canetti, and others, as “misleading” and “ahistorical” (3). However, many of the virtues of crowds stated by Le Bon are replicated, which makes Mills’s counter-claims against these theorists questionable. This is further confirmed by the fact that Le Bon and Freud, whom he initially criticises, are never mentioned again in Mills’s book, as working against their theses entails. Plus, his readings echo and are embedded in Le Bonian/Freudian ‘stereotypical’ paradigm. Paradoxically, Mills’s definition of the crowd as “a gathering defined by its collective identity and purpose” (9) is but a rephrasing of Le Bon’s ideas. With all the remarks made, his project remains one of the first works, if not the first, to shed light on the neglected literary crowd.

Mary Esteve seems to share the same revisionist stance by seeking to re-establish and re-valorise crowds in American literature. For her, individuality is consumed by the negative image of crowds. As a result, she concerns herself with the ‘unmotivated crowd’ that surmounts the possibility of being hypnotized in collective action. She asserts that Le Bon’s theory of the crowd introduces ground for “savvy and manipulative” leaders (5). Her discontent with crowd theorists is influenced by the abuse of their ideas. Esteve, critical of the binary of ruler and ruled, postulates that this binary deprives the crowd of an ontological existence, and therefore, her choice of the ‘unmotivated crowds’ becomes legible. However, if, according to her view, Le Bon’s remarks dispose the crowd of a certain ontological independence, her own remarks seem to uproot the crowd from its natural and historical immersion in power dynamics. Plus, even if her approach is promising and interesting showing an extensive

acquaintance with crowd theories, her eclectic choices remain too abstract to contest Freudian or Le Bonian views.

When reviewing scholarly works on crowds and literature, two distinguished contributions offer themselves: Weliver's *The Musical Crowd in English Fiction, 1840-1910* and Wiegandt's *Crowd and Rumour in Shakespeare* (2012). Despite the scarcity of academic works on the subject, these two authors approach it from a peculiar perspective. Weliver opts for a study of the 'musical crowd' or 'aesthetic groups' in English Fiction (1840-1910). The historical context of her study is justified by the English Musical Renaissance lasting from 1840 to 1940. Her study focuses on "musical events at which people assembled, connecting them to other ways of imagining community at the time" (4). She draws on the notion of "Social" and "Public Sphere", Hanna Arendt's Political Theory, Benedict Anderson's Imagined Communities, and others, to examine the ties between Music and National/Class Identity. Even if the bond established through music echoes Freudian and Le Bonian ideas, no reference is made to them. However, unlike Esteve, her eclectic choices are clearer and less abstract. She observes that, regardless of their historical positioning (Past/Present) and class belonging (Popular/Royal), the type of crowd she studies is almost static. Even if some music programs aimed at elevating the taste and behaviour of crowds, an "unruly audience behaviour" is persistent to their character (15). This expresses her tolerance towards the nature of crowds. Although original, the historical context of the study imposes the dominance of class in her work.

Similarly, Kai Wiegandt's study proposes an original reading of Shakespeare. Drawing on the perception of Shakespeare's plays as a "drama of individuality" (1), Shakespeare's mastery of individual peculiarities, and the neglected aspects of collectivity, the author studies parallels between crowds and rumours in some plays. He

argues that Shakespeare “is all but exclusively concerned with individual” (2). In this regard, he attempts to liberate Shakespeare from Western individuality. He claims that Shakespeare depicts collective actions in richer ways than his predecessors. For him, rumours are seen as “society’s daydreams, expressing collective desires, anxieties and aggressions” (2). He considers the rumour to be the voice of the crowd which humans cannot help but be immersed in. This recalls Freudian and Le Bonian remarks about contagion and suggestion. In addition, like Mills’s definition of the crowd that echoes Le Bon’s, Wiegandt defines it as “a group of people united by the bond of particular psychological mechanisms” (3). Similar to Weliever too, Wiegandt’s study relates Shakespeare’s crowd to class. However, he slightly goes beyond that to touch upon crowds’ relations to ‘rhetoric’, ‘state organisation’, and how collective rumours express social and philosophical scepticism.

In fact, class seems to be a hackneyed angle in approaching literary crowds. Zimmerman’s study is concerned with ‘panic novels’, and how American authors and readership participated in the popular discourse of panic. He initiates his book with the prevalence of financial panics at the turn of twentieth century and assumes that they engendered a “freakish behaviour among individuals” (1). The work examines how authors elucidated historical and ideological facets of panic, the emergence of a collective economic behaviour and its historical agency, and the aesthetic rendering that explores the limits of narratability. He locates his interest in panic events as both setting and subject in which collective behaviour is mostly apparent. However, Zimmerman’s book, although promising heightened emphasis on crowd, rather focuses on panic events and the financial scene of America.

With similar situation of his work in times of turmoil, Stefan Jonsson inspects the status of crowd in times of war. He claims that while German and Austrian cultures

were hugely influenced by the masses from 1918 up to 1933, only few authors devoted attention to the links between crowds and Weimar Republic. Although his work is concerned with the transition to democracy during the inter-war frame, part of his research is oriented to the study of crowd in literature. His interest in the aesthetic rendering of crowds stems from a dissatisfaction with the academicians' negative perception of the mass as a "dark sun, unapproachable for all the heat it emitted" (xvi). His inclusion of the literary dimension stems from his belief that the aesthetic transcends the elitist fear of the crowd as threatening entity to unquestionably enlighten us and make visible what academia and politics would deny. The distrust he expresses is extended to the Crowd Psychology, which he sees an ambiguous domain presenting no clarity crowd-related issues. However, he remains similar to other scholars in providing no epistemic counterpart to the problem he advances against the field.

Folks (2002) orients his study to Canetti's views on the Crowd Psychology. In his reading of Faulkner's *The Sound and the Fury*, he resorts to biographical instances to explain his thesis, and posits Faulkner as a survivor in the face of the demands of the crowds. These biographical instances include his rejection within mainstream New York publishing industry, the clash between his aspiration to become a writer and family responsibilities, and the ties with his father (mainly resentment) and mother. The author argues that these anxieties shape *The Sound and the Fury*, to conclude that Faulkner transforms his demise as an author into a novelistic success. In another publication, Folks (2017) follows the same perspective to read Poe's idealised marriage mainly in "Ligeia" and "Eleonora". He argues that the conjugal bonds in Poe's tales are but responses to the 'commands' of society/crowd. In fact, in both works, Folks takes a marginal instance in Canetti's views. By his focus on the individual's reaction to the crowd, he replicates the centrality of the individual in reading literary conflicts. In

addition, the crowd in both works is metaphorically expressive of social burdens and demands than an actual psychological group. With his constant references to incest, oedipal complex, and ambivalence, the crowd, in both works, is metonymic of the family. This orientation aligns more with Individual Psychology than Crowd Psychology. Canetti's lens becomes incompatible with the declared aim of the author.

Mitsi notes that part of the demands of the nineteenth century crowd was power. Without stressing a necessity for their inclusion in literary criticism, she suggests that their natural advent prescribes their incorporation in the literary scene. Like the middle ages patrons and their portrayal in paintings, the nineteenth century crowd as the new readership wished to see its reflection in Fiction (Mitsi 292). It is worth mentioning that Mitsi treats Le Bon's views as "derivative", "mythipoeic" rather than scientific, and suggests that his thesis maintains "the superiority of the individuals over the crowd" (291). Her article reads the 'sphinx-crowd' riddle in relation to Poe, Baudelaire, Rilke and Eliot. Her analysis operates by projecting her own interpretation of Le Bon's theory. Her assumptions about Le Bon's inclination to the individual shape her reading; she concentrates more on the author/narrator/speaker of the text to highlight the perception of the crowd in the works. Alongside her reading of Le Bon, focus on the individuals' attitudes, and the 'flâneur gaze' to access the crowd, her selected authors/narrators/speakers do not seem to be facing Le Bonian/Freudian crowds. Their encounters are limited to urban human gatherings in the city. Despite their numbers, they do not witness a moment of transformation that groups them together as a crowd.

Despite the limited contributions on the subject of crowds in literature, American and English literatures received some attention. However, in the case of African literature, a shortage of academic works is noticed. The only work available to the researcher is Maughan-Brown's "The image of the crowd in South African fiction".

Maughan-Brown believes that the advent of anti-segregationist political activism in South Africa and the rise of a politically charged Anglophone literature were met with the oppressive governmental policies. Both black and white writers faced comparable degrees of censorship. This emerging, nascent literature, he observes, centred its focus on race riots allowing its readers to access race ideology. Such literature has essentially challenged media portrayal of race riots and reported the untold details media “was proscribed from publishing” (1). His research focuses on the portrayal of such ‘endemic’ events. He contextualises the study with regards to the treatment of the black crowds in the light of racial domination ideology of the first two decades of Nationalist rule in South Africa. Maughan-Brown opines that this literature expresses a “fear of crowd” that stems from “faith in individualism and a concomitant distrust of collective political action” (4). This sentiment is mediated through the pervasiveness of the crowd’s image as “violent” and “irresistible” (4). In addition, an animalisation of the crowd and an evocation of its “mindlessness”, “uniformity”, and inhumane traits accompany the process of being immersed within it (6). By reviewing this portrayal of the crowd, Maughan-Brown states that even if the “sympathy [...] for the plight of the oppressed black individual is beyond question”, it is “forfeited as soon as the individual engages in collective action” (8). Therefore, the authors’ treatment of the racial crowd, although anti-racist and liberal, participates in fostering “white fears of the black crowd, and thereby reinforces, at the ‘cultural’ level, ideological justifications for racial domination” (18). Therefore, it remains complicit with the government’s repression. Maughan-Brown relocates the focus on class struggle to race, but does fairly attribute primacy to the crowd or its portrayal in literature.

The works reviewed for this research indicate the relevance and possibility of including crowds in literary readings. Plus, echoes of Freud and Le Bon in the works

reviewed prove the prevalence of their views. However, the discourse of individualism, the same that has distanced crowds from literary criticism, is seemingly dominant in some of the works reviewed. Moreover, the crowd is rarely analysed as a focal point. Authors' perceptions dominate, and in the rare occasions where the individual frame of literary scholarship is surpassed, the collective is caught in the web of social stratification, certainly significant to both crowds and power, but remarkably blurring the presence of equally important issues. The novels selected for this study offer detailed depictions of the crowds and their ties to power. Yet, except for *The Scarlet Letter* which Mills (1986) includes in his book, their evident portrayals of crowds are seemingly neglected. Plus, they have never been subject to comparison.

The following thesis aspires to read the crowd and its immersion in power dynamics in the selected works. It tries to attribute precedence to the crowd by establishing a tie between its psychological predispositions and power terrains. It essays to inspect its revolutionary potential, antagonism to intellectuals, servility to leaders, and violent actions within a frame of manipulative schemes. By giving prominence to crowds in the analysis, one reverses the classical literary conflict (Man versus Society) to access it conversely. Instead of the individualistic frame that elaborates on the crowds' 'victims' from their standpoints, the psychology of the masses constituting the three narratives is stressed. This is achieved by means of comparative reading. The comparative stance conforms to the major theoretical framework of the research: Le Bon and Freud. Their observations stem from a universal paradigm that proffers historical and racial transcendence. The works selected, being from three different continents, portraying crowds with different cultural and even political backgrounds, are suitable for a comparative reading.

To achieve the said purpose, this thesis relies principally on Gustave Le Bon's and Sigmund Freud's theses on Crowd/Group Psychology. The cross-historical comparison Hawthorne achieves in his narrative reveals a stagnant profile. The puritan crowd that victimises Hester replicates the same mental construction of the ancestors he describes in the frame narrative. This extends to quasi-identical portrayals in Orwell and Achebe. Sighele's accusation of Le Bon to have plagiarised his work is significant (42). The similitude between pioneers of Crowd Psychology is dictated by the comparable manifestation of collective traits. Freud's work rarely spots differences between Le Bon, his predecessors, and even compeers. Thus, Le Bon is opted in this research not for the singularity of his ideas, but for the popularity of his work which enhances chances of influence in the literary composition of Orwell and Achebe. Freud, however, is included for his major contribution on the libidinal charges that differentiate individuals from groups. In analysing the process of attachment and detachment of crowds and intellectuals, Freud offers an original lens that supplements Le Bon's docile descriptions of crowds. However, this research is not exclusively limited to the said theorists. The analysis to be carried in this thesis will be assisted by an eclectic approach which couples Le Bon/Freud with other theorists.

In order to examine the literary rendering of crowds and the ties it postulates with power, the first chapter of this thesis deems a Bakhtinian reading necessary. It enables one to abide by the literary scope of the research while exploring the notion of liberation from political powers. In addition, issues of leadership and failure of the intellectual will also be addressed in the second chapter. In order to re-engage with the public role of intellectuals more realistically, one is compelled to deviate from their idealistic perception. In fact, the idealisation imposed on intellectuals is restrictive. By assuming the radical revolutionary mantle that is capable of challenging systems and

ending always victorious, one neglects a more intricate power that is often hard to contest. More realistically, the ‘exaggerated’ influence assigned to intellectuals is simply predictive. For Russell, while intellectuals are seen to perform changes, “they merely have been foreseeing them a little sooner than the rest” (491). Thus, “[t]he man who appears influential is merely the one who sees the change coming a little sooner and so he is thought to have caused it” (493). This capacity to predict changes is what generates the admiration of the characters. Readers, intoxicated by the deafness of the majority to blatant truth, finally find those intellectuals who share their views on the events. This perspicacity often imposes a role to change to which these characters are not equipped. The assessment of the protagonists takes a realistic approach in dissecting the reasons behind their failure. Aware of this exaggerated position imposed on the intellectual, concrete analysis of the political infirmity will be highlighted through a discussion of Freud’s libido, Weber’s Charismatic Leadership, and Rancière’s ‘Stultification’. Finally, the subject of collective and political violence is addressed in the third chapter by relying on Zizek, Benjamin, Agamben, and Gelderloos. This combination allows one to inspect how power structures maintain violence as an asset instead of fighting it. Different conceptions of violence will be tackled to investigate the reasons behind the impotence of the crowd’s action.

Chapter One:

***Rendering the Many-Headed Monster: The
Merits/Limits of Novelising Crowd Psychology
through Carnivalesque and Grotesque Writing***

I- Chapter One: Rendering the Many-Headed Monster: The Merits/Limits of Novelising Crowd Psychology through Carnavalesque and Grotesque Writing

Introduction

An intended study of the crowd necessitates delving into its psychological nature and tracing the genesis of the phenomena. It principally targets the portrayal of the crowd in the selected novels in accordance with the collective mentality that has been elucidated in accounts of Crowd Psychology. Hawthorne, Orwell, and Achebe manifest acquaintance with the unique traits that accompany the birth of the crowd and govern its behaviour as distinct from the individual. The literary works which compose the corpus of this thesis exhibit a familiarity with the psychology of the masses comparable to the theoretical accounts relied on in the study. In order to reflect on the literary rendering of crowds in these works and avoid a pretentious psychological/sociological account insufficiently applied on fictive entities, further reliance on the carnivalesque and grotesque is presumed adequate for this task. This stems from the observation that an authorial resort to these modes of writing is noticed whenever crowds come to occupy the novelistic space. If these authors have been approached from the perspective of the carnivalesque and grotesque, their sharp rendering of collective and popular traits is infrequent in this regard. Hawthorne, Orwell, and Achebe partially deviate from their dominant style to carnivalesque and grotesque writing as soon as an agglomeration is presented.

The archetypal image the ‘many-headed monster’ bears different dimensions. Apart from the impact it has had on the denigrating reception of the crowd, it is representative of facets that are relevant to the subject of the present study. It encapsulates the different ideas presented in Crowd Psychology and furnishes an example of carnivalesque/grotesque writing that characterises the literary portrayals of

the crowd. From the perspective of Crowd Psychology, the image of the many-headed monster sketches the dimension of multitude/multiplicity that shapes the birth of the collective mind, suggests the impulsive nature of crowds and their liability to suggestion and contagion, and declares the monstrosity relevant to the primitive and unconscious tempers of the masses. Equally, the same image bears a carnivalistic and grotesque facet conveyed through the poetics of chaos, excess, and terror that do confront readers as soon as a crowd presents itself. Thus, in its philosophical and literary trope, the subject of the crowd is inherently relevant to both theoretical approaches employed in this chapter.

Added to that, the choice of the carnivalesque and grotesque to be coupled with Crowd Psychology allows one to explore an angle that reigns equally supreme in the orientation of this research. The three novels tackled in this thesis outline close ties between the carnival, the grotesque, crowds, and power. Hawthorne evokes images of punishment and celebration that inspire public perversion. Orwell draws a minute description of oligarchic practices that are inseparable from the existence of crowds and their manipulation, and Achebe portrays the rise of populist politics and the role played by the masses. The Bakhtinian thesis discusses potential emancipatory premises from power systems. However, the profile of the crowd and its pertinent relevance to carnivalistic and grotesque ambience revisit Bakhtinian claims about the virtues of Carnivalesque/Grotesque. In order to reach this 'revisionary stage', the chapter discusses recurrent psychological traits that accompany the emergence of the crowd, spots their projections onto the corpus, establishes ties between these traits and those of the carnivalesque, engages with a review about the aptitude of the carnival to negotiate power, and finally supports the review with manifestations of grotesque elements that corroborate the revisionist stance expressed towards Bakhtin.

1.1 The Marketplace Mentality: Intersections between Crowd Psychology and the Spirit of the Carnival

The selection of the three works assumes a joint authorial scrutiny of the collective body. This authorial interest in inspecting crowds places the novels in a position where popular judgments, tastes, and actions are central to the narrative act. Hawthorne, as early as his 'Custom House', the frame narrative of the novel, infuses hints about the position of the masses in American history and their relevance to the federal and republican conflict. Faithful to his foundational narrative, the exposition of the story invites the reader to contemplate a 'throng' of men and women coalescing before a prison door. Hawthorne announces the collective facet of human agglomeration and the ties between the public gaze and the penal system. The crowd before the prison door heralds and frames the focal point of the story; it demands its own conception of justice by abusing an already convicted victim. Comparably, Orwell's *1984* depicts a dystopian world reliant on the presence of the masses. Despite its dictatorial nature and the stability it tries to propagate, the Party is on the verge of collapse if crowds are excluded. The existence of the oligarchic system is disrupted if people desert the equation of political power. Crowds are essential to formulate the mechanisms of power as O'Brien instructs Winston: "power is collective [...] [and] power is power over human beings" (270). Equally, Achebe's opening chapter contextualises the story. It is not gratuitous that the depiction of crowds, their reactions, and glimpses of their psychology represent the backbone of the story. After a remark made about the popular perception of Nanga and the amicable ties he maintains with the public as 'a man of the people', the narrator confesses the following: "I have to admit this from the onset or else the story I'm going to tell will make no sense" (1). This narrative confession is pivotal; the work derives its meaning from the presence of the crowds at its core. With his sharp eye as a novelist, Achebe offers an account of Nigeria with a crowd back in

his mind. Part of the instability announced in the cover, ‘a novel of political unrest in a new nation’, is tied to the emergence of populist politics and the participation of crowds in its dissemination.

With this shared interest, the collective nature, which is central to the narrative construction, imposes its own psychological rules in the novels. The agents that animate the novelistic space are deprived of their individualities. Once the “collective mind” reigns, the individuals “feel, think, and act in a manner” different from their feeling, thoughts, and acts in “isolation” (Le Bon 27). The traits that signal the transition from individual to collective psychology reappear throughout the discussion of the chapter. Among them, chief reference is made to unconsciousness, invincibility, low intellect, contagion, and suggestion. However, these traits are not comfortably retrieved from the corpus. Generally, readers are thrust into the psychological realm of collectivity without prior reference to the individual state of the members that form the crowd. This absence precludes readers from tracing changes that occur to individuals once immersed in a group. In addition, the three stories offer detached narrative perspectives. This detachment underlines a narrative resistance to the suggestions of the unconscious that dominate those events. The sense of collectivity destabilises narrators; therefore, an uncanny narrative perception of collective psychological symptoms is communicated to the reader. Narrators, and by extension readers, enter the realm of Crowd Psychology with full individual consciousness. The conscious narrative act engenders confrontation with a territory that is psychologically alien and remote from individual experiences.

However, there are conceptual and narrative details that relate the transfer from individual idiosyncrasies to the collective mind. With the birth of the crowd, individuals are subject to a radical change that eclipses their individual traits; “the transformation is so profound as to change the miser into a spendthrift, the sceptic into a believer, the

honest man into a criminal, and the coward into a hero” (Le Bon 33). With this being said, one spots characters who are “induced to commit acts contrary to [their] most obvious interests and [their] best-known habits” (32). The correspondence between the general rigidity of the puritan individual character and that of the crowd eclipses the transition from individuality to collectivity. The absence of a radical shift fosters the plausibility of this suggestion. The puritan community, too rigid and obdurate, displays during Hester’s punishment a character closer to the disposition of its members individually. Offered as a throng, the reader cannot access the individual peculiarities of the people forming the crowd. However, two notable instances clarify this shift. Governor Bellingham’s “rigid and severe” persona contradicts “the appliances of worldly enjoyment” which he procures in his private attic (85). The Governor has a “taste for all good and comfortable things” that opposes the austere principles of the Puritan character (85). Thus, despite how “stern he might show himself in the pulpit, or in his public reproof” of transgressions, there is a “genial benevolence [that dominates] his private life” (85). Equally, the General of the Custom House joins Bellingham in his anthropophilous proclivity. They are both revealed, individually, as refined botanical aesthetes. Their fondness with floral beauty contradicts their violent past as participants, even leading figures, in multiple wars and massacres. Within the spirit of the moment, traits that constitute their individual personalities retreat and other personality attributes appear in accordance with the temperament of the crowd.

Further instances of departure from the individual to the collective are divulged if one focuses on characters who show intellectual excellence. Le Bon argues that, “it is stupidity and not mother-wit” which reigns among crowds, and the “abyss” that is intellectually existent among individuals is subject to deletion, for the judgments of “an assembly of men of distinction [...] are not sensibly superior to the decisions that would

be adopted by a gathering of imbeciles” (29). With the regression in intellect, the intellectual becomes equal to the “ignoramus” (42). The regressive process that operates among crowds neutralises the intelligence of ‘refined’ minds of let alone laymen. The intellectual regression is but a signal of the collective forces that absorb individuals. It is a phase in which those who excel intellectually adopt and are absorbed by the collective mind. Reverend John Wilson is initially introduced as “a man of kind and genial spirit” and developed “intellectual gifts” (Hawthorne 53). Based on this description, one expects Mr. Wilson to either display his affable character to sympathise with Hester, or to rely on his intellectually sharp personality and refuse participation in a legal process turned into ridicule before the eyes of the public. Had he been left to his individual peculiarities, he would, possibly, have pronounced a different view on Hester’s case. However, Mr. Wilson shares with the crowd he addresses the same abuse towards Hester. He prepares and delivers a speech on sin in which he perceives Hester as its incarnation. Opposed to Wilson’s immersion in the collective and symbolic perception of Hester, the bond-servant who, being alien to the place as a new resident in the colony detached from the collective mind of the public and its symbolic sphere, interprets the scarlet letter with a different perception. He judges from Hester’s “air” and “glittering symbol in her bosom that she was a great lady in the land” (82). Unlike the crowd which attaches the scarlet letter to the sin and even hallucinates about it, the servant thinks of Hester an upper-class lady wearing an accessory of extravagance. The different interpretations show how Wilson’s perception is tethered to that of the crowd in spite of his intellectual sharpness while that of the servant is autonomous despite the intellectual modesty that is assumed in his case.

The same is traced in *1984* where Orwell reveals the force of contagion and the alteration from humanity to savagery in subjects supposedly immune to the suggestions

of the collective. Le Bon postulates that among crowds “every sentiment and act is contagious” (30), to the extent that the individual loses his autonomy and becomes “a grain of sand amid other grains of sand, which the wind stirs up at will” (32-33). The Two Minutes Hate captures immersion into a shared, unconscious, and impulsively unrestrained expression of fury. The ritual of hate escalates “to a frenzy” with participants captured jumping and yelling furiously. Obeying the rules of contagion and suggestion, a “hideous ecstasy” of terror and revenge, of torture and murder circulates among the participants “like an electric current”, and “an abstract, undirected emotion [of rage] which could be switched from one object to another like the flame of a blowlamp” metamorphoses every member “against one’s will into a grimacing, screaming lunatic” (21). Orwell declares that the gruesome aspect of the ritual is that one is not compelled “to act a part, but, on the contrary, that it was impossible to avoid joining in” (21). This is shown in Winston’s involuntary participation. Even if he is detached from the party and secretly abhors its principles, he “could not help sharing in the general delirium” by yelling along with the others and violently slamming his heel against his chair (23). Similarly, O’Brien is offered as a member of the Inner Party who shows intellectual traits exceeding his peers. However, matching the excitement of other party members, O’Brien is portrayed with his face flushing and his “chest swelling and quivering as though he were standing up to the assault of a wave” (20). The intellectual ascendancy and significant detachment recede into the background during their participation in the Two Minutes Hate to epitomise instances of helplessness in front of contagious and suggestive sentiments.

Syme conveys a more radical case in spite of his intellectual profile as an expert of the Newspeak. With his immersion in the collective, he desists from humanity and embraces monstrous savagery that conforms to Le Bon’s observation that, by

immersion in a group, an individual's cultural and intellectual refinements leave space to a "barbarian [...] creature acting by instinct [...] possesses[ing] the spontaneity, the violence, the ferocity [...] of primitive beings" (32). Syme incarnates this image; he "would talk with a disagreeable gloating satisfaction" of savage air attacks on civilians and brutal acts of torture and elimination inside the Ministry of Love (56). More clearly, he derives a sadist gratification from attending public executions. He tells Winston "I think it spoils it when they tie their feet together. I like to see them kicking. And above all, at the end, the tongue sticking right out, and blue—a quite bright blue. That's the detail that appeals to me" (56). Syme's elaboration on the public trial reveals the savagery and sadist attitude of the crowd that permeates the 'legal' punishment. The 'venomous orthodoxy' that Syme inherits from the crowd transforms his character radically.

Similarly, the endemic nature of the collective contaminates Odili and Andrew whose character composition, like Winston, is framed upon significant detachment from the crowd. During Nanga's reception at Anata School, Odili finds himself attracted to Nanga. Later in the novel, during his visit to Nanga's house, Odili is captured partially excusing Nanga about the impact of luxurious commodities on him. As he declares, "on that first night there was no room in my mind for criticism. I was simply hypnotized by the luxury of the great suite assigned to me" (34). He confesses "that if I were at that moment made a minister I would be most anxious to remain one for ever" (34). Odili tries to philosophise this intrusive thought. He refers to "man's basic nature" to cling to the abrupt comfortable change if he rises "overnight from poverty and insignificance to [...] opulence" like Nanga (34). In spite of the validity of this pondering, Odili becomes equally immersed in the complicit popular perception that tolerates corruption. Like the crowd, he is drawn to the luxury exhibited by the leading class, and though phrased in

refined and philosophical manners, simply excuses them with an irrelevant justification. Similarly, Andrew, who is introduced as an intellectual, abstains from supporting Odili's protest against the ridiculing queue to receive the minister. Because of "[p]rimitive loyalty" that groups Nanga and Andrew in the same village (7), he fails to express his opinion. Following the reception, his private discussion with Odili describes Nanga as "empty-headed" (21). This particular event reveals the contrast between an individual immersed in a crowd and when enjoying his individual peculiarities.

To further project the collective traits onto the corpus, one is compelled to resort to a misogynist dimension that envelops the work of Le Bon and is noticeably present in the corpus. In highlighting the major characteristics that govern the mind of the crowd, Le Bon advances an analogy that is partially problematic. He lists the "incapacity to reason, the absence of judgment and of the critical spirit, [and] the exaggeration of the sentiments" as collective traits comparably found among "beings belonging to inferior forms of evolution" like "women, savages, and children" (35-36). In his introduction "The Ambivalences of Le Bon's *The Crowd*", Merton lists Le Bon's view on women "as weak and acquiescent, unreasoning and unreasonable, given to impulse and therefore thoroughly unstable and capricious, deprived of morality, and altogether but not unpleasantly inferior to man" among the ideological defects that contaminate the work (xxxviii). Le Bon's sexist conjecture was pervasive at his time, and to a certain extent, is still in circulation. Interestingly, the novels inherit from this misogynist conception, though not directly from Le Bon, to intensify some of the psychological traits of the crowd.

Hawthorne accentuates the emotional facet of the agglomeration by populating his crowd with women. In a side note, the narrator hints at the emotional dimension that overrules the event by relating that women take more interest in Hester's punishment.

With equal implicitness, Achebe populates his first crowded scene with a group of women dancers. In addition, the song of Grammar-phone accounts for an emotional penchant and inferior intellect. Instead of focusing on Nanga's intellectual and personal merits, and his public service to the community, she praises Nanga's radiant outer looks in her song. Orwell, however, is more explicit by maintaining a misogynist judgment throughout the novel. At the sight of the little sandy-haired woman during the climax of the Two Minutes Hate, Winston's overt judgment is announced: "It was always the women, and above all the young ones, who were the most bigoted adherents of the Party, the swallows of slogans, the amateur spies and nosers-out of unorthodoxy" (17). Women's liability to the propaganda of the party is perfectly incarnated in Winston's wife. Katherine symbolises the low intellect and contagion to grasp whatever the party dictates. She has, Winston relates, "the most stupid, vulgar, empty mind that he had ever encountered" that consumes every "imbecility" preached by the party (73). Winston feels suspicious almost with every female character who embodies traits of the crowd and predicts his fall by a "nosing zealot" female who would detect his ink-stained fingers and would denounce him (34). Similar to this, Orwell highlights the openness of crowds to contagion through a woman from the proles. While in Mr. Charrington's room, Winston hears a woman repeating a song produced by the party's Music department. Orwell highlights the crowds' susceptibility to contagion by capturing the performance of this woman.

The traits and analogies highlighting the general forces that sway crowds announce the emergence of a different world. The narrators, as highlighted already, perceive those events from a conscious angle that estranges the conduct of the crowds. This estrangement is interpreted in narrative descriptions that repetitively offer those events as performative spectacles. Hawthorne's first human agglomeration appearing

before the prison door is labelled as a “crowd of spectators” waiting to attend a show (45). With their inquisitive presence, the event turns, “with a whole people, drawn forth as to a festival” (51). This festivity is equally remarked in Hawthorne’s second major event, the New England Holiday, “a play-day for the whole world” (177), attended by a “press of spectators” (191). Similarly, Orwell’s Hate Week is referred to as “a tremendous show” (62), the public execution of prisoners as a “popular spectacle” (30), and the ‘great purges’ and ‘public trials’ of people accused of treason as rare, “special show-pieces” (51). Achebe’s novel stresses a corresponding nature. The reception of Nanga by the villagers is commented as a “ridiculous festival” (2). Correspondingly, the dispute between the minister of finance and the entire house inside the parliament is commented on as an “unedifying spectacle” (6). The sense of carnival that accompanies the formation of human agglomerations circulates around the spectacle dimension that is ascribed to the major scenes of the three novels. This signals a departure from the mundane to a carnivalistic realm which surpasses mere qualification of those events as spectacles, and rather announces a ‘world turned upside down’. As soon as the collective takes over, the spirit of the carnival ensues.

In its basic definition, the carnivalesque entails a reversal of orders, norms, perceptions, and roles. The carnival is a “temporary liberation from the prevailing truth and from the established order [...] [typified by] the suspension of all hierarchical rank, privileges, norms, and prohibitions” (*Rabelais* 10). It entails “change” and “renewal” while maintaining a “hostile [stance] to all that was immortalized and completed” (10). The Bakhtinian thesis of the carnival prescribes an eradication of hierarchical “inequality” during “official feasts” and suspension of “norms of etiquette and decency” to favour an experience of rebirth celebrated against imposed order (10). Bakhtin’s carnivalesque is abridged in his motto, ‘a world turned upside down’. If one follows this

assumption and closely examines the nature of crowds, links are naturally established. The psychology of crowds is itself based on a reversal of individual traits. It captures backward movements, from conscious to unconscious, from logic to low intellect, and from humane to primitive. In his reflection on the agents that populate the carnival, Bakhtin advances thoughts comparable to Le Bonian and Freudian observations on Crowd Psychology. The ontological organisation of the carnivalesque crowd entails a holistic experience of their existence and engenders a feeling of being “an indissoluble part of the collectivity” (255). It results in a social and political organisation that is exclusive to this feeling and is “outside of and contrary to all existing forms of the coercive socioeconomic and political organization, which is suspended for the time of the festivity” (255). Bakhtin’s view reiterates the remarks stated in Crowd Psychology. The sense of equality that emanates from the suspension of hierarchies is also found in Le Bon’s thought. What Bakhtin advances as an ideal momentary eradication of boundaries is, according to Le Bon, a psychological manifestation of the collective that engenders a prevailing feeling of unity (24). The tolerance and acceptance felt towards dissenters or people of lower stratum is an expression of this unity. In group formation, Freud argues, “intolerance vanishes, temporarily or permanently” while “individuals behave as though they were uniform, tolerate other people’s peculiarities, put themselves on an equal level with them, and have no feeling of aversion towards them” (56). This hierarchical alteration momentarily redrafts norms and signals the prevalence of carnivalistic spirit. If dignified persons join laymen in the spectacles highlighted above it is because there is a remarkable descent into the cognitive order that is interpreted by Bakhtin as a socio-political movement. The spectacle/carnival brings characters who excel, either intellectually or hierarchically, closer to the masses.

The carnivalistic sense of equality emanates during the New England Holiday. Despite the general rigidity of the puritan character, the “picture of human life in the market-place [...] was yet enlivened by some diversity of hue” (180). The scene is diversified with Indians in their savage attires and wild aspect who are exceptionally allowed into the public space on this day. It is a moment of equality in which those from the margins participate. Hierarchies and differences are abolished as to allow centre of the colony to mingle with the periphery. In addition, one describes the “rough-looking desperadoes” smoking and drinking publicly “transgress[ing], without fear or scruple, the rules of behavior that were binding on all others” (181). Even morality is violated and impiety invades the public space for the mariners are not imposed but tolerated with the puritan benign smile. Exceptionally, frontiers and ideals are eradicated, and the fashion of extravagance is tolerated and manifested in the special code of clothing.

Similarly, the ritual of the Two Minutes Hate is a moment in which everyone is supposed to participate; the members of outer party mingle with the inner party. Equally, public executions noticeably group proles with party members in their voyeuristic act. This similitude is but a reflection of vanishing differences. In addition, this moment highlights the fall of ideals. Vulgarity prevails and the chastity that is attached to female party members is abolished momentarily when one of the women is captured cursing. Achebe’s novel reflects similar accounts in which the masses are constituted of politicians, artists, intellectual, and laymen. More than that, the eradication of boundaries is highlighted in the village of Anata. This latter gains a carnivalistic dimension which accounts for an amalgamation of different spheres, notably the traditional and the modern, the Christian and the African. The return from the city to the village for celebration highlights an unexpected digression. While it is supposed to be symbolically a return to the roots, it is reflective of Christian celebration

merged with traditional elements. With the presence of “holidaying students”, referred to among villagers as “holiday-makers” (91), the reader can spot boys in the cultural patchwork merging traditional clothing and masked dances with European style. This amalgamation, being directly a consequence of colonialism, is left uncommented by Achebe to relate the state of affairs relevant to the carnivalesque.

The manifestation of carnival is mostly experienced in the marketplace (Bakhtin 255). Interestingly, Hawthorne, more than Orwell and Achebe, conforms to the demands of the carnival. Attentive to crowd mentality, Hawthorne announces the site that hosts the fusion of Crowd Psychology and Carnivalesque. He devotes a chapter to the marketplace and locates major scenes in it. *The Scarlet Letter* foregrounds the centrality of the marketplace during two principal events. Both Hester’s punishment and the New England Holiday advance the site as the centre of colony. Bakhtin’s insistence on the marketplace as a specific location can be approached from a historical perspective. Bakhtin’s carnival inherits from middle ages practices, and therefore, choice was limited in terms of public spaces. The same can be said about the setting of *The Scarlet Letter* which rarely finds a referential public site to host the events of the story. Accordingly, one cannot negate the presence of other spatial forms that fulfil Bakhtin’s primal remark about the marketplace, and ultimately the carnival: the sense of collectivity, unity, and equality. In *1984* and *A Man of the People* marketplace scenes are not abundant. However, even if the site is not spatially focalised, equal attention is paid to public spaces that fulfil the same collective, and consequently carnivalistic function and manifestations. Within these sites, insights of crowd psychology are novelized through the narrative shifts appropriate to the mood of the marketplace. Bakhtin insists on the marketplace as a site that goes beyond the official and equips people with an unprecedented trait of unity and power. Looked at from the prism of the

psychological formation of the people, the same traits displayed in Hawthorne's marketplace are traced in the other novels even if the site does dominate the works. The world can be turned upside down beyond the perimeters of the marketplace.

The carnival issues a new order of power which mediates and solidifies the centrality of the crowd. With the dominance of the carnivalistic spirit, 'the way of the people' as Bakhtin puts it (*Rabelais* 255), crowds acquire a sense of invincibility (Le Bon 30). Bakhtin proposes the carnival as an opportunity of un/crowning. For him, the "all-annihilating and all-renewing" nature of the carnival is entailed in "decrowning", which stands as the "primary carnivalistic act" that guarantees "the pathos of shifts and changes, of death and renewal" (*Dostoyevsky*, 124). Acts of uncrowning are facilitated by the empowering feeling of the collective. Feeling invincible, the crowd engages in explicit negotiation of power that promises reform.

In *The Scarlet Letter*, the reversal of orders and norms culminates in an exceptional, momentary critique expressed against the leading body. The women, and by extension the crowd attending the trial, find the magistrates who inflicted the punishment to be excessively "merciful" making the punishment ineffectual (42). With this comment, these women allow themselves to criticize the 'representative of god on earth'. In a puritan setting, the magistrates and church men incarnate the word of god and rigidity of the puritanism. They are never contested and their views are respected. However, as soon as the punishment is declared, this sustained position is questioned, contested, and ridiculed. The women rebuke the light punishment inflicted upon Hester. Such a view held by the public, simple as it seems, reverses the patterns of power. In their sceptical attitude to the punishment, the women envisage a substitution of power mechanisms. They conceive themselves as women "of mature age and church-members in good repute", capable of inflicting a more serious 'judgment' on the "malefactresses"

such as Hester than the “sentence [that] the worshipful magistrates have awarded” (42). This act of critique directed towards the leading people is inherent to the spontaneous gathering of human beings. Conforming to the nature of the carnivalesque and the collective mind, the women feel equipped with an unprecedented power which allows them to debase hierarchies and reverse power. Instead of being ruled, they symbolically repeal the punishment inflicted by the magistrates and constitute a counterpower. This symbolic stance taken by the crowd is concretised during the New England holiday. The leading body seeks validation from the people as they proceed before them.

Such overt scenes of redefining power dynamics can be compared to less indirect instances in *1984* and *A Man of the People*. Although crowds are explicitly hegemonised in these two works, the strings of power are slightly amended. The carnivalistic rituals reverse power dynamics to grant the ruled a moment of participation in power. In spite of the blatant oppression to which the masses of *1984* are subjected, they are given moments of expressing their hatred towards Goldstein. In addition, just like Hester’s punishment, the prosecution and persecution of the prisoners derive significance from the attendance of crowds. Similarly, Achebe’s masses are seduced and solicited for their votes. The prime minister refuses the plan of the minister of Finance because it imperils their position and the votes of the farmers, being a majority in the post-independence era.

1.2 The Carnival beyond Bakhtin

The epistemic affinity between Crowd Psychology and Bakhtin’s theory is so far unobstructed by any conceptual disparity. However, proceeding with the purpose of uncovering an accurate depiction of crowds entails re-examining some of Bakhtin’s tenets. If the links drawn between the two poles, the carnival and the crowd, are so far consonant, the general profile of the crowd as sketched in *Social Psychology*, confirmed

through observation in reality, and manifestly portrayed in the three novels challenges some conclusions advanced by Bakhtin. It goes without saying that the carnivalesque remains a concept less rigid than its perception and application in academia. Bakhtin's theory is subject to constant reviews and so is the promised liberation it advances, especially when challenged with remarks as concrete as those of Crowd Psychology. For instance, in his revisionist paper "Carnival and Comedy: on Bakhtin's Misreading of Boccaccio", Stevens (2007) declares that the assertion of reversing norms tends "to absolutize the liberating potential of carnival" and which consequently shapes a "too idealized" version of this latter (1). Therefore, seeing the carnival as an entire nullification of societal "conventions, laws, limits and hierarchies [...] is surely too sweeping" (2). With the validity of Bakhtin's thesis being questioned, one should reconsider some of Bakhtin's principles of the carnival.

Certainly, the grip of power is momentarily loosened in all the novels. The manifestation of equality and suspension of hierarchies seems to equip the carnival with a liberating potential as put by Bakhtin. Moreover, the critical tone of the three works imposes alignment with this Bakhtinian principle. Hawthorne portrays the symbolic success of a woman facing a whole community; her success is partly a failure of a theocratic rule. Similarly, Orwell outlines a critique of Oligarchy and denudes an oppressive system. Achebe reflects on the Nigerian post independent phase; the fall of Nanga is a promise of a fall of populist agenda/system. In addition, the antagonistic context in which Bakhtin's work emerged seems to force its liberating premises. Eagleton opines that "Bakhtin pits against that 'official, formalistic and logical authoritarianism,' whose unspoken name is Stalinism" (144). Robert Young derives from this context that *Rabelais and his World*, initially offered as Bakhtin's doctoral thesis, stands as "an attempt at direct political intervention" (78). The hostile relation

with the political regime of Stalin, his exile, the refusal of his doctoral thesis, and the difficulties of its publication are projected onto his theory. The Marxist interest in Bakhtin and the adoption of his different postulations in critical readings coincide with a crisis of internal frictions and intellectual insecurity within the school. Bakhtin's "sociological poetics" offered an escape route from the intellectual "impasse" as a lens offering both theoretical insights and practical methods to surpass "the twin reductionisms of formalist poetics and vulgar marxist sociology" (72). The renewed interest of Marxist literary critics in Bakhtin joins the "consensus that the way forward was back to Bakhtin"; it places *Rabelais and His World* as an epitome of how the literary readings should be performed (72). To Marxists, Bakhtin offers "a reconciliation between poetics and hermeneutics, between questions of form and questions interpretation, in the context of their relation to society and to history" (74). This interest in Bakhtin should signal the core of Critical Theory in uncovering tacit systemic schemes of power. Although the interest in Bakhtin equips this realm with the necessary tools and method, the Bakhtinian notion of carnival seems detached from reality and far from achieving efficient revolutionary effect as it promises. The groundbreaking effect of the theory is limited to the method rather than political effect. This should not nullify its utility altogether. Discussing Bakhtin with Crowd Psychology in the background highlights the core interest of Critical Theory.

Bakhtin's insistence on the radical disentangling force of the carnival eclipses the crux of the link that it establishes between power and the masses. Equally, the projection of his theory with the ruins of its context remains repressive of the fact that the carnival engages in power without violating its general decorum. If one reorients the perspective from the surface content and authors' intentionality, the contextual projection that forces the trajectory of Bakhtin onto his work, and by extension to the

appropriation of his theory as a critical lens, to a reflection on the agents peopling the different scenes of the novels, a deeper reading of the aforementioned events nullifies the democratic values of the carnival. The idealistic/liberating suspension of hierarchies, reversal of power, and participation in power making take a dimension opposed to Bakhtin's utopian project. With the people's psychological profile in mind, the carnival metamorphose into a safe niche to the antitheses of democracy and liberty: Theocracy, Oligarchy, and Populism.

Bakhtin's liberating potential of the carnival is notably derived from his distinction between official and nonofficial events. The carnival is clearly defined "[a]s opposed to official feast" (Bakhtin, 10). The democratic values of the carnival are defined by a clear opposition and levelling of all that holds an official layer. While theorising the carnivalesque as opposed to official festivities, Bakhtin does not offer conclusive insights about this distinction. Apart from the aspired democratic values derived from the carnivalesque, no other foundational distinction is introduced. Even if Bakhtin insists on the aspirations of the Carnival to be "both ideal and real" (10), his distinction between official and unofficial events is only an artificial and utopian aspiration. Actually, the contrast drawn between the official and unofficial is the first seed that dismantles Bakhtin's theory and redefines the democratic/liberating facets of the carnival. Reality prescribes that the official and nonofficial coexist. In fact, Bakhtin's amalgamation of spheres in the carnivalesque includes an inevitable degree of officialisation, and conversely, events of seemingly pure official nature harbour carnivalistic elements. In fact, readers of Bakhtin already acquainted with Rabelais's works and the historical origins of the carnival will find it hard to dissociate the moments of pure unofficial nature that he cites. Correspondingly, Stevens opines that Bakhtin's reference to Boccaccio does not position "a comfortable division between an

‘official’ ordered noncarnival world and carnival as a subversive [frame] [...]; rather it suggests that the carnival and noncarnival worlds are closely interlinked” (2). The inevitable contact with official culture situates the carnival in a problematic position. Robert Young opines that the carnival is inherently inconsistent and contradictory in functions. While it is proposed as “a revolutionary dispersal” of hegemony with “a directly political and anti-ideological function” (76), it simultaneously exists within the contours of official culture. The anti-systemic stance is questioned “by the fact that it is permitted by the state authorities and thus could be said merely to constitute an instance of repressive tolerance” (77). Furthermore, the chaotic nature of the carnival issues lack of discipline and organization. These imperfections further inflate when the profile of the agents peopling the carnival is recalled.

The mingling of the official and unofficial finds way in the spontaneous human gathering that takes a different shape. The moments of relief ideally standing in opposition to the official are seized by an authoritative dimension. For instance, the spontaneity of the people that envelops the opening scenes of *The Scarlet Letter* is challenged by a meticulous protocol to follow. It is not secretive that Hester’s punishment is indeed legally official. As early as the beginning of the work, the reader locates Hester in two penal institutions: the prison and the pillory. Hester proceeds to the pillory of shame while being led by the beadle. This latter emerges as a figure incarnating in “his aspect the whole dismal severity of the Puritanic code of law, which it was his business to administer in its final and closest application to the offender” (43). Further, the site of public shaming is located within the proximity of the church. The presence of the Governor and his retinue accentuates the official aspect of the event. The attendance of these figures to disciplinary sanctions, in all “majesty” and “reverence of rank”, ensures that “the infliction of a legal sentence would have an

earnest and effectual meaning” (46-47). Similarly, the infrequent radical shift observed during the New England Holiday is comparably countered by formal protocols. The delivery of the Election Sermon, which constitutes the core of the day, is preceded by a codified ceremonial order. The scene opens with the military chorus which accords “a higher and more heroic air” to that day, accompanying the procession on the street headed towards the meeting-house “with a slow and stately march” (184). The whole scenery is further officialised with the presence of soldiers who assume “the name and pomp of soldiership” forming the “honorary escort of the procession” (184), and guarding the magistrates, “the men of civil eminence” whose “outward demeanor [...] showed a stamp of majesty that made the warrior’s haughty” (185). All these elements imprint the official layer which complies with an early codified tradition. With the narrator’s description, the spectacle enters the realm of the official with these legal protocols. The spontaneity of the people attending Hester’s penalty and the jollity of the New England Holiday tempt readers into uncovering the probability of the Bakhtinian principle of liberation. However, they are confronted with the omnipresence of the official.

Comparable formalities are traced in *1984* and *A Man of the People*. Both the Two Minutes Hate and the Hate Week are rigid rituals which are further monitored with official protocols. The Two Minutes Hate specifies seating arrangement and sequencing of visuals on the telescreen. On daily basis, every detail is planned leaving nothing unattended to chance. Equally, arduous, official preparations of speeches, parades, and rehearsal assemblies precede the Hate Week under the supervision of party agents. The public executions are not a different case; they feature as momentous public events convoyed by the forces of the party. Such rituals fall directly within the responsibilities of the major ministries of Oceania. In Achebe’s novel, Nanga arrives to Anata School

with an extensive motorcade escorting him. The students and teachers, the principal actors of the carnival, form a large queue to “mount a guard of honour” during Nanga’s reception (7). To further dignify the minister, traditional hunters and dancers perform a show reserved to unique occasions. These meticulous protocols dismantle the idea of an absolute spontaneity apt to counter political power. Protocols indicate a major force that orchestrates, channels, and manipulates the agents of the carnival. One can plausibly argue that these protocols are reflective of an official nature against which Bakhtin defines his carnivalesque. However, this comes with an erroneous denial of the exuberance of the people and air of festivity that is noticed. The aspiration of tracing moments of pure non-official nature is but a utopian attempt too fictive to be achieved. It is implausible to neglect the ties that any existing system establishes with the masses. Even within the circle of the unofficial, tacit bonds to power exist. The discordance between the two realms is artificial. Bakhtin advances the two poles as inherently irreconcilable while the dialogical process he proposes dictates coexistence. In addition, the un/official nature neither gives birth to crowd nor handicaps its emergence; rather, it is the psychological predisposition that forms psychological groups, and consequently, a carnivalistic air. The carnivalesque is an aesthetic resort which captures the psychological nature of the crowd, and yet remains limited in the promise of liberty it postulates. Thus, the moment of the promised liberation turns into an event which maintains hierarchy through protocol.

In fact, a closer reading of the clothing code which suggests the joyous atmosphere of the carnival spirit and announces the emergence of different norms widens gaps and validates hierarchies. In *The Scarlet Letter*, Hester’s craft with her needle, which is usually incompatible with the simplicity of rigid puritans, is nonetheless exhibited in official ceremonies. Hester’s hand-made clothes penetrate “the

sable simplicity [...] [of] the Puritanic modes of dress [...] [with] an infrequent call for the finer productions of her handiwork” (65-66). However, the outcast of the public is solicited for her handcraft to appear only during public consecrations to lend “majesty” and “magnificence” exclusively “allowed to individuals dignified by rank or wealth, even while sumptuary plebeian laws forbade these and similar extravagances” (66). In Achebe’s novel, the difference is clearly shown. The plainness of the villagers’ looks is countered by Nanga’s luxurious robes, silky “damask and gold chains” (7), and his wife’s velvet-made, “grandly matriarchal” outfit and “delta-shaped Japanese fans” (130). In 1984, however, the clothing code is not annexed to specific events. Yet it is reflective of hierarchical and social distinction. Party members are distinguished from proles through the uniforms they wear. Even inside the party, differences between the inner and outer members, or leagues and unions are implied in the distinct colours and accessories. Clothing, then, functions as ‘Cultural Capital’, a signifier of the class to which one belongs (Bourdieu *Distinction* 77). Instead of indicating reversal and suspension of social order, it turns out to sustain it. Though the exceptional clothing code is generally a sign of festivity that accords a carnivalistic dimension, it fails even symbolically and temporarily to unite the leaders with the masses. Unlike Bakhtin’s promise to equip the lower class with carnival digressions, exceptions in the festive mode of the carnival are reserved to the higher ranks. Instead of symbolic and only a short-lived moment of reversal, the carnival solidifies the social distinctions and maintains hierarchies.

In addition, a major point that needs to be discussed with regards to Bakhtin’s distinction between official ceremonies and carnival is linked to the utilitarian capstone of each. Official ceremonies maintain order while carnivals eradicate this orderly, hierarchical system. Still, while the culmination of the official is practically sensed, that

of carnivals is never really achieved. If one contemplates the crowds of the three novels, an issue that directly counters any liberating force to the carnival ensues. One needs attending to basic needs before one can “philosophize” or revolt (Chiang 58). Crowds are placed at the lower levels of Maslow's pyramid. Apart from the austere and ascetic lifestyle, deliberately adopted by the puritans but largely preached by the religious institution, the crowds of Orwell and Achebe do not surpass the stage of aspiring to secure basic needs. The systems fabricate shortages of different sorts to invest in their low status and do not aspire to elevate the conditions of their quotidian life. They are held within the limits of *Panem et Circenses*; their immersion in events of carnivalistic defers their fulfilment as conscious and rebelling subjects. In this regard, Bakhtin clearly asserts that the carnival is *momentary* in nature which invites us to contemplate on the possibility of manipulation. The ‘temporary’ in Bakhtin’s theory corroborates the idea of illusionary reversal. It is short-lived and only symbolic. At a concrete level, the conditions in which the masses are held are the same preceding and following the carnival. If examined closely, every project of improving the lives of the people is delayed. In this way, Bakhtin’s promise turns into a rhetorical strategy that consumes the energy of the crowds. Instead of offering a counter-discursive space, it develops a space in which a semblance of equality emanates while a delayed plan holds crowds in their perpetual condition.

Furthermore, Bakhtin’s formula of the carnival advances it as the ‘people’s second life’. It operates outside official temporality. However, the daily/monthly/annual temporal pause experienced during the carnival in which everyone leaves the self aside to be engaged in collective activities concertises Eagleton’s ‘official licence’ rather than the claim of a ‘second life’: “Carnival, after all, is a licensed affair in every sense, a permissible rupture of hegemony, a contained popular blow-off as disturbing and

relatively ineffectual as a revolutionary work of art” (“Wittgenstein’s Friends” 148). It is in fact a temporal interruption granted by the state. Most of the events entail the closing of official institutions to indoctrinate younger generations. Hester’s punishment grants an early dismissal to school children, and the chapter on the New England Holiday is but a temporal suspension which validates rule. Similarly, Orwell suspends all individual activities to participate in collective ones, and Nanga adjourns the functioning of an educational institution to host his reception. Though this temporal pause deceives readers and crowds respectively with the illusion of power, it remains in essence an official permit allocated by the system to the agents of the carnival. Therefore, the ‘moment of relief’ as Bakhtin puts it is an official licence.

Moreover, with a closer inspection, time does not culminate to offer the aspired liberation. Although the moments of the carnival suspend temporality, there is no fulfilment of relief for crowds. Instead, stagnation reigns. *The Scarlet Letter* draws on an apocalyptic plot; a noticeable movement to the day of judgement takes place. For the attendees, everything is suspended until the punishment takes place. However, the rest of the novel relates a continuous retribution that holds both the victim and the crowd within this apocalyptic temporality. The crowds of *1984* and *A Man of the People* are captives of a historical stagnation. They are seized in inactivity; none of their actions results in establishing subversive plans. Within these temporal contours, the carnivalistic spirit or its spectacle dimension is not nullified. The carnivalesque dominates to contaminate the quotidian but its premise of liberation is neutralised. Contrary to the trajectory of the carnival drawn by Bakhtin, the promises of liberation and debasement of order/hierarchies are in constant delay. Instead of emancipation, one sees the domination of the carnival and its penetration of the mundane as signs of

stagnation rather than the promised rebirth. Instead of liberation, crowds find themselves living in a daily carnival.

In fact, the historical comparison drawn between the past and the present reveals the essence of stagnation. It is compatible with the stagnant profile of the crowd. The popularity of the three novels is dependent on its cross-temporal quality. The critiques advanced, the portrayals drawn, and the themes discussed remain relevant to different ages. This is partly accomplished by the critical eye with which the novelists capture the essence of crowds to transcend their times. Hawthorne and Orwell execute a historical examination that underlines the static nature of the crowd's profile. Hawthorne establishes links between the present and the past through his frame narrative. The conduct of puritan crowd attending Hester's abuse represents a continuity of the puritan past. By referring to his forefathers, Hawthorne establishes a cross-historical comparison that connects the historical with the fictional. The 'incident' of the Quaker woman, a martyr of the puritan purge, and his reference to Gallows Hill and New Guinea, sites of the public hanging of Salem witch-hunt, connect the historical victims to the fictional heroine, Hester. In Orwell's novel, the historical comparison indicates rupture rather than continuity. Nonetheless, it foregrounds the stagnant profile of the present. Winston's private memories relate a past in which people were conscious, autonomous in thought, acting as individuals rather than masses. The party's propaganda conditions them into collective subjects acting in direct opposition to their human nature. This stasis is the result of the emergence of the collective.

By stressing the profile of the crowd, Bakhtin's neglect of the agents of the carnival entails an additional layer that opposes his distinction between official and nonofficial events. As discussed formerly, crowds are essentially driven by

unconsciousness. The distinction between official and nonofficial nature of the different events requires a degree of awareness and consciousness inherently absent among crowds. The unconscious which dominates the formation of the collective immobilises the possibility of attaining a stage of cognizance that allows clear distinctions. Thus, Bakhtin fails once again to elaborate a coherent link between the aspirations of his carnival and the nature of the agents participating in it. One can plausibly argue that all the events in which manifestations of carnivalistic spirit have been advanced are officially staged. However, circling back to the profile of the agents peopling these events, one should reflect on their unconsciousness and required awareness to spot this dimension. This further dismantles the distinction made by Bakhtin. The direct consequence of agglomerations is a birth of an unconscious personality. Thus, the agents participating in a collective action or event are not aware of distinctions.

Certainly, these events mark an inevitable degree of official manipulation. However, they should not be read as mere systemic manoeuvring that hides the servility of the crowd. Obeying the nature of the collective, the attendees of the events devote exclusive attention to leading figures which secures an indirect continuity of hierarchical order. Instead of an ontological celebration of the ‘people’, the carnival discloses special focalisation on those leaders. For instance, despite the spontaneity, festivity, and chaos that dominate the New England Holiday, Hester explains to Pearl the primary calling of the puritan agglomeration. The erasure of individualism, the infrequent prevalence of mirth, and the suspension of daily schooling and labour among puritans are but an announcement that “a new man is beginning to rule over them” (178). The conversation between the mother and child reveals the essence of the event. In this carnival, everyone leaves his individual self and becomes immersed in a collectivity that grants an unusual air to the puritans in order to appoint a new man.

Similarly, though the collective hysteria of the Two Minutes Hate portrays a radical behaviour among party members, its focal point is the veneration of Big Brother. The attendees mark the end of the ritual with a celebratory “deep, slow, rhythmical chant of ‘B-B! ... B-B!’” (23). It is neither liberation nor reversal that the refrain achieves, but rather “an act of self-hypnosis, a deliberate drowning of consciousness by means of rhythmic noise” (23). Therefore, despite the general atmosphere that suggests a radical turmoil, it remains symptomatic of the excessive nature of crowds and an occasion which, like the chorus adopted by the party members, aggrandises Big Brother. In *A Man of the People*, Nanga’s address at Anata Grammar school preserves the same hierarchical order. Although this carnival deceives the reader into believing in the participation of simple villagers in power creation, it unfolds as a celebration of the minister’s visit. As already highlighted, Grammar Phone, the famous singer, directs her performance to Chief Nanga; her prosodic composition is employed to praise Nanga’s handsome features. Even the performative show of the Hunters which inflames the festivity of the event is devoted to honour Chief Nanga since most of them “reserved their precious powder to greet the Minister's arrival” (2). Thus, the space allocated to the carnival turns into an occasion that publicly heralds “the many virtues” of the Chief Nanga (130). The nature of the crowd strengthens this orientation. When Mr. Nwege extends his tedious talk about his achievements and services to the party, the narrator relates the agitation of a “restive” crowd and its “loud grumbles” (12). The crowd perceives Nwege as a distraction from their primary focus. Their reaction might suggest a position of power in which the crowd takes the lead and decides who shall speak. The radical action they perform does not surmount the level of abusing people of similar rank, like Nwege. In fact, they react not out of revolutionary impulse but out of docility.

In fact, the drop of liberty and equality hides the preservation of hierarchies and consumption of the energy of the people. Power is essentially hegemonic, hierarchical while the rituals are performative. In the New England Holiday, everyone participates in the governor's office; all activities inaugurate the new order of power which will subjugate them instead of granting them power. The rituals of hatred in Orwell's text consume the zeal of the crowd only to be further immersed in unconsciousness. The carnivalistic reception of Nanga and his public appearances neither suspend hierarchies nor equip the villagers with control over the strings of the power as promised by Bakhtin. It is thus obvious that the hope of liberation or securing a place in power making is an illusion. In essence, the same hierarchical design determines those episodes. Such passages offer insights into how distinctions between the leading and the led are sustained and how the public offers validations to systemic rule opposed to the uncrowning promised in Bakhtin's theory. The people, instead to reversing power structures, perpetuate them.

More than that, actions of radical nature suggesting invincibility are in fact direct results of imprudence emanating from the unconscious. The "sentiment of invincible power" and surrender to impulsive "instincts" completely cloud the feeling of "responsibility" and accountability that individuals are endowed with (Le Bon 30). The individual forming the crowd becomes faceless within it, and therefore, irresponsible to restrain his conduct. Observers of the carnival, pioneered by Bakhtin, seek ambitiously the culmination of these psychological predispositions into revolutionary acts. However, these acts lack potent ends and exist only outside conscious personality. Evidently, there is a degree of radical action taking place in the three novels, which in turn suggests a revolutionary stance compatible with the unfettering potential of the carnival. However, the sense of chaos that ensues within the carnival and which seems to alter the dynamics

of power is a mere psychological leaning. Equally, Le Bon also argues that crowds are essentially conservative; “to believe in the predominance among crowds of revolutionary instincts would be to misconstrue entirely their psychology” (55). Like the short-lived and momentary quality of the carnival, violent, “rebellious and destructive outbursts are always very transitory” among crowds (55). Crowds are fundamentally “weary of disorder, and instinctively turn to servitude” (55). The history of revolt relies much on comprehending “the profoundly conservative instincts of crowds” (55). Among crowds, the demonstration of proneness to change soon vanishes in the face of “conservative instincts as indestructible as those of all primitive beings” and unconditional “fetish-like respect for all traditions” and “unconscious horror of all novelty” (56). Therefore, regardless of how radical crowds seem to be, they nonetheless exhibit a strong penchant towards conservatism. The conservative nature of crowds urges ones to revisit the claim of the carnivalistic freedom and liberation. If one contemplates the sources of mental construction of crowds, the normative measures through which the crowds of the three novels act work against Bakhtin’s claim. Analysed closely, they are derived from systemic norms, traditions, and cultural education that is claimed to be entirely eliminated within carnivals. Thus, the instances marking the spirit of the carnival metamorphose into different directions.

For instance, the crowd assembling before the prison door perceives Hester as a threat to the ideals of purity and their conservative nature. Their radical stance in inflicting a penalty as extreme as death remains within the perimeters of “the Scripture and statute-book” (43). Despite how revolutionary they might appear, they operate within a referential systemic sphere that governs the community. Besides, their judgments about their leaders reflect contradictory statements. The status of the leading people is not radically questioned as it might seem; their revolt against the magistrates

reserves a degree of respect. Despite their 'light' punishment, the community still perceives them as "God-fearing" (42). Thus, the 'radical' reversal holding an ideal empowering capacity comprises an undeniable degree of conservative orthodoxy. The revolt and reversal of hierarchies announced earlier react to the perils that threaten conventions. If the figures that incarnate the system are openly castigated, it expresses resentment at the persons supposed to guard the 'system' intact. In addition, Hester's craft, publicly allowed on the countenance of dignified people, has never been solicited "to embroider the white veil which was to cover the pure blushes of a bride", an indication of "ever relentless vigor with which society frowned upon her sin." (66). Hester's skills amalgamate the different events; her hand-made clothes are worn in weddings as put in coffins, joining official and non-official, the celebratory and funerary together. In addition, the gradual change observed among people in treating people might be annexed to her skill, and therefore, upholding the liberating potential of the carnival. The status of Hester as sinful woman persists outside the frontiers of the carnival. Even if one neglects the limitation and monopoly of clothes among the elevated figures, and considers this extravagance to be a trait of change that marks the carnival, people's views about Hester and brides mark their conservatism. In their prejudice, her transgression contaminates the purity of the conjugal bond.

Similarly, Orwell's crowds obey the same psychological nature. The 'frenzy' discerned during the Two Minutes Hate which is inherently radical is energised by the picture of Goldstein, the 'Enemy of the People', who incarnates all the crime directed against the Party and is an essential part of the Two Minutes Hate. The ecstatic feeling derived from Public Executions is reflective of the same idea. This anomaly, which itself suggests a radical imbalance, is directed to figures that threaten the party. The same is noticed in Achebe's novel. Inside and outside the parliament, the exposure of

the minister of finance and his group, results in acts of radical nature. However, these acts remain conservative. For the crowd, the imagistic faculty suggests that the group publicly denounces incarnates a threat to the nation. The accusations of treachery and sabotage, applying to a great number of intellectuals in the country are now embodied in a group forming a coherent image in the mind of the crowd. Odili is comparably accused when Nanga invokes being his former teacher. For the crowd, Odili breaks a cardinal principle of respecting elders. Despite the illusion of participation in power and decision making through radical action, crowds are indirectly impelled into action through their conservative facet. It becomes clearer as one advances with both Bakhtin and Eagleton in mind that the carnivalesque has two different layers: A primary level in which equality sprouts, liberty is chanted, and chaos reigns over order; a second layer that offers the essence of the carnivalesque as an ephemeral, licensed moment.

Moreover, the marketplace is the site in which, according to Bakhtin, manifestations of the essence of the carnival are exhibited. If one intends to compare events of pure carnivalistic nature with those with official layer, the starting point should be this location. A closer examination from the prism of Crowd Psychology reveals no significant difference. The same psychological traits of collectivity that echo Bakhtin's views on the spirit of the carnival are observed. In fact, there is an overlap between the site as a non-official location and the events. For instance, the market that is brought to the scene for a purely official ceremony is the same site with which the story opens amid a random, spontaneous agglomeration of human beings attending Hester's public shaming. Hawthorne clearly asserts the fusion of the official and non-official by situating the 'official' public ignominy and government appointment within the proximity of the marketplace and amid the reign of collective psychology. In the two other novels the case is similar. Public sites mingle with officially orchestrated

events and rituals. The proximity debunks the distinction. Most of the carnivalistic events in the corpus are held within or immediately proximate to official sites. Therefore, though these sites harbour official events, they are impacted by the mentality of the marketplace. The triad of prison, marketplace and scaffold in *The Scarlet Letter*, and the school and parliament in Achebe's novel attest to that. Had Bakhtin's thesis been valid and verified through observation, the levelling of the official would be more symbolic when it takes place from within these institutions. However, the spatial reading proves otherwise. The carnival, with its redefined notion, takes place in proximity of its favourite site, the marketplace.

Furthermore, the suspension of hierarchies expected in public spheres, a function that is encapsulated in the marketplace in the work of Bakhtin, recedes in relation to the spatial design of the events. The composition of space evinces a continuity of hierarchal order amid the disorder of the carnival. The centrality of the marketplace is challenged by other properties. Though the centre "acquires paramount importance over all around it" (Lutwack 42), it loses its significance in relation to other spatial positioning. The associative positions of height, baseness, centrality, and remoteness imply "a hierarchy of values" in which verticality inspires dominance and implies the Christian association of good and evil with high and low places (39). The centrality of the marketplace and public spaces is contested by the verticality of spatial design. Hawthorne arranges the scene of punishment, albeit in the marketplace, according to the social stratum. The balcony hosts the dignified figures to inspect the event from above while the crowd is down in the street. The crowd is equally immersed in the circle of evil as Hester who stands below the balcony. Orwell's crowd attends the Two Minutes Hate with the face of Big Brother gazing from above. Similarly, Nanga delivers his election address from a higher platform.

Moreover, the site fulfils its promise of generating a carnival-like spirit indeed. However, characters who mostly need a liberating force to disentangle them do not experience that. On the contrary, they are more suppressed and impelled to exhibit a sense of conformity expected of them within these public spaces. In this way, the “central place” becomes “tragic if the hero is restricted to it or drawn to it in some self-destructive way. [...] The sense of tragedy is helped by binding the victim to a single place” (Lutwack 43). Just like Dimmesdale and Chillingworth who “are attracted again and again to the scaffold in the center of the town until they perish there” (43), the crowds of the three novels are held captive within this centre. Lutwack argues that Hester is an exception to the tragedy because of her transcendence of this centrality (43). She envisages a nautical escape to a secluded place of the Old World, away from the hostile colony and its torments to start a new life. However, as she stays within the colony, she is bound to the sense of tragedy. Had she been dispensed, Hester would not have occupied a marginal site as an attic. Her place is closer to the forest than to the marketplace. The same societal distress is expressed by Winston and Odili when occupying the centre. Their non-belonging is more apparent in those spaces.

Interestingly, the few episodes of little emancipation these characters experience far from the oppression of the central place are located in sites opposed to the marketplace in nature and function. Marginal spaces, opposed to the central ones, fulfil the temporary liberation. The ‘peripheral place’ is a sanctuary where “the hero’s total commitment is not required”, and which characters resort to for “reintegration” which indicates “distrust” and loss of “confidence in central places, in certainties and hierarchical structure” (Lutwack 45). Hawthorne equips Hester, Pearl, and Dimmesdale with a certain freedom in the forest. Compared to the “dreary” route which leads back the centre of the colony where Hester “must take up again the burden of her ignominy,

and the minister the hollow mockery of his good name”, the “dark forest” offers a space which the “golden light” of the colony fails to provide (153). Within the forest, “seen only by his eyes, the scarlet letter need not burn into the bosom of the fallen woman”, and Dimmesdale, “seen only by her eyes, [...] false to God and man, might be, for one moment, true!” (153). Similarly, their escapist plans reflect the same idea of refuge from the centre. Hester proposes an alternative to Dimmesdale’s restrictive “universe” which is limited to “the compass” of the colony; she offers seclusion “into the wilderness”, which is less exposed to a social gaze, there only would Dimmesdale be finally emancipated from the site where he had “been most wretched” (154). Even if this is read as the influence of the Transcendentalist doctrines on Hawthorne, Orwell executes a similar plan. The initial meeting of Winston and Julia is held in a “natural clearing, a tiny grassy knoll surrounded by tall saplings that shut it in completely” (126). Contrary to the omnipresence of surveillance in the city, workplace, or even private sites, this place offers a momentary relief to allow them both to relax their defences. Moreover, in their private little room, the two characters transgress the boundaries of the party and sharply criticise its doctrines. It is only in their hiding place that Winston and Julia fully experience their identities. As for Odili, the moments he feels close to Edna are always far from the public. During his visits to her house, and in absence of her father and Chief Nanga, Odili feels secure to contemplate her beauty and dissuade her against her marriage with Nanga. Inside the room where Odili is hospitalised, the final scene grouping the two characters, they both feel emancipated to express affection for one another and officially plan their marriage. These natural and intimate sites do not share with the marketplace its urban and crowded quality. The authorial spatial design fosters the view of different values attributed to space. The marketplace is not a *locus amoenus*. To use Bachelard’s words, it is deprived of the

topophilic ambience of “felicitous amplitude” (191). Though spatially larger, it constrains the protagonists enormously. The marketplace fails to symbolically adhere to Bakhtin’s view. At a surface level, it fuses realms and hosts the carnival spirit; inspected closely, it is a site which supplies ground for the continuity of dominance. In contrast, spaces contrary to the marketplace fulfil the promised function.

Bakhtin insists on the monological facet of Hegelian dialectics to differentiate it from his carnival’s dialogism (*Dostoevsky* 26). On the basis of this distinction, Young synthesises Bakhtin’s dialogism as a concept which “cannot be resolved; it has no teleology. It is unfinalizable and open ended” (Young 76). The analysis carried so far postulates that the carnival is principally monological. It offers the illusion of plurality, unresolvedness, and open-endedness. But its impotence in terms of revolutionary culmination makes it monological. This conclusion is attained through the coupling of discourse to context that Marxists cherish in Bakhtin. It is the reading the carnivalesque as a separate and fragmented temporality which magnifies its revolutionary promises. However, if tied to a wider context of power negotiations, it remains a licensed moment that consumes the energy of its agents and deceives them into promises of elevation to power and decision-making. The enactment of a second life for the people is challenged by the reinforcement of social imbalances. Within these carnivalistic settings, social stratification is accentuated which denudes the mechanisms of the political systems in place. Plus, the absence of teleological dimension makes it impossible to equip the carnival with a revolutionary air. If it lacks teleology, its revolutionary plans become subject to the arbitrary. Therefore, though Bakhtin seems intent on qualifying it as dialogical rather dialectical, one seems the prevalence of a single worldview. The presence of crowds at the core of the aforementioned scenes contributes in adorning the three novels with multiple discourses. In fact, the mythical allusion to crowds, the

many-headed monster, suggests this multiplicity which in turn highlights the polyphonic nature of the carnival. In essence, these emerging multiple voices are mere patois quelled by the monological imposed on the people, the worldview of the system.

Although Young claims that the carnivalesque offers “a somewhat treacherous way out for Marxist criticism” (84), it remains as sweeping as the claim of liberation within the carnival. The problem of adopting Bakhtin as a Marxist, which seems to be Young’s principal preoccupation, constitutes an inherent flaw within the theory itself. Bakhtin’s theory is partly too ambitious in the radical change it aims at orchestrating. The problem is doubled when the crowd is taken into consideration; the revolutionary potential of the carnival becomes impossible, or only attainable as a shallow action. The utility of the carnivalesque is more about method.

Eagleton’s view of the carnival as a strategy, an illusion, an event that aims at absorbing the energy of the masses is more plausible. It is more compatible with the general profile of crowds that is closer to servility. Thus, from this perspective, it is clear that the carnival is not liberating in any veridical sense but represents a decoy that veils the true sense of hegemony. To cling to the hope of its revolutionary effect, is a sign of “commonplace sentimental populism” as Eagleton would put it (“Bakhtin, Schopenhauer, Kundera” 183). Moreover, the accounts of crowds in social psychology and the concrete examples offered from the corpus deconstruct any generic distinction between official and unofficial ceremonies. As soon humans assemble with a common a purpose that activates collective reasoning, the crowd's behaviour, tendencies, tastes, and perceptions are the same. Thus it becomes quite relevant, at least in the context of this study, to adopt with Eagleton’s claim.

1.3 The Grotesque against Bakhtin: Exaggeration, Rumours, and Laughter

Bakhtin's proposal is two-folded. Amid his discussion of the carnivalesque, he further projects his postulations onto the realm of the grotesque. This latter receives scholarly attention that does not reach consensus. Instead of elucidating the term and defining its boundaries, they add more controversy, lack clarity and consistency, and widen the scope for other variations and functions of the grotesque (Steig 253; Thomson 59). Historically, the term went through different stages hovering around different attributes of the grotesque. This accords freedom to frame the concept according to the needs of the research. The grotesque is flexible to adapt to different situations. For the purpose of clarity and relevance to the specific grotesque images one intends to advance, this research adopts the term in its basic form, that which maintains as fundamental exaggerated, hyperbolic, and excessive style (*Rabelais* 303). It is worth-mentioning that, in spite of the academic flexibility that the grotesque offers, the definition adopted is not subject to selective bias. Except for an intentional exclusion of the comic principle as advanced by many theorists, and a re-examination of the liberating potential of Bakhtin, the definition synthesises a representative number of scholarly contributions.

The familiarity of the three authors with the grotesque is noticeable in their writing. This makes them well versed in this style. It is generally expressed in Hawthorne's romantic and gothic writing, Orwell's poetics of excess and parabolic and fabulist composition, and Achebe's witty and satirical portrayals. This general acquaintance is partly replicated in the studied novels in which instances of grotesqueness, caricature, and exaggeration are infused smoothly within the text. Much of the architectural extravagance of three novels relates grotesque excess and horror. The composition of the governor's old, extravagant attic comprises "strange and

seemingly cabalistic figures and diagrams”, appearing to be decorated with the air of “Aladdin’s palace” than a house of a puritan governor (81). Similarly, the buildings of the four ministries in *1984* are related with the same penchant to excess. The narrator relates an excessive architectural design. In their gigantic arrangement, the headquarters of these ministries “dwarf” the whole city (11). In addition, the narrator relates a bizarre abundance/absence related to these buildings. While the Ministry of Truth contains “three thousand rooms above ground level, and corresponding ramifications below” (11), the “frightening” Ministry of Love has “no windows in it at all” (12). Orwell’s mastery of the poetics of excess are easily retrieved in the dystopian text where he successfully creates an impossible world. Equally, the luxury of the ministerial houses in Achebe’s novel stems from a comparable extravagance. Like Nanga’s luxurious, “princely seven bathroom mansion” (38), each minister receives a residence containing “seven bedrooms and seven bathrooms, one for every day of the week” (34). However, the current interest raised in the grotesque is not typical of what precedes. What warrants the attention is the resort to grotesque style to reflect on issues tied to crowds and power.

If one circles back to the archetypal image of the many headed monster, a grotesque dimension emanates. The image inspires terror and the multiplicity of heads suggests an implication of excess that is compatible with the grotesque. Equally, the monstrous image suggests departure from the familiar realm of the human and a descent in the inhumane order. The debate on the grotesque does not intend a qualification of the novels as entirely grotesque. The research is interested in grotesque layers tied to the mentality of the crowd. Occasional resort rather than whole conformity to grotesque in writing is valid as Thomson confirms (35). In line with the penetration of the carnival to the mundane, Bakhtin asserts that the “participants [in the carnival] live in it, they live

by its laws as long as those laws are in effect; that is they live a carnivalistic life” (Dostoyevsky 122). Therefore, one can reasonably argue that as long as those participants are collectively immersed in the dynamics that govern groups/crowds, they abide by the laws of the carnival. They live in a perpetual carnival realm that penetrates the mundane; such episodes are reinterpreted in terms of grotesque. These rapports, though generally in accordance with this established link, work against Bakhtin’s initial claim and solidify the argument formerly proposed about the absence of liberation.

The novels emerge and depict conflictual contexts. In accordance with this contentious frame, the grotesque prevails “in societies and eras marked by strife, radical change or disorientation” (Thomson, 11), and in which the ‘nightmarish’ and chaotic world imposes an artistic rendering where the “dreamlike and the real are no longer clearly distinguished” (Steig, 253). This, according to Kayser, offers an ambivalent and radical rendering of ‘opposites’ stemming from the “abysmal forces” that penetrate the coherent structure of one’s world (37). The novels emerge in contexts of conflicts and relate decisive transitions and moments in the fictional worlds inspired by the referential worlds. *The Scarlet Letter*, both thematically and contextually, relates the establishment of a puritan community branded by a political conflict and a quest for purity. *1984* portrays a dystopian world which echoes the rise of Nazism and Stalinism and extends it to extremes in an unparalleled success (Howe 197). *A Man of the People* reflects on the post-independence Nigeria and the rise of populist politics. Curiously, the nightmarish transitions and sense of turbulence which appeals to aesthetic reliance of the grotesque is in/directly influenced by the inclusion of the crowd.

The most obvious route through which crowds connect to the realm of the grotesque is via their intrinsic proclivity to exaggeration. The foundational excess of the grotesque is included in the characterization of crowds. A crowd obeys an

“exaggeration of the sentiments” to the extent that any suggested feeling is subject to amplification that nullifies “doubt” and “uncertainty” and turns “suspicion” into “incontrovertible evidence” (Le Bon 50). Legend creation among crowds is frequent and tied to “their extreme credulity” and “prodigious perversions” that their imagination and its sequential, illogical, visual penchants create (40-41). It is worth mentioning that “the incoherence” of the perverted images shows that crowds are blind to truth, obeying “the deforming action of its imagination”, and convincing the crowd to embrace as real/true only those instances suggested from imagination even when they are mostly unreal (41). If one contemplates the provenance of some of the perverted images, a verbal, the collective practice of rumours is revealed (Hart 15). It is not infrequent that the narrators refer to rumours among crowds. This frequency deserves attention as the word of mouth is the source of grotesque elements.

In *The Scarlet Letter*, the word of mouth is central. Hawthorne’s emotionally driven female characters are occasionally labelled as ‘gossips’. Chronologically, the phenomenon of rumour constitutes both the tale’s genesis and closure. It inaugurates the narrative as the source of the manuscript is recollected from the “verbal testimony” of people who either knew Hester or heard her story “from contemporary witnesses” (28), and closes with the same practice regarding hearsay about Pearl’s marriage. With the prevalence of this practice, perverse images circulate, and exaggerated collective hallucinations achieve rapid diffusion. During the first confrontation with the public, and on her way back to prison, “[i]t was whispered by those who peered after [Hester], that the scarlet letter threw a lurid gleam along the dark passage-way of the interior” (56). Inside the colony, the commoners associate a degree of “grotesque horror” with the symbol of shame amounting to a “terrific legend” that it “was red-hot with infernal fire, and could be seen glowing all alight” during Hester nocturnal walks (70). Like the

women who intensify the emotional facet of crowds, Hawthorne's choice of commoners, or 'the vulgar' as the narrator describes, sharpens the psychological predisposition to exaggeration. Attracted to exaggerated images, these people associate the suggestions of the letter's colour and sin to formulate a perverted image easily diffused through rumour. The reader remembers Mr. Wilson's sermon on sin after her refusal to reveal the father of her child. The oratorical insistence on the symbol of shame animates the visual perversion of the crowd that the letter "assumed new terrors in their imagination, and seemed to derive its scarlet hue from the flames of the infernal pit" (56). By their imaginative hallucination, the puritans transcend the world of normalcy and insist on the obscurity that has always been attached to Hester since her ignominy. True to the implications of the grotesque, the images engendered are outcomes of "a strange, contagious fear" through which Hester is perceived within the puritan community (65). In spite of the partial change noticed in the treatment of the wearer of the scarlet letter across the years, her acceptance into public spaces which suggests tolerance more than scorn, and her partial regain of reputation, the grotesque fear persists: "wherever Hester stood, a small vacant area—a sort of magic circle—had formed itself about her, into which, though the people were elbowing one another at a little distance, none ventured, or felt disposed to intrude" (182). During the New England Holiday, the people "from the country roundabout" express an interest in Hester and her scarlet letter "made terrific by a hundred false or exaggerated rumors" (191). Hester's disgrace persists and expands beyond the colony thanks to the word of mouth. The incoherent and exaggerated tales that emanate from rumours develop a curious attitude that is contagious to the degree that Indians, Sailors, and even village inhabitants are drawn closer to Hester by the obscurity of her letter, making her the subject of an undesired attention.

In contrast to Hester, Dimmesdale receives elevation through the same medium. The apotheosis paid to Dimmesdale among puritans follows the same patterns. The decline in the minister's health, which the reader is gradually acquainted with its source, is ironically seen by those admirers as an outcome of a rigorous devotional commitment and pastoral duties "in order to keep the grossness of this earthly state from clogging and obscuring his spiritual lamp" (94). Concerned with the health of the minister, the community interprets Chillingworth's arrival to the colony as an evident providential plan. Chillingworth is admitted into the narrative space with a supernatural taint. An "absurd" rumour of exaggerated "stage-effect" gains space even among "some very sensible" figures that, as if "out of the sky" or from "nether earth", Chillingworth was divinely transported by "absolute miracle", somatically "through the air" to achieve a "miraculous interposition" from Germany to Dimmesdale's place (95). In its attraction of 'sensible' members in spite of irrationality and inconsistency, it joins them to the 'vulgar' commoners in this practice. With the intellectual faculties of the individuals neutralised, rumours relate incoherent and exaggerated content propagated by the 'vulgar' and the 'sensible' alike. Soon as the Dimmesdale's health begins to deteriorate, crowds reconstruct their position towards Chillingworth, yet with comparable perverted rumours. Suspicion regarding Chillingworth emanates from a testimony that suggests the alleged friendship between Chillingworth and Dr. Forman, an old conjurer who was involved in murder. This information, though implying nothing incriminating, nurtures the conclusions the crowd seeks to establish in order to justify Dimmesdale's ailing appearance. Accordingly, a new rumour unfolds implying Chillingworth's practice of sorcery which he learned from natives during his captivity. Contemplating his transformation from erudite serenity and contemplation to a physically repulsive and malevolent appearance, people yield to the "vulgar idea" that the flames of his

workshop came out of “the lower regions” and were nurtured by “infernal fuel” which made his face “sooty” (100). According to them, Dimmesdale, following the paths of the exceptional saints preceding him, was possessed “by Satan himself, or Satan’s emissary” disguised in Chillingworth (100). Chillingworth, according to them, was only part of a divine testing to which Dimmesdale was being subjected. In shifting their position, crowds incriminate Chillingworth while preserving the same degree of apotheosis to the minister with their belief in the sacred providential plan.

In accordance with the general apotheosis of the minister among the puritan community, grotesque perversion escalates near the end of the story. The chapter in which Dimmesdale finally reveals his secret depicts a crowd “borne aloft [...] as on the swelling waves of the sea” by the minister’s speech (193). Like those waves, the crowd is swayed by the currents of Dimmesdale’s eloquence. Once the sermon is delivered, the crowd expresses a “united testimony” on the minister’s exceptional speech on that day (193). The narrative stresses the source of the minister’s eloquence on the matter of sin. The burden he harbours within himself informs his eloquence on the matter. Opposed to the narrative assertion of Dimmesdale’s guilt, the puritan community interprets this eloquence as a mystic inspiration imparted onto Dimmesdale. The crowd believes that it is as if the Dimmesdale was seized by a holy spirit to inspire him beyond the script of speech he prepared to raise as a seer with a prophetic message to deliver, a personification of an “angel” casting with “his bright wings [...] a shower of golden truths” before his eminent departure from their world, endowed with a heavenly, unusual energy, as sacred as the message he transmits to the community (194). Ironically, their perversion distances them from the very concept of truth they fantasise about. These final scenes of the novel replicate the dynamics that govern the work. They revolve around the same urge to confess, the frequent perversion of crowds, and

the cardinal question on the status of truth and liberating potential of the grotesque. The crowd is paralysed and incapable of sound judgment exhibiting a passively silent astonishment. Incapable of proper reasoning, their reaction is minimized to murmurs, applause, babbles, and shouts; at best replaced by a degree of grotesqueness. Dimmesdale finally conquers his inner fear; he refuses Chillingworth's dubious proposal to oust the mother and her child to preserve his reputation and that of church. It is a narrative moment in which the delayed truth, that which has been withheld for seven year is finally imparted. He addresses the attendees with an unprecedented explicitness referring to himself, in contrast to the devotional and affectional perception of sainthood paid to him, as "the one sinner of the world", who stood on the very day of Hester's shame and public "repugnance" without being suspected (198). Dimmesdale moves from his proverbial confession to action, but the reaction of the crowd clashes with the blatancy of the minister's 'revelation'. The majority of the attendees relate their sight of the same letter on his breast, "imprinted in the flesh" (200). In accordance with this collective hallucination, explanations emanating from the apotheosis of the minister, the exaggerated emotional facet, and mysticism ensue. Some linked the mark to "a course of penance" and "hideous torture" that the minister started right after Hester received her "ignominious badge", others concluded that it the effect of the "potent necromancer" Chillingworth, while a third group attached it to the "ever active tooth of remorse, gnawing from the inmost heart outwardly" (200). The different 'conjectural' interpretations locate the ideas of the crowd farther from the realm of truth and certainty. Apart from the perversions which is proof enough of distance from truth, the admission of different versions decentres the concept of truth itself.

This perversion which contradicts the most blatant exposure to truth is but a logical continuity of the events leading to the resolution of the narrative. Throughout the

novel, flagrant incidents confront readers to gradually reveal the distance between the perception of the crowd and the truth. Truth-seeking and detection are hindered by the fundamental absence of awareness and critical spirit that are required in unearthing truth or spotting contradictions. To challenge readers, the truth about Dimmesdale slowly unfolds. The narrative hints at Dimmesdale's involvement with Hester without overt declaration. The gradual revelation of successive hints uncaptured by the crowd fosters their blindness to truth. For instance, one finds Chillingworth's judgement to be suggestive when he suspects the pious perception of the minister discerned in a wild nature he detects. In addition, the resemblance between Pearl and the minister functions as an allusive element. Pearl acts as a "visible", "plainly manifest" symbol of the "material union" which exposes "the secret they so darkly sought to hide" (161). However, despite this flagrant symbol, crowds would have never dared to blemish the minister's reputation, and even if they discerned some physical affinity, they would have enveloped it with a metaphysical explanation. Though a living proof spent years among them, their quest to discover the father is not achieved. The narrative hints grow more explicit regarding the case of Dimmesdale. For a man like Dimmesdale with a "genuine impulse to adore the truth" (113), the public impression with which he was celebrated was a source of agony rather comfort. The narrator relates the minister's pressing urge to confess before the public. He desperately entertained the idea of ascending the lectern to address the public with the full force his voice could afford, to openly reveal his identity as "utterly a pollution and a lie" perceived with "reverence and trust" and vested with responsibilities of priest's robe (113). This narrative development in unveiling the minister's will to confess accentuates the unawareness of the masses. This paralysed wish is conquered multiple times before his final revelation. Dimmesdale reforms his internal thoughts into incessant public confessions. He

repeatedly confronts the community with the truth about himself, describing himself as an “altogether vile, a viler companion of the vilest, the worst of sinners, an abomination, a thing of unimaginable iniquity, and that the only wonder was, that they did not see his wretched body shriveled up before their eyes, by the burning wrath of the Almighty!” (113). However, the crowd's reaction dramatically opposes the narrator's comment and expectations. In spite of the directness of his confession which was “plainer” than any speech, the meaning of Dimmesdale’s “self-condemning words” escaped their notice. Instead of stripping him of the ministerial role he disgraced, they revered him more and condemned themselves: “The godly youth!” [...] “The saint on earth! Alas, if he discern such sinfulness in his own white soul, what horrid spectacle would he behold in thine or mine!”” (113-114). Instead of coping with the truth revealed to them, the masses venture into phantasms and visions. The day following Dimmesdale’s attempt to expose himself publicly at night (which is itself a source of irony), he delivers a speech perceived as his most profound and finest piece, “replete with heavenly influences”, that many of his hearers “were brought to the truth by the efficacy of that sermon” (124). This instance marks the crowd’s deafness to truth more visible. While the minister’s sermon brings people closer to truth as they claim, it verily widens the gap between them and truth, and ultimately between the minister and his source of agony. The degree of irony escalates the morning following Dimmesdale ironic exposure at night. As the minister descends from the platform, the sexton hands him his glove, which they retrieved from “the scaffold, where evil-doers are set up to public shame” (124), a description that fits Dimmesdale perfectly. The sexton confides his belief that “Satan dropped it there, I take it, intending a scurrilous jest against your reverence. But, indeed, he was blind and foolish, as he ever and always is. A pure hand needs no glove to cover it!”” (124). The irony emanates as the statement of the sexton on Satan is conveniently

applies to him, and by extension to the ‘blind’ and ‘foolish’ crowd. The clash between the interpretation of the people and the version of the story that readers know further reveal their unattainability of truth. The sexton informs Dimmesdale of a manifestation of a letter A on the sky. Though readers grow more familiar with the secret story of Dimmesdale, crowds interpret the letter as standing for Angel, an appearance that honour their past govern made into an angel.

The general force that commands most of the rumours bearing grotesque significance is ‘altruistic’. The perversions ensuing around Hester and Dimmesdale are driven by no layer of interest. The propagators of those rumours act according to “some kind of cause” and “promote the public good as they see it” (Sunstein 12). Those rumours are easily accepted because they match the crowd’s “prior convictions” (4). Thus, predisposition is a key factor in the spreading of rumours. Those rumours which gain space in the novels are aligned with veneration of leaders or fixed dogma to which crowds have been exposed to. However, Orwell and Achebe highlight similar general instances of blindness to truth, but with the altruistic nature altered into political interest. Rumours circulate in *1984* and *A Man of the People* out of political propaganda, surveillance, and rivalry over power. Still, they join Hawthorne in the distance of crowds from accessing truth and multiply the chances of manipulation.

Although less exaggerated than *The Scarlet Letter*, Orwell’s *1984* is engrossed in this practice. The manipulation inherent to the subject of rumours is flagrant in Orwell’s novel. Their omnipresence is clearly retrieved in its inclusion in significant events. In the onerous preparations the Hate Week preparations including late shifts, civil and military marches, exhibitions, projections, slogan and song creation, and forged evidence, rumours circulated to feature essential as a propagandist tool. In response to the “febrile air” preceding the Hate Week, “wild rumours” were attached to

the escalating bombing (154); when one of the bombs landed, “a rumour flew round that spies were directing the rocket bombs by means of wireless waves” (155-156). The capacity of crowds to link unrelated items as Le Bon suggests is nurtured by rumours. Further, it implies the blindness to truth. Although the bombing was made by the party, the crowd yields to the suggested rumour instead of questioning the sudden frequency of bombing. To animate the hatred of the crowds and strengthen their firm belief of the threat, “it was occasionally rumoured” that Goldstein was yet living and “hatching his conspiracies” against the Party (19). Equally, the narrator relates the existence of “whispered stories” and “vague rumours” about the clandestine exchanges of Goldstein’s text, “a terrible book, a compendium of all the heresies” (20). Through hearsay, Goldstein, his book, and the Brotherhood acquire a layer of mystification which amplifies the threat they pose. In addition, the party, aware of the dynamics of crowds, strategically infiltrates proles through Thought Police agents to propagate “false rumours” in an attempt to identify and decimate those “judged capable of becoming dangerous” (78). Rumour is employed as both as a propagandist and surveillance instrument. It propagates intended messages to influence public opinion and monitor the reaction and conduct of the Party subjects.

Achebe’s *A Man of the People* relates a case of rumours closer to the politically charged dimension of Orwell. In order to secure more seats, rumours circulate about the bribes that each parliamentary member of P. A. P would receive and the ministerial positions awaiting them as a reward for their sudden shift to P. O. P. to grant this party “a comfortable majority” in the parliament (79). In addition, rumours in Achebe’s novel acquire an institutionalised layer. Following the conflict caused by the rise in import duties announced by the minister of foreign trade and the leaking of information to the British Amalgamated, “filth began to flow” (95). Scandals of corruption accusing Chief

Nanga of similar acts circulated in the Media. The participation of media in propagating these stories accounts for an institutionalized version of the rumours, even if they might be true. Besides, the aftermath of these media reports describes the capacity of the word of mouth in mobilising crowds. Following these reports, the “country was on the verge of chaos” with strikes and escalation of criminality (95). In addition, the same intervention of rumours in the political game is noticed. In order to appease the public, rumours circulate about the resignation of the prime minister. The inclusion of rumours in realms, supposedly of high order, turns the liberating facet of the grotesque on its head. Crowds, their actions, and their manipulation contribute in carnivalising the atmosphere rather than being emancipated.

In fact, a rumour does not only propagate incoherent content; it is conceptually a bearer of grotesque significance. Rumours are reflective of the dynamics of body images in which the mouth takes over the mind. A reflection on the mechanisms of the group orients one to perceive the circulation of information and knowledge among crowds in a grotesque manner that recalls Bakhtin’s discussion of the body and revisits it. Within the realm of information and knowledge emanating from this source, regeneration, as aspired for by Bakhtin, is not possible. For Bakhtin, bodily grotesque images emit a “cosmic” unity (*Rabelais* 19), and reverse the normative perceptions in which bodily functions of “the lower stratum replaces the upper stratum” (309). Following this, the rumour can be ideally seen a source of free circulation of information and knowledge. It obeys its own rules and operates outside any form of institutionalisation. In other words, it is the popular medium of expression in its ideal form of multiplicity and dissemination of information outside the authority of the official. In rumour, the grotesque body image results in decrowning the centre of logic and cognitive faculties, the mind, by the coalition between human productivity (mouth)

and receptivity (ear). This process of reversal will ideally engender liberation. However, it only portrays susceptibility to manipulation and low intellect. The persistent image in the case of crowds, and which follows the principles of the Bakhtinian body images reflects a dimension opposite to liberation. Rumours reflect a reversal of orders and a movement from abstraction to materialism. The word of the mouth reigns to reorder the functions of the body. Incapable of decent reasoning, crowds rely on the organ of the ear and the mouth which produce impaired intel and judgments instead of well-processed knowledge emanating from the brain/mind. Opposed to any liberating potential, this makes the openness to manipulation more explicit. People are reduced to decadent acts; they are unable to produce proper speech and can only gossip. While Bakhtin holds that these images harbour the possibility of regeneration, the case of the corpus hints at the incapacity and paralysis. The rumour is reflective of a crowd incapable of generating reliable speech and information. Crowds are never spotted in a work of intellectual activity demanding labour of reason; they are only clusters good at mastering gossiping.

The incapacity of appropriate speech is not the only handicap, but also incapacity of reasoning is tied to the source of information. The absence of critical processing of information fits with the low intellectual faculties of the crowd. The manifestations of the social dimensions rumour are seen in the chain of transmission of rumours. Rumours gain space through 'Group Polarization'. When "like-minded people" meet, prior opinions are reinforced and result in "a more extreme version" of their thinking prior to the discussion which involves hearsay (Sunstein, 6). Such channels of rumour communication prove the impact of low intellect and contagion among members of the crowd. The absence of critical spirit and the forces of the contagion impose reliance on the collective mind and its filters. In absence of reliable

information that refutes rumours, people rely on what others believe and (Allport and Postman xi). Another layer of ‘learning from others’ entails the dimension of conformity. While some people do believe in rumours, others will just perform due to “conformity pressures”; people “censor themselves” to mediate a feeling of harmony with the group (26). With this social phenomenon, biased prejudice and prior beliefs are intensified with the group granting confidence to those who are usually insecure. Cascades relate the dependence on others’ beliefs and actions. If the majority accepts a rumour, others will join in. When people do not have access to information, they also tend to easily adopt the opinions of others.

Achebe excels in rendering a phenomenon closer to the rumours in its oral dimension. Rumour, as symptomatic of popular reasoning, leads one to reflect on Bakhtin’s popular sources. Bakhtin’s reference to popular culture merits re-examination for it entails an absolutist orientation. For him, Rabelaisian images are rooted in popular sources including idiomatic and proverbial practices to uproot and oppose any official force (*Rabelais* 2-3). In *A Man of the People*, this quality which Bakhtin praises in the works of Rabelais is traced in forms of oral practices which evince an impaired reasoning and complicit mentalities with corruption. Instead of political emancipation, popular reasoning and orality pave way for enslavement to political power. Instead of taking a revolutionary stance against nepotism, crowds verbally accept acts of corruption and negate competence as a prerequisite for position: “A common saying in the country after Independence was that it didn’t matter *what* you knew but *who* you knew” (16). The idea acquired a proverbial dimension attesting to its rootedness in the popular mind and difficulty of uprooting it. In addition, the reader of *A Man of the People* remembers the popular proverb at the beginning of the novel that tolerates corruption. The same popular mass who qualifies Nanga as a ‘man of people’ does not

even rebuke his corruption: “Tell them that this man had used his position to enrich himself and they would ask you---as my father did---if you thought that a sensible man would spit out the juicy morsel that good fortune placed in his mouth” (2). Instead of revolting, “‘Let them eat,’ was the people's opinion” (136). These sayings, amounting to the force of popular proverbs, indicate a general resignation. They signal the birth of popular attitudes which excuse the infractions of the leading class. This oral facet reflects the deeply rooted passivity of the collective mind. The mass does nothing to shake these beliefs and any attempt at shaking them would be treacherous; it takes the shapes of a blasphemous eradication of the totemic symbols.

Furthermore, the popular and collective practice of rumour and orality is aligned with the fundamental principle of laughter. Bakhtin’s “festive life” and its grotesque manifestations are “organized on the basis of laughter” (*Rabelais* 8). The presence of the comic/laughable alongside elements incongruous with it, usually inspiring horror, appears to be a defining condition that is central to scholarly propositions about the grotesque. Thomson reports and aligns with a near unanimity among modern writers and theoreticians on the ‘comic’ as a primordial component of the grotesque. He fails to define the grotesque beyond the comic since the grotesque, according to him, depends on the comic combination with the “terrifying”, “disgusting”, and “repulsive” in a problematic and unresolvable manner (21). Similarly, Kayser relates the same paradox of opposites (Kayser 56). Ruskin generalises that “almost all cases” are made of the “ludicrous” and the “fearful” with a prevalence of one over the other, as “sportive” or “terrible” grotesque but rarely without the combination of the two (151). Edwards and Graulund join unanimity as well (93). Even to the detractors of Bakhtin’s theory, like Young and Eagleton, the comic remains relatively and cautiously praised. However, this proposition lacks flexibility and remains restrictive. It excludes other grotesque forms

that are not comic, or where the comic is overshadowed by the elements of terror and remodified at the level of perception. Apparently, the tension that this combination engenders attracts the attention of these critics. The confusing and unsettling dimension as well as the tensions that arise out of comic/terrifying can be established beyond this orientation. The comic/horror synthesis remains an obvious nest of tension which is applicable to general grotesque cases. The images addressed in the corpus contain an inherent, situational tension. The conflict is traced in the clash between their content and the manner in which they are proposed. In addition, the profile of the crowd, when taken into account, adds to this tension.

Stevens opines that while the crowning/uncrowning processes “may be comic, they are not necessarily so; the effect of such acts is context-dependent, a matter of the circumstances in which they are performed” (2). Laughter is absent in *The Scarlet Letter* and *1984* in accordance with the general decorum and propriety of the literary worlds depicted by the authors. The general absence of laughter is itself an argument which discredits its ‘universal’, subversive potential. Had it been potent in the context of the novels, it would have been envisaged by the authors. However, the socio-political awareness of the novelists excludes the effortless resolution of aesthetic conflict through that route. It would have been aesthetically passive, unauthentic, and realistically improbable to counter the rigidity of the puritans, the dictatorship of Big Brother, and the corruption of Achebe’s political system with a mere collective laughter. Such an artistic choice relates a view too idealistic and detached from reality, or an absurd comment that merits attention. However, not attending to the unanimity observed among scholars does not exclude an observable degree of the grotesqueness. The rarity of laughter in the two other novels is context-dependent. Even its absence relates a grotesque world of terror that inspires grotesque horror. The radical absence of laughter

relates an abnormal and exaggerated world that goes against human nature. It is not surprising to observe the absence of laughter in Orwell's novel. It is purposely excluded from the world that the party aims to establish. In the ideal world of the party, "There will be no laughter, except the laugh of triumph over a defeated enemy", as O'Brien informs Winston (273). Thus, the political orientation of the party allows laughter which is only hierarchical and celebratory of its ideology rather than subversive. In addition, if it had the potential with which Bakhtin equips it, it would have been more significant to infuse it. However, impotent in the context that Hawthorne and Orwell draw, its absence tells more than its presence.

Even if one abides by the restrictive definition and momentarily neglects the justified presence of the grotesque beyond the 'defining' element of the comic, its presence offers a dimension different from Bakhtin's in nature and function. Moments of explicit laughter highlight doom instead of freedom. The few instances, mostly located in Achebe's novel, indicate that laughter is a grotesque element that represents a curse for the crowd rather than a prospective strategy of liberation. In some cases, it is insignificant and captures a crowd laughing stupidly at the noises emitted from the microphone. In most cases, however, this insignificance recedes to announce a sinister worldview. Laughter is seen when Nanga denies Odili's remark about being a busy minister. When Nanga insincerely declares that a minister meant being a "servant", his dishonest comment is met with applause and laughter (8). Within the same scene, Nanga announces that he regrets leaving the "very noble profession" of teaching, an untruthful comment to which "everybody just collapsed with laughter" (9). Such scenes relate Nanga's capacity to manipulate the crowd. The collective laughter clashes with the ironic tone of the narrator. At other times, laughter acts in accordance with the invincibility of the crowd. When the Minister of Finance receives his share of public

abuse, collective laughter reigns. However, it is a laughter that condemns the minister and the crowd equally. It is a cynical laughter that distances the crowd from truth. If the minister is condemned by the insults he receives, the crowd is condemned to a fate that eclipses its vision on truth. The nature of laughter in Achebe's novel is explicitly announced during Max's speech. The criticism directed at the corrupt government and intended to lead crowds into action captures them into laughter. However, "it was the laughter of resignation to misfortune" followed by no plan of "vengeance", "rage", and "sign of fight" (117), "a slack, resigned laughter" posing no threat to the ongoing regime (118). Laughter as Stevens opines does not indispensably "imply any revolutionary resolve to abrogate their allegiance to the various hierarchies which structure their society" (4-5). In Achebe's novel, laughter dominates amid the passivity and ignorance of the masses; it is a trait of paralysis that is compatible with the incapacity to reasoning that characterizes crowds. It surfaces to signal an ironic laughter at one's fate. It is a reaction that reappears in decisive moments requiring critical assessment. It ironically follows references to manipulation, dishonesty, and corruption to which crowds prefer roars of laughter rather than roars of dissatisfaction and revolt.

When dissected, the significance of the comic resides in the dimension of affect. The laughter which seems to drive the definition of the grotesque and offers a glimmer of liberation derives its nature from the perception and reaction of the reader. Its presence "is not 'free' or undisturbed"; it is a "nervous" and "uncertain" laughter which is "countered and balanced" by "the simultaneous perception of the other side of the grotesque - its horrifying, disgusting or frightening aspect - [which] confuses the reaction" (Thomson 54). The possibility of laughter is that which comprises laughter at the conduct of the crowd because of their distance from flagrant truth. It is a repulsive and arrogant laughter which recedes once its appalling ramifications surface. It connects

the im/possibility of the fictional world to that of reality. The laughter wanes once one is reminded of being caught in a similar situation, or worse, being impacted without necessarily being involved in collective inanity. The grotesque that one confronts is aligned with cases of “brutal and hideous” grotesque where the clarity of the sources of terror, fright, and horror is not replicated in the ‘comic effect’ (54). The grounds of laughter are not explicit enough; the force of the crowds, the situations in which it is put, and the expectations of the reader directly clash with the acts and resolution of the situations. For Steig, the aggressiveness of is ridiculed in a way that fulfils “an infantile, aggressive wish” which penalises the initial character. However, it comes with a “peculiar ambivalence of response”, that which engenders “satisfaction” at seeing the wish fulfilled, and that which is characterised by a sense of “guilt” at the “aggressive” wish which initially brings satisfaction (Steig 259). The same can be said about crowds. One might derive a satisfaction at their fate because of their neglect of blatant signs of truth. At the same time, fear inhibits one when contemplating the perils that surround us. The source of both repulsion and the possible laughter are located in the clash between expectations and conduct. It disturbs readers as to be indecisive about the response.

The comic in the carnival is a release of an ambiguous feeling between the tragic and the comic but only felt by the reader. Thus, if liberation is expected, it might be in the dimension of affect. However, this poses another problem inherent to the definition of the grotesque. The fulfilment of a liberating force, whether in content or affect, entails the resolution of the conflict that characterises the grotesque. The conflicting tension crafted in the creative composition of the grotesque and consequently imparted onto the reader fades if any form of liberation is attained. In fact, the essence of the grotesque in the context of novels depends on this tension. Instead of liberation, the

value of the grotesque resides in the refreshing perception of the reader, and that which is mediated by the ambivalence he feels. Thus, absence of any prospective plan of liberation transcends topical and thematic concerns. In the present context, its organic significance is equally conspicuous. The grotesque dimension, with its unresolvable conflict trait, dissolves if the Bakhtinian thesis is attained. Thomson argues that “the basic definition of the grotesque [relies on] the unresolved clash of incompatibles in work and response” (27). This essential component of the grotesque is threatened if the Bakhtinian liberation is accomplished. Aesthetically, liberation releases the grotesque tension, no matter how enormous its construction is. It guarantees a resolution to the conflict assembled out of the clash of opposites/incompatibles. Therefore, opposition to Bakhtin becomes an organic necessity as it constitutes a defining feature of the grotesque developed. The unresolvability of the grotesque in question is guaranteed by the perpetual state in which crowds are held. If one claims the presence of any liberation, it becomes pretentious. The conflicts between the crowd’s acts, the situations they face, and the expectations of the reader cannot be settled. Instead of an emancipation that emerges out of the grotesque, the crowds are on an ongoing move in different grotesque realms that accentuates the tension.

If the thematic/topical and organic/aesthetic denial of any liberation appears to be radically cynical, the favourable and constructive facet of the grotesque is located in its alienating function. Among the different functions that can be ascribed to the grotesque, one finds that the alienating effect most suitable for the concerned instances to be highlighted. Such a function comes both historically and theoretically to grant the grotesque’s tension and conflict with unresolvable mingling of opposites a definite function which alienates to refresh one’s perception instead of mere ornamental purposes of “exaggerated buffoonery or the ludicrously fantastic” (Thomson 15). It is a

dimension that attaches purpose to the employment of the grotesque. According to Thomson, the grotesque causes an abrupt “shock-effect” that is employed ‘to bewilder and disorient, to bring the reader up short, jolt him out of accustomed ways of perceiving the world and confront him with a radically different, disturbing perspective” (58). Thomson calls this effect as “alienation” in which the “familiar and trusted is suddenly made strange and disturbing” (59). Thus, even at the level of affect, readers are not expected to be entirely liberated, for if liberation is attained, the tension of the grotesque is attenuated, if not dismantled altogether. The reader remains indecisive; the poles of friction manage the extremity they propose while holding the same degree of tension. the function of grotesque is not to exhibit liberating forces. It renews and refreshes the perception of crowds and their ties to power by means of aggressive and shocking content. The reaction it produces lays bare the psychology of the crowd and depicts their conduct in grotesque way, Hawthorne, Orwell, and Achebe lament the situation in which they are trapped to communicate a warning to the readers. The authors work specifically on the revelation of truth and the blindness of the crowd to its direct and manifestations. Truth functions at the level of reception and thematic construction of the stories. It communicates with both readers and characters. Instances of revelation are gradually infused, implicating both readers and characters. In a grotesque fashion, characters (crowds) fail to catch the narrative hints that are blatantly offered. This leaves readers astonished at their deafness to truth and refreshes their perception about the masses. The reader, who still enjoys individuality, is thrust amid these agglomerations, within their tastes, their experiences. He then feels indecisive about his feelings due to the unresolvable conflicts advanced in the works to re-emerges with a fresh reception of crowds.

Conclusion

The affinity between Crowd Psychology and carnivalistic/grotesque writing indicates the interpretation of the authors' observation of the masses into their creative writing. This remarkable affinity seems to equip the crowd with unprecedented power. However, a concrete continuity of hierarchal rule and complicit layers with power systems is noticed. The carnival emerges not as an opportunity of change and renewal, but rather a sense of systemic permit granted to consume the energy of the masses. In fact, what Bakhtin calls official ceremonies and events is but an abrupt assault that seizes the spontaneity of the public. More than that, many of the elements contributing to the emergence of carnivalistic and spectacle dimension are in essence formal rituals and protocols. This systemic assault aims at containing the event and directing the energy of the masses to abort an agglomeration through which relief has dimmed. Carnival is anodyne; it pacifies the energy of the crowds while remaining inoffensive. The reading performed in this chapter corroborates correspondence between Bakhtin's views and Crowd Psychology with a flagrant digression from any critical, liberating, and democratic ventures.

With the passivity of the crowd and its incapacity to express any reproving stance against power systems, emancipation is neutralised. This should not be taken as an accusation against Bakhtin. The real asset of his theory lies in the method he proposes. Its compatibility with the premises of critical theory allows one to uncover such issues. If the liberating potential is debunked, the refreshing aspect of carnivalesque and grotesque writing remains valid. The shocking content replenishes a view that has been neutralized either by immersion in a collective body, or by lack of interest in the dangers of power schemes. Hawthorne, Orwell, and Achebe offer original angles, albeit different, from which crowds' intellect, nature, taste, and dogmas are

accessed. One can argue that the authors' reliance on the carnivalesque and grotesque is essentially tied to this purpose. It is aligned with an intention to expose the nature of relationships between crowds and power rather than offering a way out of political enslavement. If characters are not liberated, readers become aware of the schemes of manipulation found in the real world.

Chapter Two:

Mobs and Lords: Leadership and the Crisis of the Intellectual

II- Chapter Two: Mobs and Lords: Leadership and the Crisis of the Intellectual

Introduction

The Socratic trial stands as an archetypal pattern that inspires the trope of the intellectual vs society. Both Plato's and Xenophon's Apologies portray an abusive crowd, enraged by Socrates' figure as a 'provocateur' who threatens Athenian ideals, and easily swayed by the words of his accusers. Socrates is principally indicted based on his intellectual profile as a 'teacher' and 'educator' invested in subjects suspected of corrupting the youth and promoting disbelief in divinities. Socrates is accused of being a "clever speaker" while his accusers "persuasively" frame multiple "falsehoods" into undeniable truths (*Plato* 1). Ironically, the man who is partly accused of twisting reality through rhetoric could not appeal to the crowd while his accusers could. Socrates appears feeble as a man of seventy begging and imploring a crowd of juries to listen to him. Just like the intellectuals, Socrates was committed to accounting for "the whole truth" without relying on "beautified" and "contrived" speech (1). Next his commitment to truth, he asks the crowd to logically process the statements he utters (2). Thus, Socrates remains attached to a belief in a 'virtuous' crowd who would be interested in truth and logic. This commitment is where the accusers excel knowing that a crowd is blind to truth. Socrates is on the defensive imploring the crowd of juries not 'clamour' before he finishes the defence. On the contrary, his accusers persuade Athenians through "envy and slander" (3). The accusations, though untrue, remain strongly passionate and mysterious to counter the simplicity of the logic with which Socrates defends himself. Though he logically refutes the charges of Meletus through logical dialoguing and showcases the contradiction of the accusations, he could not convince the Athenians. The triumph of the Socratic method of logic is only symbolic. It survives as a testimony against fallacies, but his logical pleading could not spare him death.

Socrates is not acquitted but rather charged guilty. Even at the counter proposal he offers as paying money by his students, he is condemned to death. This shows how hatred dominates the crowd. Socrates' failure to the angry mob and the success of ruling class rhetoric dramatise the crisis of the intellectual in his society. The portrait of Socrates as a man fearless to death is championed by many. He stands as an iconic figure who died for his ideas and ideals. Yet the martyr status he acquires is not accessible to everyone after him. The intellectuals emerge as heirs of the Socratic tragedy.

The crowd's proclivity to servility guarantees the rise of mediocre leadership and failure of intellectuals. Being deaf to logic, the crowd fails to be attracted by an intellectual appeal potential revolutionary plan. Equally responsible, the intellectuals remain within a sphere of idealism and abstraction that is incongruous with the mental composition of mobs. This allows other figures, with modest intellectual profile, to assume leading positions because of they succeed in manipulative schemes. They display prestigious background, oratory skills, and anti-intellectual manoeuvring which neutralises the threat of the intellectual. They emerge victorious in their leadership because they outperform the intellectuals in this regard.

2.1 The Enigma of Servility: Herds, Libido, and Detachment

In one of the earliest treatise on tyranny, *The Politics of Obedience: The Discourse of Voluntary Servitude*, originally published in 1577, La Boétie deals with the crucial question that defines the nature of despotic rule: The "puzzling and appalling" ground of "popular acceptance" and "general consent to despotism" offered by the people who "acquiesce in their own subjection", and grants the tyranny of a minority of rulers its perpetuity (13). La Boétie finds it enigmatic that a multitude serves "in wretchedness, their necks under the yoke", to endure the agony not of a larger mass, but

that of a single man whose power is limited to that which they grant him with, whose capacity to inflict pain is equally limited to that which they accept from him, and whose personality is logically unamicable because of the inhumane and brutal treatment they receive from him, a tyrant capable to perform these acts only because the crowd he rules over opted for acceptance rather opposition (46). La Boétie's views are based on 'natural law' which dictates humans' innate quest for liberty. The innate proclivity and naturalist stance La Boétie takes seem to impose the astonishment he expresses towards the general acceptance of tyranny. His philosophical positioning neglects the mental construction of agglomeration which robs the individual of reason and innate tendencies to freedom.

When La Boétie announces his observation on the crowd servility as enigmatic, he disregards a basic trait in Crowd Psychology. The natural inclination to freedom with which he supports the 'conundrum' of mass servility to leaders is a projection of individual feelings onto group psychology. As soon as a group dawns, its members relinquish the natural penchant to freedom. They transition to comply with an "instinctive need [...] to obey a leader" who acts as the "nucleus around which the opinions of the crowd are grouped and attain to identity" (Le Bon 117); they convert into "a servile flock that is incapable of ever doing without a master" (118). Thus, among the fundamental traits of crowds is the 'herd instinct' which develops in radical submission to a leader. The condition of the crowd in the three novels could be approached with the same enigmatic perspective. The reader notices the unconditional obedience to Dimmesdale in spite of his manipulation to truth, to Big Brother's despotic rule, or to Nanga's corrupt leadership. However, the incongruity between the reality of these leaders and the submission of the masses is partially deciphered with the crowd's psychological conditioning to be led, before being subject to any other consideration.

Consistent with the crowd's immersion in excess, its members are inclined to assign "supernatural", "miraculous", and "mysterious power" to their leaders (Le Bon 73), as highlighted in the collective veneration and reverence of Dimmesdale which exceeds normalcy. Within the colony, no soul before Dimmesdale was "so honored by his mortal brethren as the preacher" (195). His reputation overshadows many of his fellow ministers. This is concretely seen during the New England procession. At the sight of the minister, though he was part of a huge assembly of military and civil figures, all eyes were fixed on him, and as he was approaching, the crowd's "shout died into a murmur" in special respect and appreciation (195). Dimmesdale is highly esteemed and his adulation takes the form of an "almost worshipping respect of the community" (185). His "fervent admirers" consider him in a comparable position to "a heaven-ordained apostle" fated for a divine mission inside the puritan church (94). Dimmesdale's apotheosis reaches extreme stages when some consider that if the minister dies, "it was cause enough, that the world was not worthy to be any longer trodden by his feet" (94). For them, the minister incarnates "a miracle of holiness" as "the mouth-piece of Heaven's messages", which "the very ground on which he trod was sanctified" (112). This mystification is seen during his speech delivery. The unusual energy which he exhibits during his ailing days is interpreted as a "spiritual" force imparted to him by "angelic ministrations" (186). In hope of blessing and benediction, even the elder members of the church instructed to be interred next to the "young pastor's holy grave" (113). The crowd's mystical devotion to Dimmesdale is certainly informed by religious influences. However, it highlights a natural trait in Le Bonian thought.

Le Bon argues that a "crowd demands a god before everything else" (75). The 'god' tag is both metaphorical and literal. It refers to the crowd's need for a leader, but

equally important is the religious composition of their sentiments. Hawthorne's novel is aligned with this Le Bonian observation. Dimmesdale's veneration reincarnates the "worship of a being supposed superior", blindly obeyed and admired (73). For Le Bon, the 'religious' aspect found among groups goes beyond divine worship but is revealed in one's deliberate effort to invest his mental and physical efforts in "the whole-souled ardour of fanaticism at the service of a cause or an individual" (73). Thus, organised religion is unnecessary for a mass since all pacts, whether religious, social, or political assume a "religious shape" of "intolerant ardour" and sect creation (76). If the religious context obscures Le Bon's claim in *The Scarlet Letter*, its validity is clearly seen in the secular contexts of *1984* and *A Man of the People*. Dimmesdale's leadership and veneration, inscribed in a religious hierarchy and induced by religious indoctrination, are not different from the idolisation of Big Brother or Nanga.

Orwell dramatises a secular, even anti-religious political structure which mirrors the same religious mentality. The apotheosis of the leading figure in *1984* takes a similar religious form. Big Brother emerges as a false 'god', whose appellation implies correspondence to the image of Christ, deified through an omnipresent, gigantic portrait with his "eyes follow[ing] you about when you move. BIG BROTHER IS WATCHING YOU, the caption beneath it ran" (9). With this constant exposition to the idolatrous portrait, veneration naturally ensues. Similar to Dimmesdale's veneration, Big Brother acquires a messianic attribution traced in the ritual of the Two Minutes Hate. Within the excessive reign of emotions, the impact of Big Brother's face "on everyone's eyeballs was too vivid to wear off immediately" (22). This hypnotic episode escalates to be voiced through a woman who stretches her arm towards the screen where Big Brother is displayed, addressing him with a trembling voice as her "Saviour", and then covering her face with both hands in a sort of "prayer" (22-23). This is followed by an inclusion

of all the attendees into a chant which manifestly celebrates “the wisdom and majesty of Big Brother” (23). The Two Minutes Hate, as the nomenclature implies, are structured on fanatical hatred. It imprints Orwell’s society with a religious shape by turning political leadership in an anti-religious setting into a liturgical practice resembling that of religious sects.

Similarly, the same religious essence is depicted in *A Man of the People*. Achebe’s opening lines relate the popular recognition of chief Nanga that is expressed in the novel’s title. His undeniable reputation as ‘a man of the people’ highlights correspondence to Christ as a servant of his followers, the ‘chosen one’ in a mission to assist the needy. Analogously, the prime minister is venerated with a title that remarkably borrows from theological philosophy. Among the names attached to him during his public speech, the prime minister is called “the One and Only” (5). This denomination is a flagrant replication of monolithic divine attributions. Therefore, the rise of sectarian Nanga’s Youth Vanguard during the election campaigns, whose aim is “to annihilate all enemies of progress” (107), becomes a natural consequence of the birth of a group.

Even with this primal position of the leader, Freud considers that the above-mentioned ‘herd instinct’ disregards the leader by focusing on the psychological predispositions of the members of the group. Freud reacts to crowd psychologists to further enhance the visibility of the leader. For him, the field fails to account for a clear postulation on the reason behind the mental transformation of individuals once in groups. The insistence on suggestion as an essential factor of change among groups is a misleading “shelter” and “screen” to explain the essence of group mind (40). The ‘suggestibility’ advanced as innately compelling for the individual to be emotionally engaged and fully disarmed to resist the suggestions of the group is for Freud a trace of

emotional association and identification. Freud contributes to the understanding of group dynamics through a libidinal approach. For him, the transformation of individual peculiarities, such as the natural quest for freedom, or the contagious influence exercised by the members of the group, emerges out of a common emotional tie with the leader.

Freud attributes the capacity of a group to be welded together to the realm of *Eros*. His contribution advances “emotional ties” as “the essence of the group mind” (40). For him, the ‘illusion’ of the love of the leader holds the group together. He stands as a figure expressing equal affection to all the members of the group. If this impression is disturbed, the group disintegrates. This further explains the religious dimension of the group’s emotion. The sense of fraternity is channelled through the love of the leader. Like the biblical image of Christ, the leader stands “a kind elder brother”, the “father surrogate” for whom “everyone is equal, and that everyone has an equal share in his love” (43). What holds the herd together is the common sentiment which pacifies narcissistic feelings into an ambition for a sort of justice and equality. Members who might be naturally “rivals” reach the stage of “identifying themselves with one another by means of a similar love for the same object”, their leader (87). In groups, the natural “intolerance” towards others ceases to exist while members act in a “uniform” manner which nullifies individual “aversion” towards the other members, a sign of “limitation of narcissism” which could only be explained by the established libidinal energy within the group: “Love for oneself knows only one barrier — love for others” (56-57). Thus, the brother/sister attributes among puritans, the insistence on comradeship among party members, and the feeling of nationhood among the ‘compatriots’ are not mere rhetorical tags, but traces of this psychological unity. In spite of austerity and severity of the Puritan community, the despotism of the Party, and the flagrant sings of a collapsing

country, the three novels depict solid groups maintained together through communal sentiments.

Originating in his theory of emotions, Freud explains the libido as the energetic instinctual associations which are contained within the word 'love', including those driven by a "sexual union", but also those which "are diverted from this aim or are prevented from reaching it" (37-38). Unlike individual libidinal ties, the curbed "narcissistic self-love" in the emotional ties involved in groups creates libidinal charges that are inhibited in their sexual aim (58). This, Freud argues, "achieve such lasting ties between men" (78). Being sexually diverted, the functioning of the libido observed among group members exceeds its sexually oriented counterpart which is subject to "extraordinary reduction" once "the sexual aim is attained" (78). It becomes clearer why the Party restricts sex¹. An indirect manifestation of a libidinal charge which is sexually inhibited is seen in the desexualized conduct of the crowds of the corpus. In spite of the chaotic situations in which crowds are found, the derogatory verbal comments one confronts, and the debauchery that sometimes ensues, sexuality is excluded. Freud's definition of libido comprises the sexual and those which diverted. It both explains the association of the crowd with a leader and the intellectuals with women. The emotional explanation does not only attribute the role it does to leaders. It also explains the detachment of intellectuals in the novels.

Sexual desires and sexual gazes are inevitably traced in the attachment of the protagonists to the feminine figures. In fact, the presence of a sexual aim is what differentiates their libido from that of the crowd, and therefore, constructs their immunity to servility and contagious association with the group. It is the absence of this inhibition, or rather the presence of a sexual goal which severs ties with the crowd.

¹ See page 129

Thus, it is inherent to the nature of the protagonists' attachment to detect a pervading penchant to sexuality and intimacy. For instance, in spite of her proclivity to the ideology of the party, Winston declares that he could have accepted to be with Katherine if her perception of intimacy was not subject to indoctrination. Winston relates that Katherine would "wince and stiffen" like "a jointed wooden image" as soon as he approaches her; her rigid muscles suggest that even when she held him close, she conveyed the impression of pushing him forcibly (73). Her gestures suggest neither resistance nor co-operation but total submission, transforming their intimate encounters into "embarrassing" and "horrible" experiences with Katherine's perception sexuality as a utilitarian process to "produce a child", a regular task, a "duty to the Party" (73). Unlike Winston who values intimacy, seeks in it a sanctuary from the party, and considers it a revival of olden values, her attitude transforms that intimate act into a service to the party. Their different perceptions of sexuality represent a fracture in their unity.

Winston relates an episode with a prostitute that is closely connected to Katherine and suggestive of his sexual energy. Disappointed with Katherine's conduct which does not assuage his desires, Winston resorts to this prostitute with a pervading thought of Katherine that makes his teeth clench and an urge to spit inhabits him. He stands with the woman in her kitchen with feelings of "defeat and resentment" and "the thought of Katharine's white body, frozen for ever by the hypnotic power of the Party" (74). Contrary to party women who neither wear cosmetics nor perfume, the woman attracts Winston with the appealing makeup worn on her face and the synthetic scent he associates with his intimate desires. The contrast drawn between this prostitute and party women highlights the significance of this minor character. He resorts to her in an

attempt to forget about his disappointment with party women, incarnated in the conduct of his wife, Katherine.

Winston's relationship with Julia is replete with episodes of intimacy. As soon as Julia confesses her love, the initial violent thoughts leave space to a sexual gaze. While he formerly thought of violently "smashing her skull in with a cobblestone", the confession she makes demobilises Winston into exclusive thoughts of her body (117). Winston explains that former thoughts are linked to associations with party women: "He had imagined her a fool like all the rest of them, her head stuffed with lies and hatred, her belly full of ice" (117). The narrative focus on Julia's waist, a symbol of femininity and sensuality, connotes Winston's drive. Introduced without a name, in accordance with Winston's unfamiliarity with it, Julia's physical appearance is emphasised. Based on Winston's sexual gaze, one spots the insignia of the Anti-Sex League round her, which brings her physical shape into Winston's notice. The immediate hatred and violent hallucinations expressed towards her stem from a sexual objective that Winston considers unattainable. Winston's resentment is directed at a "young and pretty and sexless" character he desires yet would never reach because of "the odious scarlet sash, aggressive symbol of chastity" that encircles her (22). After the confession of her feelings and the realisation of her difference from party women, the frustration is transformed into a sensual gaze and a recovery of his sexual energy is noticed. Winston is sensually driven to her by a thought of bare and attractive body. The transformation is noticed at the level of the symbolic waist. As they walk to leave the clearing during their first meeting, Winston engages in a physical inspection to notice "how much softer her waist seemed to feel now that the sash was gone" (130). The transformation, the recovery of his aspirations, and symbolic concentration on Julia's waist culminate in

explicit physical contact between the two. Their frequent encounters, when allowed by the hectic schedule imposed by the party, relate similar acts of intimacy.

With equal focus on intimacy, Odili's earliest confession about Elsie sexualises their rapport. She is the first girl Odili meets and intimately engages with in just an hour. The foregrounding of intimacy in the first encounter that readers have with this character is significant. It seems to define the nature of the ties that unite them. Moreover, Odili's reaction to Mrs Nanga's journey highlights a degree of sexual preoccupation. He thinks of this as an opportune coincidence to bring Elsie to Chief Nanga's home. Odili's sexual drives are also expressed in Jean's interpretation of his shaking legs as a sign of sexual overthinking, and to which Odili shows no denial. The case of Edna is quite different. In spite of the absence of explicit rapport between the two, the presence of a sexual desire is expressed in his attraction to her beauty and the frequent praises he inserts in narration. When Odili gives her a ride to visit her sick mom and on the bicycle, he feels elated for "having her so close within [his] arms and the perfume of her hair in [his] nose would have proved overpowering if [he'd] had much time to consider it" (88). Plus, during one of his visits to her house, Odili's sexual gaze is noticed. In spite of the threat of her father, Odili focuses on inspecting her physical forms while she urges him to leave.

In spite of this undeniable sexual energy, the preoccupation of the protagonists with intimacy transcends the limits of pleasure. The prominence of intimacy and the supposedly light, pleasure-driven nature suggested by the focalisation on sexuality do not nullify an attachment that goes beyond that. Their libido, which is uninhibited in its sexual aim, does not neutralise the emotional attachment they feel towards these feminine figures and their compensatory aspirations. Freud argues that decrease in desire is noticed once the sexual fulfilment is achieved. However, in order to promote

its longevity, sensual love must initially “be mixed with purely tender components [...] [which] are inhibited in their aims” (78). Though consisting of irrefutable sexual gazes, the feelings developed towards the aforementioned women are compensatory emotional plans equally charged with pure affection.

Winston and Odili emerge as adults disturbed by the relics of being orphaned in their childhood. The absence of a family spirit, especially a mother figure, determines their quest for emotional compensation and shapes the libidinal energy they concentrate in the feminine figures they encounter. From a comparative perspective, Elsie and Katherine represent major disillusioning experiences for Winston and Odili. Idealised and sought after emotionally and intimately, they stand as the initial compensatory figures in the course of the protagonists. However, their acts and conduct clash with the profound obsession Winston and Odili develop towards them. The major disenchantments are compensated by Julia and Edna. They come as feminine figures who provide, both physically and emotionally, secure sanctuaries for Winston and Odili.

Winston’s parental absence is revealed through the narrative frame of dreaming. This frame accentuates the inner, unconscious conflicts that drive Winston’s life. In their unfolding, the dreams form a bridge between Winston’s consciousness and unconscious, for in spite of being retained in the “dream scenery” (36), they extend as daydreams influencing Winston’s life. Consequently, they permit one to track the complexes that compose his libidinal energy. Winston loses touch with his family when he is around eleven years and suspects their elimination in the early purges executed by the Party. In one dream, he sees his mother and sister drowning while exchanging gazes with him. Winston survives while watching his mother and sister embracing their fate without disapproving that “they must die in order that he might remain alive” (36). This

memory of his mother pains “at his heart because she died loving him, when he was too young and selfish to love her in return” (37). Winston’s other major dream immerses him in more guilt. Though elusive and inconsistent to be retold by Winston after he wakes up, it is principally structured around the last sight of his mother and her protective instinct. Winston is around ten years old, fatherless, and in a period marked by panic, war, hunger, and poverty. His mother’s behaviour at that time foretells their tragic separation. Often, she would hold him tightly and silently. Winston remembers from that period of extreme austerity and poverty his gluttony and constant complaints about the lack of food in spite of his mother’s readiness to supply his needs. Though his mother would implore him to think of his sick sister, he would selfishly cry “with rage” to get more, in spite of knowing that he was “starving” them (168). His selfishness is expressed in an incident that Winston connects to the dream. At the issue of chocolate-ration to be shared by the three of them, Winston wants the entire portion to himself. He acts against his mother’s words and steals the share of his sister. In spite of his mother’s calls, Winston leaves the house to remember only how his mother protects his sister and presses her against her bosom, the only coherent gesture that pairs the dream with Winston’s consciousness. The “enveloping protecting gesture of the arm” contains the “whole meaning” of the dream (169). Winston sees in his mother “an unusual woman” who “possessed a kind of nobility, a kind of purity, simply because the standards that she obeyed were private ones” (170). When she “had nothing else to give, [she] still gave [them] love” (170). Though this gesture was concretely inefficient in appeasing his sister’s hunger or preventing death, it did not halt his mother from acting with a maternal protective instinct. The dreams declare suppressed feelings of guilt that persist and haunt Winston. Winston’s memory of his mother inspires a burden of guilt that involves a binary of life and death. The sense of comparison engendered within

Winston accentuates the feeling of guilt and malaise of the Survivor Syndrome. He associates her death with his survival.

Katherine stands as the first feminine figure Winston seeks to compensate the loss of his mother. The dream sketches the countenance of his mother in a way that resembles Kathrine. They are both tall, fair-haired women with appealing movements. The resemblance proves the obsession of Winston with his quest for compensation. He sees in Katherine a replica of the mother and associates the nobility of his mother with her face. However, during their fifteen-month relationship, Winston discovers a profile that overtly opposes his aspirations. Earlier in their marriage, Winston discovers that Katherine is a ‘goodthinkful’ party member, “naturally orthodox, incapable of thinking a bad thought” (138). Katherine feels discomfort away from her belonging to the group as is symbolically related by Winston during a community hike. For her, being “away from the noisy mob of hikers even for a moment gave her a feeling of wrong-doing” (140-141). Katherine feels safe, both realistically and symbolically, in uniformity with the group. The degree of expectations clashes with a radical outcome that Katherine incarnates. The shame Winston relates is his resort to a prostitute suggests an act against his nature that he is forced to commit because of his past experience with Katherine. However, further disappointment emanates. Winston considers the prostitute’s mechanical gesture in approaching intimacy shocking, and in clear light, Winston discovers “that the woman was *old*”, with “streaks of white” hair all over her head, and an edentulous mouth “revealing nothing except a cavernous blackness” (75). She artificially disguises her age with heavy makeup “plastered so thick on her face that it looked as though it might crack like a cardboard mask” (75). Winston scribbles this experience in his diary with a therapeutic intent but to no avail. This episode, which initially represents a sanctuary from party women, does not satisfy Winston. He laments

the situation in which he is trapped and the fact of not having “a woman of his own instead of these filthy scuffles at intervals of years” (74). But more importantly, he reveals his need “to be loved” (74). Winston’s quest for compensation is clearly expressed. Though he is attracted to her at first, the resolution of the episode proves an artificial rather than genuine beauty.

Less allegorical in relating his inner void, Odili explicitly reveals the emotional condition generated by absent mother. When he sees Peter buying gifts for his parents, he declares feeling “envious” that “had no mother to buy head-ties for” (25). The envy Odili endures reflects a degree of longing for a feminine figure in his life. Early in his childhood, and despite the comfort brought by his father’s first wife, Mama, Odili senses the emotional void left by his mother. In addition, her death comes with a burden that he bears throughout his life. Since she dies while giving birth to him, Odili epitomises the “unlucky child, if not a downright wicked and evil one” in the collective mind (25). The perception of his people puts him in an antagonistic relation with them. Odili, “the sensitive child”, feels “something wrong with [his] affairs” that finally gets clearer when a boy calls him a “[b]ad child that crunched his mother's skull” (25). Like Winston, the death of Odili’s mother, added to the absence it exerts on him, involves a dichotomy of death and life. As soon as Odili develops comprehension of the oral heritage of his people, he discovers that he “should have died and let [his] mother live” (26). In this hostile social territory, the paternal presence does not assuage the absence of the mother. Odili expresses the same envy as he converses with Max about his father. While Max is the only son to his father, Odili deals with a polygamous father whose many brides and children prevent him “to take any special notice” of Odili (25). Even if Odili wants to gift him, “giving things to him was like pouring a little water into a dried-up well” (25). It becomes clear that Odili lacks a sense of a family, an institution

in which the psychological well-being, which is the genesis of libido, is formed. Thus, it is entirely justified that the ties Odili tries to establish or maintain are attempts of compensation.

To emphasise the importance of the feminine figure and signal Odili's libidinal drive, the first reference to Elsie imposes a stylistic shift in narration that reserves much importance to the character. Before Odili re-plunges in the memories that constitute most of his narrative, he resorts to the present and directly addresses the reader about the significance of Elsie as a character in his story. The significance he narratively attributes to Elsie amplifies the conflict between his expectations and the resolution of his story with her. Odili reveals his jealousy once he sees Elsie reading letters of her boyfriend. In addition, Odili divulges that after leaving the university he almost "kicked the bucket" because of postal strike 1963 that hindered their correspondence (24). The angst expressed by Odili's conveys a libidinal energy that is not limited to brutish sex. Odili sees in Elsie the first feminine figure he seeks in order to compensate the lost mother. In Nanga's house, Odili interrupts his "elevated thoughts" on the political corruption of the country, the unifying theme of the novel, to confess that "[m]ost of the time [his] mind was on Elsie" (35). In fact, Elsie is one of the 'chief reasons' of Odili's visit to Bori. Once he meets her, he derives a degree of satisfaction when he sees her jealous at the mention of a meeting with an American with the same name. In addition, had it been mere sexuality that Odili seeks, he would not have confessed that he does not go to prostitutes when thinking of Mrs Nanga's departure. It significantly shows the sense of attachment rather than mere sexual pleasure. Added to the attachment explained above, which contradicts Odili's declaration to the minister about Elsie being "just a good-time girl" (55), even this statement torments Odili as he internally confesses. True, though his plans of marriage with Elsie are not established he thinks "it

was grossly unfair” to describe her as “a good-time girl” (56). This declaration, though abolished by the flagrant attachment he feels, relates an urge to exhibit his manliness in front of Nanga, who “had five stories to every one” told by Odili (56). Thus, after many exchanges of manly “tales of conquest”, Odili feels “compelled to speak in derogatory terms about women in general” (56). Plus, once they are home, he waits for Nanga to regain his room before joining Elise, because he does not want to expose her as an indecent girl in front of Nanga.

Elsie’s betrayal represents a climactic point in the story and further proves an attachment beyond ephemeral pleasure. Odili enters a shocking phase and a conflicting psychological experience once he discovers her affair with Chief Nanga. It is expressed in his hyperactive movement inside Nanga’s house, fluctuation between a necessity to act and paralysis, impulsive internal thoughts, conclusions drawn then retracted about Nanga, delusions about Elsie’s cries to be rescued, and strong emotional charges of repulsion that soon depart to be replaced by an emotional void that leaves Odili “empty inside and out” (66). Odili is seen acting in total opposition to his thoughts. Avoidance marks his psychological reactions. Instead of confronting Nanga, he starts packing his stuff nervously to leave the house. The shocking episode manifests itself in the defence mechanism that operates once Odili wakes up. He experiences a blackout followed by an immediate surge of panic and a desire to cry that Odili resists when humiliation resurfaces. One also sees a cessation of the libidinal admiration. Without the regret previously expressed by Odili, he considers Elsie “a common harlot” not worth talking about (68). Inside Max’s house, Odili enters a phase of denial by negating that it was not really about Elsie but his dignity and his feelings are equally touched.

If Katherine and Elsie represent major disappointments for the protagonists, Julia and Edna come in accordance with their quest for emotional compensation. They symbolise continuity in the formation of libidinal energy.

Winston's preoccupation with Julia is announced early in the novel. After being noticed in the Two Minutes Hate, Julia is one of the first characters to receive narrative attention. Strangely, Winston expresses an immediate dislike towards her based on the impression of conformism "and general clean-mindedness which she managed to carry about with her" (17). As explained, Winston's misogynist attitude is not exclusive to Julia but rather framed on his experience with Katherine. Suspecting Julia to be a Thought Police agent, a feeling of discomfort and aversion haunts him whenever she gets close. However, away from the source of hatred, these mixed feelings position Julia in a significant narrative place. Amid the oscillating emotions of love and hatred towards Big Brother and Goldstein during the Two Minutes Hate, Winston transfers his inner loathing to her. With this, the girl stands as a decisive figure in his life, just like the status of Big Brother and Goldstein. The proximity between Winston and Julia begins with the falling episode. In spite of the suspicions that he attaches to her, upon seeing her topple, "it had been as though he felt the pain in his own body" (113). While helping her, Julia manages to secretly confess in a paper the feeling which she scribbled: 'I love you'. This activates in Winston a preoccupation with the girl that he could not divert his attention from. For Winston, "the memory of her face" triggers "a raging, intolerable desire to be alone" in order to sort this intrusive affair out (116). She stands as a new phase in Winston's life: "At the sight of the words *I love you* the desire to stay alive had welled up in him" (117). Because of her, "life was like a restless dream" (118). The frequent encounters, when possible, have a positive impact on Winston beyond sex. His lifestyle changes; his drinking habits which were a necessity

stop; and his health improves with some weight gain, and a remission of varicose ulcer and coughing. In short, “[t]he process of life had ceased to be intolerable” (156).

Winston develops obsessional tendencies with Julia. The fixation on her leads to a continuous hunt for her presence in the departments of the Party. The thought of losing her is alarming that “[a] kind of fever seized him” (117). When Julia disappeared for three days after her confession, Winston experienced an “unbearable sensitivity” and “agony” that accompany him awake and asleep (118). He quits writing and finds a momentary escape in his work to distract himself. Her absence engenders dark scenarios. Clueless about her fading, Winston thinks of possibilities of vaporization by the party, suicide, and exile. Winston’s fears recede when they finally meet, despite the difficulties imposed by the party. In the lane she asks him to meet, Winston arrives earlier than her and is captured picking flowers for her. Too immersed in this new experience, when she asks about his opinion of her before she hands him the note, Winston is not tempted to lie. He considers it “a sort of love-offering to start off by telling the worst” (128). He confesses all the dark thoughts because he thought she incarnates the traits of a model party member. Inside the room, Julia surprises Winston with her determination to assume her femininity rather than party membership and comradeship. The use of cosmetic products all over her face strengthens her feminine features. The perfume she wears reminds him of the prostitute episode, but it was more inviting than shocking, compensating his terrible experience with the prostitute. With the presence of Julia, Charrington’s room allows Winston to experience love in a context of radical censorship on intimacy. When a rat breaks the serenity of the atmosphere inside the room, Julia fulfils a significant role. When she mentions stories about babies being attacked by rats, Winston turns “pale” and begs her to stop “*Don’t go on!*” (151). Julia’s story reminds Winston of his frequent nightmares. To comfort

Winston, Julia drew him next to her and embraces him. The motherly affectionate reaction of Julia corresponds perfectly to the compensation Winston seeks. The fear of rats stems from a childhood experience that Julia appeases just the way she stands as a feminine figure that Winston seeks to restore in his life. When Winston wakes up “with his eyes full of tears” (166), Julia is interestingly sleeping next to him to fulfil the comforting and consoling role after the disquieting dream. However, whenever Julia fails to arrange meetings, Winston’s obsessional rage resurfaces. After a month of their relationship, the intensity of his desire metamorphoses from “sensuality” to a “physical necessity” (146). Having internalised all her features, Julia became indispensable for his well-being.

Odili’s interest in Edna is signalled since the beginning of the story. The eye contact with her during Nanga’s visit to Anata captures her beauty and actuates a sense of curiosity. The interest deepens into a quasi-obsessional tendency with Odili’s constant inquiries about the identity of the girl. Near the end of chapter, Odili asks one of the journalists about Edna. Determined to know more, even at chief Nanga's house, Odili keeps asking about her only to be told by Mrs. Nanga that she is the one her husband intends to marry as his second wife. After Elsie’s betrayal, Odili approaches Edna and the proximity between the two aggrandises the obsession. Amid the political turmoil and his conflicts with the villagers after his return from Bori, Odili’s thoughts swerve to Edna. Under the pretext of a courteous visit to Mrs. Nanga before he moves to Urua, Odili admits that the “strongest reason for going was the odd chance of seeing Edna there” (98). After the quarrel with Mrs. Nanga, Odili drives to the hospital with the sole intention “to waylay Edna” (99). Unsure about how to proceed, he hesitates for a whole hour inside the car, and then decides to confront her only to feel “downcast” as he is informed that her mother left the hospital (99). Moreover, Odili sees in Max and

Eunice what he longs for. He confesses that their complicity makes his “mouth water” with envy (120). Odili contemplates Eunice’s beauty, observing how, with her mouth, she was nervously “forming the same words that [Max] was uttering” during his speech, spotting a “delicious picture of feminine loyalty” that summons courage in Odili to finally reveal his love for Edna (120). Odili daydreams about presenting her to his friends, and having a relationship, as stable as that of Max of Eunice, with Edna. To his disappointment, when Odili reaches her home, Edna confronts him with “a tightened-bow countenance” and a tongue that stings “like the tail of a scorpion” (122). Her insults and accusations shock Odili for he stands aimlessly “rooted to the ground”, feeling the growing “tightening in the throat”, and “a sadness deep and cool like a well, into which [his] hopes had fallen” (123). After this disheartening encounter, Odili’s composition of a letter stands as an attempt to dismiss her persistent presence in his thoughts. In his letter, Odili tries to negate that he attempted to interfere and disrupt her relation with Nanga, addressing her as “a girl who has no more education than lower Elementary” (126). Fortunately, this letter does not reach her, but more importantly, the statements uttered by Odili are not truthful. He is later relieved when he finds that she did not read it. His letter is but a defence mechanism through which Odili tries to manage his shock. Moreover, Edna’s visit to the hospital reveals affectionate ties between the two. Odili relates to her, with tears in his eyes, how “miserable” he felt when writing the letter (137). Their conversation shows that even prior to the dissolution of government and amid the tension that dominated the period of election, Edna was the only one who tried to assist him when assaulted by Nanga and his crowd. Interestingly, it is the second time he cries for a female figure.

Odili’s libidinal transcend mere sexuality. Though Odili focalises her outer looks in his narrative act, it is never reported that they reached a stage of intimacy. Yet his

attachment to her never wanes. If one argues against this point by addressing the growing libidinal energy that has not been discharged through sex, it should also be argued that Winston, in spite of his frequent encounters with Julia, does not express a decrease in his feeling towards her. Their libido, which is uninhibited in its sexual aim, does not neutralise the emotional attachment they feel towards them. Thus, the contrasting situation in which Winston and Odili are put highlight no difference in their attachment because they retain these ‘tender components’ which are defined by their quest for compensation.

Moreover, the obsession of the protagonists, just like that of the crowd, involves an idealisation of the object of love. This alters traits of the ego in association with the object of love. Freud explains that the intensification of “sexual over-estimation” results in a depletion of the ego; this latter becomes “unassuming and modest” while the object of love “sublime and precious”, until it entirely consumes and curbs the narcissistic “self-love of the ego” to naturally observe “self-sacrifice”, “humility”, and “self-injury” among subjects in love (74-75). The protagonists’ idealisation of the feminine figures imposes a decrease in self-esteem and an abnormal depletion of self-protection. The collective emotions exhibited by crowds and directed towards a leading figure are remarkably replicated, but in the direction of female characters to mark their detachment from the collective. Once absorbed in their quest, the ‘over-estimation’ of objects of love consumes their ego.

Winston’s consumed ego is seen in his loss of self-protection. As soon as Julia confesses her love, Winston is disarmed and the risks he takes became insignificant. The suspicions he formerly expressed about her cease to exist. Winston no longer entertains the possibility that she might be luring him into some scheme. Even his preoccupation with party surveillance fades. After her reappearance, Winston

experiences an overwhelming alleviation from the fear of disappearance; he fixes her for some time neglecting the precautions he should wear against the surveillance of the party. Their momentary meeting during the preparations of the Hate Week harbours the same carelessness towards self-protection. Winston feels an unprecedented urge that instils a wish that they were married, roaming the streets without secrecy and immersed in trivial mundane activities in a place of their own. In fact, it is this aspiration which leads Winston to rent the room, in spite of the risks it entails. Inside the room, Winston panics as Julia's arrival approaches. He reflects on the "conscious, gratuitous, suicidal folly" and unconcealed crime he was committing (144). Though it was unfathomable to visit the room while concealing it from the party, Winston yields to "temptation" (145). The privacy and intimacy the room offers deactivate the self-protection. Winston moves towards a "predestined horror" that his "lunacy" entails (147). They both know that it is a decision which brings them "nearer to their graves" (147). In spite of this threat and his awareness of the ephemerality of this situation, Winston chooses to sacrifice safety to guard his tie with Julia. Interestingly, in total loss of self-protection, Winston thinks of suicide among the plans he fantasises about, Winston thinks of suicide. With his obsessional attachment to Julia, Winston prefers death than separation. Similarly, Odili's attachment to Edna alters his nature and immobilises his instinct of self-protection. Odili declares "As a rule I don't like suffering to no purpose. Suffering should be creative, should give birth to something good and lovely" (99). He considers the ordeals he faces to get to Edna purposeful, and anticipates something out of them. The loss of self-protection is more explicit in his neglect of Edna's father's threats. Odili drives incautiously to her place and displays more imprudence to her alarming reaction when he replies that it "would be wonderful" to be killed by her father (100). Aware of her father's serious threats, Edna is seen trembling while Odili derives satisfaction from

her terror. He declares that “It was as though I was drunk—with what I couldn't say” (100). Simply, the feeling that Odili fails to explain is the outcome of an operating libido which invalidates rational conduct. Like a group, he loses his sense of self-protection to reach his object-cathexis. He responds with coldness to a danger as serious as Edna's father matchet. He continues his imprudent show, taking it as “a laughing matter” and replying in humorous ways to her request to leave before the father arrives (100). With the resolution of the scene, Odili emerges with a triumphant with the ‘bravery’ and neglect of personal safety he exhibits in front Edna. Odili reaches the anticipated outcome that he aspires to establish out of the suffering declared above.

Winston's perception of his inferiority is internally dependent on his idealisation of Julia. Readers discover that Winston denudes himself for the first time in front of Julia after a whole month of their relationship. Strangely, he refuses, in spite of their periodic trysts, to expose himself as he feels “ashamed of his pale and meagre body, with the varicose veins standing out on his calves and the discoloured patch over his ankle” (149). Prior to the revelation of this minute detail, Winston's elemental fear explains his shame. After Julia's confession, Winston turns delusional regarding the possibility that Julia would change her mind. The thought absorbs his senses; whenever Julia disappears, the thought reappears consequently. In spite of the invalidity of this thought, it keeps appearing in Winston's narrative. The frequency of this disquieting supposition relates the nature of the fixation that Winston develops. By idealising her, a feeling of insecurity emerges within him that he becomes emotionally dependent on her and afraid that she changes her mind. Even when they finally manage to arrange a meeting, the five-minutes delay she makes engenders the same “terrible fear” that Julia would never appear at the rendezvous because she altered her decision (121). The emotional dependence on Julia relates the dynamics of presence and absence that

Winston creates internally. Once she arrives to their first meeting, though relieved to see her, the source of his distress is finally revealed. As he stares at her young, athletic body, “the sense of his own inferiority” weighs heavily upon him (126). In spite of the advances they make, Winston’s feeling of inferiority comes to prominence when he thinks again that Julia, who has “never seen him in broad daylight in the open”, would change her mind once she sees how “dirty and etiolated” the walk under May sunshine made him look (126). As they start to converse, Winston moves closer and takes her hand to inquire with the same inferior self-portrait in the background. He asks her whether she can “still bear to look at” an older man, trapped into a marriage he cannot terminate, physically deformed because of varicosities and partial dentures (127). Her reassuring answers and acceptance lead Winston to enfold Julia. True to the depletion of sexuality observed by Freud, his sexual energy recedes as he experiences no “physical desire” but “sheer incredulity” (127). Julia’s “youth and prettiness had frightened him” as a man “too much used to living without women” (128). The inferiority, intimidation, and insignificance clear space to a sense of self-worth he recollects once Winston secures accessibility to Julia.

The genesis of Odili’s inferiority can be located in the episode of betrayal which he perceives humiliating and degrading for his person. It impacts his personality to a degree that shapes his later attachment to Edna. The obsession with Edna heralds a feeling of inferiority that is seen in the insecurity exhibited upon his visit to her. The new car and the financial ease that the party affords reshape Odili’s material status. In spite of the symbolic change that would elevate him to the rank of Nanga in the eyes of people, his self-assertion remains fragile. In spite of the newly acquired status, he feels inferior to contest Nanga in winning Edna’s heart. Instead of heading directly to Edna’s house, he reassures himself by opting to first wash the car. It is only after cleaning the

car that Odili believes that he drives “in style” to meet Edna (96). In addition, his obsession is also spotted in his “word by word” reading of Edna’s letter in order to learn how he stands “in her estimation” (106). This, however, does not unfold to be that analytical. It only shows the degree of attachment and sensitivity of Odili. He feels disappointed to find that Edna addresses him as “Dear Odili” while he wrote “My dearest Edna” (106). This futile detail is taken as an offense by Odili and absence of mutual interest. The conclusion drawn, though speculative and minor, is suggestive of the inferiority and insecurity he develops. The same restlessness is felt during his visit to Anata to meet her. He internally struggles to find the appropriate way to address her, fearing that he stands “like a mumbling schoolboy” once he sees her (121) .

It is always enigmatic to see how a person successfully influences larger numbers of people. The mystery that La Boétie expresses is nonetheless incomplete if the profile of the leader is left unmentioned. Certainly, the crowd is inclined, through inherent traits to its composition, to venerate leading figures. However, a reflection on the charming characters of the leader further clarifies the riddle of influence, servility, and veneration. The success of the leaders in the novels is created via the impression they transfer to the masses. In addition, they foster the impression they construct by mastering appealing elements to the crowds. In contrast, the failure of the intellectuals, though endowed with the privilege of detachment, is heavily impacted by the gap between them and the masses.

2.2 Life as a Stage: Charming Leadership and the Dramaturgy of Public Image

Even with the primal position they hold in the crowds’ esteem, leaders are aware of the malleability of the crowd’s opinions. Equally, they are alert to the fragility of their own profiles. They invest the assets at their disposal to reinforce their authority and appeal to crowds. Contrastingly, the protagonists, though already equipped with

intellectual merits and privileged with the detachment from collective sentiments, fail where leaders succeed. They lack the prestigious aura, oratory and communicative talents, and preoccupation with their social reputations that guarantee their rise as senior figures able to impose authority. They remain detached from mobs and immersed in idealism and abstraction.

Le Bon's observation about crowds' servility to leaders relies heavily on the notion of 'prestige'. This latter signifies "the mainspring of all authority"; a crucial principle to persuasively assert "domination" over masses whose "critical faculty" is effaced and replaced with "astonishment and respect" to the prestigious status of the leader (129-130). Whether 'acquired' or 'personal', prestige is necessary to rule over and attract crowds by neutralising judgment and adorning reality. Titles, ancestry, positions, and possessions contribute to the creation of a capital of prestige, and without it, leaders "would be stripped of half their authority" (131). Leading figures in the novels invest this capital to sustain their social and political positions. They deploy their symbolic capital as an ideological frame that legitimises the roles they publicly assume.

For instance, governor Bellingham derives prestige from a family history which he exhibits in his house. The internal design of the walls shows portraits of his "forefathers" with "armor on their breasts, and others with stately ruffs and robes of peace" (83). These ancestral elders, inscribed in a history of both war and governmental affairs, confer the necessary prestige to impress the masses. Equally, the visitors of the Governor's house are granted sight of his polished, gleaming, personal armour. The item is not "meant for mere idle show", but rather as a testimony to the Governor's participation in the Pequod conflict with Indians (83). It comes to sustain his legal background as a lawyer. This remark draws attention to the source of prestige that

attracts crowds. The Governor's intellectual background rarely matters. Instead, he materialises his genealogical heritage and armour by putting them ceaselessly into exhibition as both a testimony and a reminder. Comparably, Big Brother derives prestige from his status as one of the "original leaders of the Revolution" (Orwell 81). By displaying his history as a militant during the revolution, Big Brother legitimises the authority he exerts in Oceania. Similarly, the rise of Nanga to rule equips him with a prestigious aura. In a materialist society, the success of Nanga represents a goal that everyone strives to secure. Thus, Nanga seizes every chance to exhibit the manifestation of his success. Leading figures, aware of the unattainability of the crowd though intellect, resort to passionate elements to impose their rule. Had intellectual merits sufficed, they would not have relied on displaying family history, past militancy, or even material signs of success to attract the crowds. Compared to the capital of prestige possessed by these leaders, the protagonists exhibit no source of prestige except the personal virtues of their intellect. Naturally, crowds are not enchanted by logic or intellect.

The exclusion of logic and intellect from the profile of leadership and the advent of prestigious aura defines the authority which prevails among masses. Weber's distinction of 'legitimate rule' places 'charismatic authority' in opposition to the 'legal-rational' and 'traditional' forms of governance. Charismatic authority accepts neither the rationality of the legal sphere, nor respect to the long-standing and time-honoured traditional rule. It is an "irrational" authority, "alien to all rules" (376), and which positions "the exceptional sanctity or heroic qualities or exemplary character of a person, and of the orders that this person proclaims or creates" as the basis of legitimate rule (342). The leader needs only to advance 'proof' as to appeal to his "community" and form a circle of "disciples" or "retinue" immersed in "emotional communalisation"

(375). It is aligned with the religious foundation and predisposition to believe in the extraordinary merits of the leader to answer a vocational “calling” and “mission” (377). Being context-dependent, the perception of charisma ranges from literal supernatural merits such as those observed among the puritan community, to realistic merits that acquire unattainability through context. Big Brother’s charismatic personality is not literally derived from the supernatural, but he is systemically mystified as to raise into an obscure figure of love for followers, and an avenger of transgressors. Less detached from the metaphysical, Nanga’s success is literally real and devoid of any supernatural powers. However, the achievement he was capable of remains distinct for a mass who could barely secure basic needs. He rises from destitution to ministerial office, a success that attracts the masses regardless of the means Nanga deploys to reach this status.

Even with the granted charismatic magnetism they are offered, leaders double their charm with an incomparable eloquence to the prosaicness of the intellectuals. In fact, the rhetorical eloquence of the leaders is two-folded. Their prominence during their public appearances confers the manifestation of the charismatic aura with which they are equipped. However, it stands as reinforcing element to the prestigious personality they assume. Whether false or honest, any social performance is subject to careful consideration to achieve the intended impression (Goffman 44). Although they are readily accepted by the crowds because of the aura they emit, they are equally triumphant because of their strategic public exposure. Compared to intellectuals, leaders appeal, both in matter and manner, to the crowds.

Dimmesdale’s intellectual background seldom counts in his fame and leading position. It is rather through his oral gifts that he emerges as a distinct member of the clergy. Among his contemporaries, one finds some who dedicated more time to theological learning, and were therefore, intellectually superior to him Dimmesdale.

Others were more familiar with the exegetical perception of the world while another portion was more devout and spiritually engaged. Yet Dimmesdale outperforms them in a capacity they all seek, “that of addressing the whole human brotherhood in the heart’s native language”, of articulating “the highest truths through the humblest medium of familiar words and images”; they “lacked Heaven’s last and rarest attestation of their office, the Tongue of Flame” (112). It is Dimmesdale’s complicity with the masses which appeals to them. None of his fellow ministers could sway the puritan crowd the way he did. Although the narrator stresses his educational background as someone coming reputed universities, Dimmesdale’s eloquence takes most of the description in gaining in his pastoral occupation, an exceptional orator.

Similarly, Nanga is perceived as an ‘approachable’ man who outperforms people with intellectual excellence due to his complicity and proximity to the masses. During his reception, Nanga has “a jovial word for everyone” (7). In addition, he strategically addresses people in way that implies modesty. Nanga’s recognition of Odili after fifteen years plays in favour of the minister’s image of modesty and accessibility. He hugs him in front of people and takes pride in being his teacher. When Odili states his supposition of being busy as a minister, Nanga denies that to reinforce his accessibility and humility. The effectiveness of Nanga’s strategy is seen in the elevation of Odili into “a hero in the eyes of the crowd” (8). Even the proprietor who did not have a good relationship with him, declares Odili a pioneer of his school.

Nanga supports his quality as ‘a man of people’ with oratory eloquence to enhance his image of a courteous leader. He always finds a way to relate to his interlocutor. In his address to the school teachers, he expresses his regret for leaving the nobility of teaching to a ministerial position. He further reassures them that they have

his sympathy in the protest they made. Nanga executes this honey-tongued strategy to establish an interpersonal tie with his audience. He charms them by stressing the common ground of teaching which goes beyond leadership. Similarly, Nanga impresses his crowd by the respect he pays to seniority. Although his appreciation and honouring of Nwege as ‘sir’ seems out of pretended mannerism rather than genuine respect, he seizes the opportunity when one of his crew stresses this facet. He manipulates the crowd into validating him as “a man of high position who still gave age the respect due to it” (10). This exhibits Nanga’s mastery of the cardinal points of his people. Knowing how age is venerated among his people, he offers himself revering age and closes his remark with a proverb that further solidifies the impression he transmits: “*Do the right and shame the Devil*” (10). As expected from a master of the crowd’s tastes, his speech at Anata School was “spontaneous”, yet “most effective” (13). He disarms his audience by declaring himself detached from any electoral campaign to chase votes, but “a family reunion—pure and simple” (13). In respect to the tradition and its weight, Nanga tightens the complicity with his audience by closing his speech with a traditional dance to every group.

Nanga’s magnetism is admitted by his fierce detractor, Odili. Although introduced as immune to the suggestions of the collective, he finds himself attracted to him. He declares being able to rehearse, word for word, Nanga’s speech that day. This unusual memory is but a result of his charming episode. More explicitly, Odili concedes to the fact that Nanga was “adept” in retaining “his constituency” (22), as a man with an “easy charm” (29). Though Odili shows a critical eye when dissecting Nanga’s character of Nanga, he falls under his spell. Odili exposes the binary of success and failure by expressing a partial attraction to Nanga’s confidence. Though hypocritical, Nanga’s assertiveness, according to Odili, contributes to the prosperity of his political

career “while starry-eyed idealists strove vaingloriously to bring into politics niceties and delicate refinements that belonged elsewhere” (10). Although Odili makes this comment, he is still victim of the idealism he criticises. In fact, it represents the crisis of a whole class of intellectuals, not that of Odili alone.

In contrast to the charm of the leading figures and their communicative excellence, the intellectuals remain too detached from the mobs they aspire to enlist in their opposition activism. Indeed, Odili’s detachment enables him to acquire certain sensibilities that hinder his engagement and immersion in collective sentiments. However, it exhibits an ivory tower attitude towards the crowd. Sharp as they might be, Odili’s remarks about the ‘silly’, ‘cynical’, ‘ignorant’ villagers relate a haughty attitude that nurtures his idealist views. With such an attitude, it is not surprising that Odili is mocked when he confronts the masses. The reaction to Odili’s decision to engage into politics against Nanga proves the dissociation of the crowd: “When I first announced that I was going to contest Chief Nanga’s seat everybody laughed” (96). Because he fails to appeal to them, the crowd does not see him a potential figure to lead over them, in spite of his intellectual merits. The political domain becomes a “hostile territory” for Odili as his appeal to the masses fails (97). Oblivious to these signs, he faces the crowd’s antagonistic derision during the first meeting at the Assembly Hall of Anata School. One of the villagers whom Odili naively considers sympathetic refuses to shake hands with him. Instead, he ridicules Odili by drawing an arc at Odili’s head and knocking off his cap. As he bends over to get his cap, the same man pushes him to fall ludicrously on his hands. The ridicule Odili experiences partly fades away once his team arrives. Odili confesses that their confident arrival was “the most morale-boosting event of the past so many weeks” (115). Certainly, an individual often feels at ease around his compeers. However, in a context of political leadership, it reflects how Odili

feels in constant need for companionship and assistance. Winston's case, though different in its absence of confrontational episodes with the masses, heralds the same discomfort. His passivity does not negate a complex he assuages by associating revolutionary action with O'Brien and the Brotherhood.

Odili's idealism, abstraction, and remoteness from laymen do not stand as an isolated case. They represent the predicament of the intellectual in Achebe's novel. The promise the reader extracts from the genesis of C.P.C. clashes with the initial steps of this nascent party. Indeed, the birth of the Common People's Convention promises a shift from passivity to activity; intellectuals are finally "out of their 'tower of elephant tusk' into active politics" (74). However, the composition of the party remains too detached from political reality. The founding members represent an elitist class constituted of a flagrant exclusion of the common people. As Odili remarks, it is "somewhat odd that a party calling itself the Common People's Convention should be made up of only professional men and women" (75). Max's justification further reflects the elitist attitude of the intellectuals. For him, the actual composition of the party represents "the vanguard" that will later extend to other people; however, he seems convinced that history dictates that "great revolutions" were ignited by intellectuals, not common people (75). Max's explanation reflects the perception with which these intellectuals see themselves. This elitist view poses further obstacles to reach the masses. Their following discussion is comparably abstract. It revolves around the pros and cons of their association with leftist politics and communism. The abstract concerns of political affiliation distance them farther from *realpolitik*.

In addition, the inadequacy to political engagement is also shown in the decision to launch their campaign without due preparations. At the sight of a small group drawn

to Odili's father house, Max and his comrades decide to publicly launch their party. Though incompatible with political tactics, once the speakers are switched on, the house could not accommodate number of attendees. However, the event drew an inquisitive crowd astonished at how a microphone transmits sound from one place to another. The spontaneity of the people and the simplicity of their impressions are significant. If attracted adequately, the new party could gain an opportune space in the political game.

In fact, Max is relatively superior to Odili in his public address. He offers his party as alternative for the commoners, a statement that implies closeness to them. Plus, he employs storytelling and an evocative imagery to attract the crowd. He engages in a story which likens a hunter to the people and two vultures to the ruling parties:

Once upon a time a hunter killed some big-game at night. He searched for it in vain and at last he decided to go home and await daylight. At the first light of morning he returned to the forest full of expectation. And what do you think he found? He saw two vultures fighting over what still remained of the carcass. In great anger he loaded his gun and shot the two dirty uneatable birds. You may say that he was foolish to waste his bullet on them but I say no. He was angry and he wanted to wipe out the dirty thieves fighting over another man's inheritance. That hunter is yourselves. Yes, you and you and you. And the two vultures— P.O.P. and P.A.P. . . . (118).

This passage relates Max's intellectual wit and reliance on proverbial oral tradition. It symbolically implies action. In accordance with the deployment of orality, Max declares Odili's candidacy in a similar manner:

We all know," he said, "what one dog said to another. He said: If I fall for you this time and you fall for me next time then I know it is play not fight. Last time you

elected a Member of Parliament from Anata. Now it is your turn here in Urua. A goat does not eat into a hen's stomach no matter how friendly the two may be. Ours is ours but mine is mine. I present as my party's candidate your own son, Odili Samalu . . . (118-119).

Max's wit appears to be successful indeed. By implying closeness to the masses, relying on orality, and employing otherness and belonging as shown in the Anata/Urua binary, Odili, who is initially ridiculed, is gradually accepted. Max's gradual shift from abstraction and idealism to oration, tradition, and passion, facilitates Odili's relative adoption by the masses. However, this remains partial and reflective of those elements which attract the crowd.

Though he relatively outperforms Odili in addressing the masses, Max fails to capture them. Overall, his speech was remarkable but could not be persuasive to the majority. Max's idealist view makes him engage in a dialogue with the attendees. This, no matter how democratic it might seem, reflects the absence of leading authority on his part for charismatic leadership "is authoritarian in principle" since it relies on a mandatory "acceptance" (Goffman 405). In addition, his dialogic approach focuses mainly on listing accusations at the corrupt politicians who turn into well-off leaders in plain view of the village. Max rises as an intellectual who limits himself to governmental misconduct. According to Rothbard, many intellectuals concentrate their political and social critiques on 'fault finding' and neglect instructing the public about the strategic schemes through which the state maximises its authority, impact, and economy. However, this approach renders them "ineffective" for they expose "their counter-propaganda at a public which does not have the equipment or the interest to follow the complex analyses of error, and which can therefore easily be rebamboozled

by the experts in the employ of the State” (32). By confining his counter-discourse to a critical account of corruption, Max loses the interest of an audience already familiar with the corruption of its political class. Though his critical speech makes the audience laugh, it does not amount to stirring something potent within them: “No one among them swore vengeance; no one shook with rage or showed any sign of fight. They understood what was being said, they had seen it with their own eyes” (117). When Max’s tone escalates with shaking hands and voice, the crowd is partially animated but not led into potent action by a discourse which remains accusatory of the system that aims at consolidating itself as an oligarchy at the expense of the people.

The temporary success of Max’s speech reflects an erratic manipulation of the crowd rather than a planned strategy. The inconsistency between the degree of emotional animation and passivity the crowd abides by proves the deficiency of the intellectual’s discourse. The transient success of the appeal is accidental. Max and his political affiliates launch a party without due preparations. In the case of leading figures, their appeal to the masses obeys a well-studied method rather than random one. Given the spontaneity of the attendees, one might even dare say that had the same words been uttered by Dimmesdale, Big Brother, or Nanga, they would have had an ampler impact. Even when Couple, an ex-policeman, contradicts Max by listing water and electricity facilities brought to the village by those corrupt leaders, some oppose him and expose him as an ally of the government he defends. Had it not been the intervention of the crowd, Max would not have been able to manage the intrusion. The failure of Max’s speech underscores a larger truth about the concept of leadership. Charisma, when abandoned to randomness, cannot attain influence. The contrast between Max’s accidental and partial success and the leaders’ meticulous approach to

the masses highlights the performative nature of political life. This meticulousness and method develop an obsession with the public image.

In its antagonistic relation to all forms of rule, charismatic leadership can be seen as revolutionary (Weber 377). Thus, leaders are always on a quest to sustain their positions and refine their public image. Conscious of the fragility of their leadership and groundless charisma being their only currency, leading figures are obsessed with polishing their image. They manage intruding threats which destabilise their authenticity to maintain an intact social mask and prevent the ascent of another figure who would then assume the revolutionary virtues of charisma. Goffman's dramaturgical theory elucidates the social mask worn by leaders. It transforms the metaphor of 'life is a stage' to the realm of social interaction. It advances social life as a compilation of performative 'expressions', 'impressions', and 'inferences' to "control the conduct" and "responsive treatment" of social agents (Goffman 2). Social life is structured on the logic of a "moral right" to expect treatment which meets the demands of a social role, and to accordingly exercise "a moral demand" on others to meet that (Goffman 6). Thus, the exhibition of prestige or the eloquence which mediates complicity are signs of self-appointment into leading positions. They are "sign vehicles" which contribute the impression leaders want to inculcate (14). It is an arsenal of signs that leaders emit in performative episodes which summon the crowd to believe in the impression that one aspires to create. In contrast, the crowd perceives the intellectual as "an impostor and out-and-out fraud", not entitled to claim the rights of the leading position, "an accredited incumbent of the relevant status" (38). He impersonates a role that he does fit in the eyes of the crowd. Compared to the meticulousness of leaders, intellectuals are naively spontaneous, inept at managing the social impression of leadership and the intrusions that enfeeble it.

The duality between front-stage and back-stage in Goffman's theory heralds an excessive preoccupation with the public image of leaders. The front imposes "effective showing" of one's "occupational reputation" to meet the social demands of "idealization" (22-23). Social interaction imposes a perfect behavioural conduct that is radically different from the private one. Thus, any 'preventive' or 'corrective' measure taken is but a trace to maintain this idealised image against "definitional disruptions" (7). However, the nature of this approach turns into an obsession when the demands of the front-stage invade the back-stage. The 'front region', which Goffman uses to refer to the locus of the perception of performance, extends to invade the 'back region' where "the performer can relax; he can drop his front, forgo speaking his lines, and step out of character" (70). Though strategically maintained in public, the obsession to preserve their social masks consumes their personalities. They turn into "cynical" rather than sincere performers playing a "masquerade" and "deluding" their audience (10-11), to intentionally suppress the signs that threaten their public image. Although Goffman speaks of "social doubt" as a capacity to "judge the reliability" of the performance (38), the crowds in the novel are disarmed in front of "disciplined" performers obeying the dramaturgical rigour expected of them for the role of leadership (137). With their performative prudence, they minimise the rate of error and maximise their aptitude to manage incidental events. Thus, even if they ethically emerge as dishonest figures and agents of deceit, this process represents an asset in their success as leading figures.

Dimmesdale's urge to confess is delayed because of the fear to be exposed. In spite of his internal struggle, he expresses angst that his secret will be revealed. Dimmesdale's urge to confess clashes with the dubious avenues he takes to achieve penance. His internal struggles do not conquer his wish to preserve his public image. During her first confrontation with the public and the magistrates, Hester is pressured

into announcing the name of Pearl's father. Alarmed that she would finally yield and expose him, Dimmesdale's declarative statement attenuates the narrative tension that escalates between the earnest demands of Mr. Wilson and the public. Dimmesdale acts in accordance with the preservation of his social mask. His declaration silences her: "She will not speak!" (55). As the plot develops, Dimmesdale places himself ironically in Hester's position on the spot of public shame only while "the town was all asleep" with "no peril of discovery" (116). He becomes an "untrue man" exposing himself "in false light" of an "obscure", "dark gray" night in which the same people who witnessed Hester's shaming would be unable to catch a human silhouette (115). There, on the spot of shame, "[n]o eye could see him, save that ever-wakeful one which had seen him in his closet, wielding the bloody scourge" (116). This does not only relate the inefficacy of his penance but refers to an earlier attempt in which he whips himself secretly, in his "secret closet, under lock and key" (114). With the absence of the public, Dimmesdale exposure or punishment turn into hollow gestures of redemption. Dimmesdale, though tormented inside by "Remorse", could not conquer the "Cowardice" each time his internal pain drives him to "the verge of a disclosure" (116). In his internal struggle, the preservation of his name remains decisive. The uncalculated cry he emits accentuates the latent fear of exposure; he covers his face awaiting for the community to wake up and find him there. Moreover, on the scaffold, and while Reverend Mr. Wilson passes by, Dimmesdale hallucinates about addressing him. This scene exposes the same fear as Dimmesdale feels alarmed that he had actually spoken to Mr. Wilson and is appeased at the discovery of the contrary. On the same platform of shame, Dimmesdale feels his limbs rigid because of the coldness of the night and wonders whether he can step down from the scaffold. The thought that follows is expressive of the same internal terror. Dimmesdale is afraid that his incapacity to move would tie him to the spot until the

whole community would wake up and unearth his secret. The following day, at the end of the Sabbath in which he delivers a powerful sermon, the sexton hands him his black glove that he dropped. Dimmesdale receives his lost glove with the terror of being suspected. This dramatic accentuation reveals the latent fear in his subconscious, engendering fantastic episodes of panic.

Similarly, near the forest, Hester catches sight of the minister appearing with an infirmity that is absent in “situation[s] where he deemed himself liable to notice” (147). When Hester unexpectedly approaches him in the forest, one sees Dimmesdale adjusting his composure and air, standing “more erect, like a man taken by surprise in a mood to which he was reluctant to have witnesses” (148). The feebleness which Dimmesdale hides stems from the pain that his sin generates. However, being the source of his agony, the minister is still reluctant and afraid of being exposed by mere connections that people would infer. In addition, Dimmesdale confesses to Hester that the resemblance between him and Pearl was alarming to him since his “own features were partly repeated in her face, and so strikingly that the world might see them” (161). The heart-to-heart conversation between Hester and Dimmesdale concludes with a decision of departure on a ship, leaving their past behind, to start anew. Even to this plan, which constitutes a resolution to the conflict of exposure, Dimmesdale shows again his obsession with his public image. He considers it “most fortunate” that the ship will depart after he delivers his speech in the Election sermon, that “they shall say” of him that he left “no public duty unperformed, nor ill performed!” (168). Dimmesdale’s statement about this fortunate plan to accomplish his ministerial duties is countered by a narrative intrusion. The narrator remarks that “No man, for any considerable period, can wear one face to himself, and another to the multitude, without finally getting bewildered as to which may be the true” (168). His concerns do not stem

from conscience about the duties to be performed, but rather from the fact that he is haunted by the impression he would leave behind. The narrator's remark confirms the idea of wearing two faces. The 'front-stage' face is the social mask that hides Dimmesdale's 'back-stage'.

Pearl acts an instigator of truth in Hawthorne's narrative. Compared to affectionate attitude with which Dimmesdale treats her in the forest, Pearl spots "the remoteness and intangibility" that had fallen around the minister during the New England Procession (187). Pearl questions whether it was the same minister who kissed her in the forest, and is innocently willing to approach him for a kiss publicly. The changes observed by Pearl are linked to the public image Dimmesdale maintains. Unaware of this, Pearl considers his shift from back-stage to front-stage behaviour a strange composure. In addition, she dismantles Dimmesdale's secretive show of penance and ironic appeal to Hester. While summoning Hester and Pearl to stand with him in attempt to redeem his absence while they were being publicly shamed, Pearl counters this irony by asking him whether he will stand them in daylight. Her question brings "all the dread of public exposure, that had so long been the anguish of his life" as is Dimmesdale is seen "trembling" and delaying that to another day, if not "the great judgment day" in which "the daylight of this world shall not see our meeting" (120-121). In response, she playfully responds that Dimmesdale was not "bold" and "true" as to promise to take her hand and of her mom in daylight (123). With her observation, questions, and frequent laughs she emits, Pearl intensifies the irony of the situation and Dimmesdale's primal preoccupation.

Similar to Dimmesdale's obsession with his public image, Nanga exhibits similar susceptibility to the threats that endanger the leading role he assumes. For instance, in embracing his public role of a leader, Nanga shows intolerance to being off-

staged by another person. When Nwege extends his opening speech in presence of Nanga, the respect to senior age fades. Nanga perceives Nwege's talk as a form of upstaging to dominate the scene as he focused mainly on self-praising and services to the Party. Nanga does not remain diplomatic and rather joins the crowd's laughter when one of the attendees threatens to 'push him down and take three pence', a serious threat that is built on an incidental joke. In addition, as a "great man [who] did not easily forgive those who took up part of his time to make their own speeches", Nanga ignores Nwege for the rest of the reception (18). Moreover, in the middle of an interaction with the teachers in which Nanga socially performs the role of a superior leader, Andrew "committed the unpardonable indiscretion of calling the Minister the nickname he had worn as a teacher: "M.A. Minus Opportunity."" (11). Nanga feels disturbed and offended that he could abstain from sending a frowning look at Andrew. However, he exhibits partial indifference when Andrew apologises. This indifferent attitude is a vain attempt to maintain his public role. The social mask worn is threatened by a personal nickname that brings to light an inferiority felt by the minister. Back when he was a teacher, Nanga did not seem disturbed by the nickname. Being free of any public image, "Mr Nanga could admit, albeit lightheartedly, to a certain secret yearning for higher education" (24). However, being a minister, "he was valiantly proving that a man like him was better without it" (24). Thus, the nickname uttered by Andrew would discredit the narrative that Nanga wants to impose.

In contrast, Nanga reacts differently to a similar incident due to the different context of social performance. Nanga's friends Margaret and John, a young American couple, "no older than [Odili] [...] had the impudence to call Chief Nanga his now almost forgotten Christian name [Micah]" (41). To Odili's shock, he turns to Nanga expecting "his face contort with fury" as he would have "gone rampaging mad" if called

by his people, but the minister seems rather “pleased” and “replied sweetly” (41). Odili interprets that as a sign of servility to the ‘other’. In spite of the consistency of this claim, it goes beyond that. The different reactions stem from the respect that his public image imposes. As Odili remarkably analyses, “people like Chief Nanga don't care two hoots about the outside world. He is concerned with the inside world, with how to retain his hold on his constituency” (22). With his people, the Christian name represents a sign of disrespect that threatens his authority. However, with the American couple, it is a cordial sign that does not enfeeble his position. More than that, if one considers the validity of Odili’s interpretation, the authority of the leading figure recedes. Nanga does not feel any urge to appear superior since he is internally inferior to them.

The preservation of the public image moves from a personal concern to an institutional practice. In *The Scarlet Letter*, the church leaders profess a narrative of denial that contests the perversions around Dimmesdale’s final scene. They deny the presence of any symbol that resembles Hester’s on the minister’s torso. They disguise the incident which would pollute the religious institution. Instead, they proclaim that Dimmesdale, aware of his approaching death and the veneration of the public which “placed him already saints and angels”, wanted to die in “the arms of that fallen woman, to express to the world how utterly nugatory is the choicest of man’s own righteousness” (200-201), making his departure from the earthly world “a parable”, a “mournful lesson” on human proneness sin (201). To this, the narrator remarks the clerical “stubborn fidelity” to Dimmesdale which refutes undeniable proof, “clear as the mid-day sunshine on the scarlet letter” (201). The nugatory reaction of the clergy shifts from the grotesqueness that envelops the final scene to an official narrative. The perverted images are soon abandoned once they seemed to threaten the image of Dimmesdale, which is extended to the church. Institutional preservation of social image

can be seen as ‘team’ cooperation. In most cases, it is aligned with the goal of the performer. But in the final scene of *Dimmesdale*, it turns to be in opposite direction to his desire. After he dies, the team disregards the impression that long tortured him in order to preserve the institution.

Similarly, Achebe’s novel relates the participation of media in polishing Nanga’s image. It portrays the “cult of personality” (Ezenwa-Ohaeto 108). During his speech at the national book fair, Nanga adds Michael West and Dudley Stamp to Shakespeare, Dickens, Austen, and Shaw as great novelists of the English tradition. Even after realising the mistake he made by confusing a textbook author and geographer to literary giants, Nanga insists on the mistake to conceal the incongruity between his function as a minister of culture and ignorance of literary figures. With the assistance of Editor of the *Daily Matchet*, whom the minister frequently bribes, Nanga remodifies the English canon. In a flagrant act of fabrication, Nanga adds the two names to the speech that will publicly appear in media. The newspaper, which appears frequently as the mouthpiece of the government, collaborates in the preservation of the leader’s image by circulating his mistake instead of critically addressing it.

Orwell’s *1984* relates comparable institutional falsification but in a more sophisticated manner. The Records Department functions as a governmental section responsible for the historical falsifications of the Party. A large portion of these falsifications is made to polish the image of Big Brother. The team’s role is to preserve the social impression through “under-communication” of “destructive information” and “dark secrets” that “would discredit, disrupt” performative impressions (Goffman 87). The meticulousness of the process involves a ‘memory hole’ which destroys the instruction to amend, the copies subject to amendment, and leaves visible and traceable only the altered versions. The past was ceaselessly updated with no trace which

contradicts alterations or proves them. In the Records Department, a body of workers were dedicated to collect the material for disposal. The party assigns tasks of higher importance to different people separately, because “turn[ing] it over to a committee would be to admit openly that an act of fabrication was taking place” (51). It is meticulous process which involves editing, re-editing, cross-references, before “the chosen lie would pass into the permanent records and become truth” (51). This way, the alterations of “political alignment” and false “prophecies” advanced by Big Brother are never traced in spite of the continuous process (47). At the Records Department, Winston and his colleagues operate as ‘Service Specialists’ responsible for “the construction, repair, and maintenance of the show” (Goffman 96). Their role entails preserving a sound public image which goes hand in hand with the constant changes of history. The rectifications are partly concerned with updating Big Brother’s image to date. For instance, by formerly anticipating that South India would maintain peace while Eurasia would attack North Africa, changes had to be brought to his speech “in such a way as to make him predict the thing that had actually happened” since the assault of the Eurasian Army contradicted his analysis (45). The party executes this process believing that any admission “to change one’s mind, or even one’s policy, is a confession of weakness” (218). In addition, even with no substantive counterpart in reality, the Party declares gigantic statistics to polish the image of leader. This ensures that the credibility of the party and that of Big Brother remain intact.

With the exhibition of prestige, mastery of oration, and preservation of their image, leaders guarantee their appeal to the crowd. This latter does not dethrone its adulators; instead, it sacrifices the intellectual whose only arsenal is truth and logic. To further sustain the positions of leading figures and neutralise the threat of the

intellectual, anti-intellectual discourses and practices emerge within the socio-political contexts of the three novels.

2.3 Anti-Intellectualism: Passionate Discourse, Pseudo-Intellectuals, and Stultification

In *The Scarlet Letter*, though the puritan community venerates intellectual merit, both of the elite and laymen exhibit a derogatory perception of any intellectual realm that is detached from their religious or pragmatic views. Hawthorne writes in a context of “general antipathy or hostility” where creative authorship exists within an “essential lack of sympathy between a culture and its writers [...] [and where] the individual writer is a puny minority” (Eble 352). In a culture which considers literary authorship a “feminine occupation”, Hawthorne’s choice of a literary career comes with a “psychic cost” of perceiving himself as an “emasculated” digressing from the “Puritan tradition of public service” (Savoy 40). The implication of the choice includes “shaming”, wearing “a psychic scarlet letter”, and occupying “the status of the *abject*” (51). Anything that departs from the religious and pragmatic of the outer world and embraces the author’s creative world is perceived with devalued and degenerate suspicion (Rochberg, 257). In the frame narrative, the vocation of a novelist comes after a historical reflection on the puritan ancestors to hypothetically relate what the puritan patriarchs would confer about the intellectual and aesthetic labour. They would deem the choice of their descendant “a sufficient retribution” of their misdeeds, a contamination of the family genealogy with a “degenerate” “idler” and “fiddler”, whose “worthless” and “disgraceful” occupation of a novelist departs from the cherished role of “glorifying God, or being serviceable to mankind” (10). This positions the frame narrator/Hawthorne as derided figure and limits the scope of intellectual activity that is

worth-pursuing in a puritan community. The niche is too restrictive. This cultural narrow-mindedness transmits insecurity within the writer himself.

The feeling of alienation puts the frame narrator/author in a quest for an ideal reader. The disparity between the author and readership is clearly stated in Hawthorne's atypical "autobiographical impulse" which does not seek wider readership but those who would actually comprehend him (5). Hawthorne's choice of an autobiographical piece is justified by his quest for a sympathetic and 'apprehensive' reader who would be an ideal recipient of his work amid the general superficial reading public. Even in his professional milieu, Hawthorne suffers isolation. Like Burns or Chaucer to whom he compares himself based on their prior occupation of the same profession, Hawthorne's creative side is ignored by his colleagues. As an individual pursuing "literary fame" and aspiring to create space amongst the "world's dignitaries" by writing fiction, Hawthorne feels "devoid of significance" and deprived of "lettered intercourse" in a place that does not value art (23). Ironically, instead of being publicly and prominently displayed on books and foreign belletristic magazines, Hawthorne's name acquires a symbolic "vogue" and "queer vehicle of fame" which relates his crisis (24). His name officially seals cargoes of goods and wares which paid taxes. Like the sense of abandonment and aimlessness Hawthorne feels in his professional setting, creative works are found in an abandoned place. Symbolically, he finds the manuscript of the story cornered "in a recess" next to "heaped-up rubbish" of archived reports and official documents of "musty papers" which were only "an encumbrance on earth" since they served no pragmatic purpose (24-25). The continuity of thought of the puritan ancestors condemns both the creator and the creation.

The anti-intellectual dogma is not limited to creativity. Any activity of intellectual order which exists outside the perimeters of religion and pragmatism is

unwelcome. Without any explicit transgression, Chillingworth is subject to a certain deformity because he does not show enough conformity to the profile of the intellectual as conceived by Puritans. As a man of science, he is naturally joined to the class of scientists who were immune to “the religious zeal” upon which the puritan community founded their emigration, men who “lost the spiritual view of existence” by their immersion and dedication to the study of “the human frame” (93-94). With his “exemplary” attitude of “outward forms of a religious life” under the guidance of Dimmesdale (94), Chillingworth becomes a solicited figure among Puritans. For instance, the jailer allows him into Hester’s cell to remedy the baby without any suspicion of leaving a fallen woman alone with a male. This acceptance stems from the pragmatism which his skill offered.

In becoming a writer, Orwell suffers in similar ways to Hawthorne. Writing for Orwell constitutes an adolescence dream for a teenage boy to whom the available ‘Imperial Police’ was an “unsuitable profession” (Williams *Orwell* 8). Yet his choice remains antagonistic to the societal perception of writing where the middle class to which he belongs considered writing “as an impractical secondary activity, an alternative to ‘doing something real’” (31). His journey to Paris implies severing ties with this anti-intellectual attitude; a decision “to live ‘outside’ [his] society and to ‘write’” (32). The crisis to which Orwell was exposed is reiterated in Winston’s diary. Winston’s expressive impairment in his writing and quest for positioning in time symbolise Orwell’s lack of effect and audience. In addition, the relegation of writing to a secondary position influences the composition of *1984*. The anomaly with which writing is perceived in the Orwellian/Blairian world inspires an act of estrangement in the Winstonian world. Orwell interprets his crisis in a manner which mediates the reign of anti-intellectualism.

Orwell expresses creatively the social malaise he experienced through an act of Shklovskian defamiliarisation. The symbolic instruments representing intellectual life are introduced in an estranged manner. The diary Winston purchases stands as an out-of-touch 'commodity', "a little yellowed by age" found in "a frowsy little junk-shop in a slummy quarter of the town" (13). The diary is not only commodified but even devalued materially for the cheap price of two dollars. The act of estrangement, indicating the distancing of intellectual life, is supplemented by the description of the pen as "an archaic instrument, seldom used even for signatures" that Winston obtains with toil (14). More estrangement is realised as Winston engages in writing. As a subject not used to handwriting but to the 'speakwrite', Winston's act of writing appears in "small clumsy letters" accompanied by a feeling of "helplessness" as he loses his faculty of self-expression instead of scribbling the internal thoughts he had been rehearsing for years (14). This incapacity to write attests to the distancing of self-expression within the novel that is partly linked to the distancing of intellectual life. Winston's case concretises the success of the Party in dissociating its subjects from the realm of intellect.

The impression Winston communicates about these symbolic gadgets of intellectual life and his failure to properly express himself are traces of a systemic anti-intellectual campaign. Winston buys the quaint diary with a disturbing sense of panic. The diary, even without being used, entails severe penalties by the party. In addition, as an author concerned about "the dangers inherent in machines" (Roazen, 679), Orwell's novel voices these concerns. The difficulty which Winston experiences in writing is a direct outcome of mechanisation. The Party creates a world in which "fields are cultivated with horse-ploughs while books are written by machinery" (Orwell 197-198). Human writing is replaced with the machine. The Fiction department hires mechanical

workers rather than writers. The task that would be required of novelists is delegated to “kaleidoscopes on which the plots of novels were ‘roughed in’” (113). Similarly, the Music department composes songs, normally assigned to poets or lyricists, “without any human intervention whatever on an instrument known as a versificator” (145). The purpose is not to combat writing but rather creativity and thought emanating from human intellect. Orwell’s novel depicts a context where books “were just a commodity that had to be produced, like jam or bootlaces” (137). The mechanisation of writing represents the end of intellectual activity. The party’s wariness regarding writing stems from its awareness of the ties between thought and dissent. The early cohesive words scribbled by Winston are reflective of that, While Winston contemplates the existence of the Brotherhood, he finds that, “as though by automatic action”, he was simultaneously writing ‘DOWN WITH BIG BROTHER’ repeatedly on the page (24). Intellectual activity inevitably entails revolt. The party fights any traces of intellectual life and distances it as a measure to prolong its existence and abort the possibility of being dethroned. The anti-intellectual measures are preventive in order not to allow subjects to reach the stage that Winston seems to touch upon.

Equally aware of the forces of intellectual life, Achebe’s novel portrays a system that resorts to public shaming and passionate discourse to counter intellectual merit. The prime minister disgraces the dismissed ministers by framing them into conspirers and renegades “caught ‘red-handed in their nefarious plot to overthrow the Government Of the people by the people and for the people’” (5). Their sound judgment to reduce governmental grants to the cultivation of coffee is consumed by the accusation of conspiracy and treason, passionate subjects that seduce crowds more than well-thought political decisions. Benda’s seminal work, *The Betrayal of the Intellectuals*, locates political and national passions at the heart of a large-scale crisis where political, racial,

class, and national affiliations become decisive. By immersing the citizen in the domain of passions, each suggestion becomes “the agent of good in the world and that its enemy is the genius of evil” (Benda 21). By offering them as traitors, they are naturally joined, by means of othering, to the foreign forces they collaborate with. Strategically, the prime minister supplements his narrative with an emotional appeal that insists on presenting them as deceitful “ingrates he had pulled out of oblivion”, and who “stabbed” him in the back, a confession which catches many of his interlocutors “in tears” (5). More importantly, their disgrace is fallaciously annexed to their education for the “Miscreant Gang” is composed of cultured and educated ministers (4). The resentment towards the educated, which Odili calls “a new, dangerous and sinister note in the universal outcry” (4), indirectly ties the accusation to education. First, the prime minister dislocates the crisis by altering the narrative, he then places blame on education rather than the individuals he frames. He calls for an extraction of the culturally alienated, university educated, “decadent stooges versed in text-book economics and aping the white man’s mannerisms and way of speaking” from the political affairs of the country, like “a dentist extracts a stinking tooth” (4). His discourse discredits “the hybrid class of Western-educated and snobbish intellectuals who will not hesitate to sell their mothers for a mess of pottage” (5). The discourse of the prime minister is logically fallacious but met with acceptance due to its passionate mottos. The success of the anti-intellectual strategy is seen at the ridicule and insults that the dismissed ministers receive. Although incoherent and fallacious on the whole, he persuades the masses by relying on simple imagery and evoking subjects that they cherish. This strategic anti-intellectual attitude is not a radical isolated case, but rather a logical outcome of a context antagonistic to the intellectual.

Benda's discussion of political passions stresses their infiltration into the intellectual and scientific realm. This turn does not take place without the complicity of an intellectual class which formerly "acted as a check upon" political powers with a disinterest in materialism, focalised attention on transcendental and intellectual activity, and concerns about justice and humanity (30). By abandoning their vocation, the 'clerks' entered the realm of political passion as "stimulators" rather than safeguards against those passions (31). By renouncing to their 'honesty', they have endorsed the political ardour by chanting "the chorus of hatreds" (31). The intellectual at the service of the political passions acquires the traits of impulsive action, impatience, obsessive engrossment, exaggeration, xenophobic attitude, and dogmatism. He "has entirely ceased to let the layman alone descend to the market place" and has embraced "the soul of a citizen" he formerly was detached from (32). More seriously, by adhering to the political passions that were formerly embraced by laymen, he ends up amplifying. He secures the basis power instead of negotiating it.

To further destabilise the function of the intellectual, political systems favour the emergence of an intellectual class blindly serviceable to their political agendas. The rarity of the intellectuals is what secures their efficiency for "the intellectual, like the beasts in the zoo, is respected for his rarity. Where he gets very common he commands very little respect" (496), according to Russell. For instance, the puritan community reflects the scarcity of non-clerical intellectual figures. Within these perimeters, Chillingworth's medical and herbal skills are seen as a "brilliant acquisition" in a colony where the health of the community depended on an elderly deacon and pharmacist "whose piety and godly deportment were stronger testimonials in his favour" than any certificate, and a barber occasionally performing the role of a surgeon (94). Similarly, when Odili's speaks about his father's profession as a district interpreter,

he relates instances of power drawn from intellectual merit. He relates that while “the District Officer was like the Supreme Deity”, the interpreter was a “minor god who carried prayers and sacrifice”; therefore, every “supplicant knew that the lesser god must first be wooed and put in a sweet frame of mind before he could undertake to intercede with the Owner of the Sky” (26). However, he speaks of a time prior to the mediocrity that dominates his time. The empowering rarity that enables intellectual to gain significant influence is countered by the manufacturing of amateur intellectuals and experts. The multiplication of intellectuals is a systemic scheme to diminish and dilute the prospective threat they pose in the face of political powers.

This systemic ruse is executed through an appropriation of technicians and experts which re-models the tag and function of intellectuals in society. Though Russell praises the intervention of technicians in decisive historical moments like the remedies and vaccines they develop, he considers the unregulated proliferation of technicians a “folly” that inevitably results in their deployment for destructive and military plans (495). Russell warns against the disintegration and erosion of the social significance and agency of the intellectual, and hopes for the advent of influence to the intellectual class more concerned about “human life” than technicalities (495). Orwell expresses Russell’s concern by articulating the ‘scientific’ tendencies of the intellectual class that emerged under the rule of the Party. The party turns intellectuals into experts whose function is either prying into people or the construction of death. The party scientist is both a “psychologist and inquisitor” who engages in examining human behaviour to elaborate methods of confession extraction and hypnotical procedures of consent, or a “chemist, physicist, or biologist” who supplies the war machine with efficient and innovative armaments (198). In Benda’s words, the intellectual turns into a “Minister of War” (84), within a “cult of the powerful State” where the “military” rightfully

dominates and the “civil” surrenders to it (Benda 82). These intellectuals metamorphose into “apostles of harshness” (113), who created a “*cult of cruelty*” (115) to applaud “the warrior” while disgracing the figure of ‘justice’ and ‘learning’ (117). With the rise of this intellectual class, less humane, and impetuously oriented towards the preservation of the system than the well-being of the human, political enslavement is guaranteed.

The Records department groups different types of intellectuals at the service of the party. The different sub-departments, advanced machinery, and propagandist studios, cannot properly function without intellectuals who commands the process only to be handed to a mass of ‘experts’ who draft, supervise, create, revise, the lies that constantly update the past before directing evidence to destruction. Tilloston, whose job resembles that of Winston, is engaged in falsifying history. He dedicates his expertise to the fabrication of lies that would serve the party. Similar to his function, one finds a sandy haired woman suppressing media evidence of ‘vaporised’ people. Strangely, she conducts her job with the usual fineness even when her husband figures among those names. The indifference shown by this woman exhibits the degree of appropriation the party establishes. Intellectuals are recuperated with no sign of loyalty or dedication except that for the party. Moreover, the Records Department is responsible for the creation of journalistic pieces, entertainment, school material, and literary works, all of which could not be done without the intervention of an intellectual class. Ampleforth employs his creativity of rhythmic and metric language to produce “definitive texts” of the poetry which has grown “ideologically offensive”, but had to be preserved (48). Instead of engaging in aesthetic experiences or even just causes, he commits his talent to serve the party.

In Orwell’s novel, the “new aristocracy” is composed of an intellectual class “shaped and brought together by the barren world of monopoly industry and centralized

government” (210). This partly redrafts the social stratum in which the intellectual figures prominently among the elite. However, it remains a partial social ascendancy that is carefully watched. Syme’s profile clarifies this idea. As a philologist, Syme devotes his intellectual expertise along with a massive panel of specialists to compose and update Newspeak. The project consists of linguistic destruction which limits the range of thought. He belongs to the intellectual class that is less humane and more determined to subjugate people. His inhumanity is captured in admiration of tortured subjects. His radical profile made his attachment to the party, celebration of its triumphs, and loathing of transgressors are described as “a sort of restless zeal” rather than simple, yet sincere emotions (61). However, while contemplating his profile, Winston anticipates his liquidation. Winston sees his vaporisation inevitable only because he “is too intelligent” while the Party is threatened by such profiles (59). Syme’s fervent defence of the party’s ideals does not serve him. He lacks the “saving stupidity” in spite of his perfect conformism (61). In a context of anti-intellectual spirit and megalomaniac leadership, conformity does not matter. His ‘orthodoxy’ counts as nothing compared to the risks of his consciousness and suspicious of internalising a revolutionary spirit and competing with Big Brother. Syme embodies a threat to the leader. His intelligence represents an equal status to that of the leader. Therefore, it destabilises hierarchy.

The rise of expertise deprives the intellectual of the precondition of ‘autonomy’ from political powers and commitment to political justice (Bourdieu 656). The role of assimilated experts is limited to the validation of plans already designed by politicians. The expert does not perform an enlightening function as his title implies. He is only deployed to accelerate the projects of his allies, or delays those planned by the rivals of his associates. The dispute between Nanga and Kobino, the minister of construction,

over asphaltting a road reveals the function of expertise. Nanga employs foreign experts to approve the asphaltting project before the elections. His impatience is certainly driven by his plan to secure his constituency, but more importantly, because of a transport enterprise he wants to launch after the bribe of ten buses he receives from the British Amalgamated. The minister of construction employs a comparable plan to delay Nanga's project. He postpones the road project under the pretext of counter-expertise by a native specialist who advises him not to run the project before the soil gets tested during summer. This pretext hides the motive of Kobino's indifference; the road is located beyond his constituency, and he has no share in the enterprise Nanga wants to launch. While relating the incident to Odili, Nanga ridicules the native expert by declaring that he wants to be an 'earthworm'. He confesses that the so-called expert received promotion in an illicit way, and in which Nanga participated.

The anti-intellectual spirit gives birth to superficial forms of commitment and intellectual consciousness. Jalio, a national novelist and the president of the Writers' Society, shifts from the normalcy Odili knew him with during university years, to an author who publicly declares "that he had become so non-conformist that he now designed his own clothes" (58). During the book exhibition that Nanga attends, Jalio shows this non-conformity with an exotic dressing code. The narrative focus on the exaggerated clothing of Jalio silences the aesthetic and intellectual talent of the character. Except for a title his novel, the narrator declares no elaboration about its content or the political views of Jalio. In addition, Odili "expected that in a country where writers were so few they would all be known personally to the Minister of Culture"(58). However, Jalio is flagrantly unknown to Nanga. Plus, he is even rebuked by the minister for not informing him about the presence and ambassadors, and his informal clothing. Nanga's initial nonchalant attitude and reprimand are not even

contested by Jalio. In spite of the “inauspicious” confrontation, Jalio flatters Nanga in his opening speech by praising the doctorate of honours that Nanga is expected to receive (59). Jalio projects the image of the intellectual. His integrity fades with his pride. In spite of being rebuked like a child, he does not show disapproval and praises Nanga.

The rise of the intellectual who deserts his own principles does neutralise the threat of the real intellectual, but it severely immerses conscious voices and younger generations in despair. Winston is initially drawn to O’Brien’s character based on the belief that he was part of the Brotherhood. Winston plans his revolutionary scenario with O’Brien as principal actor whom he admired. When he finally discovers that O’Brien is a loyal agent of the party, Winston enters a phase of denial but O’Brien confronts him with truth: “ ‘Don’t deceive yourself. You did know it — you have always known it.’ Yes, he saw now, he had always known it” (245). The discovery stands a first shock receives after his arrest. It significantly contributes to his surrender, betrayal of Julia, and acceptance of the invincibility of the party. More explicitly, Odili confesses having experienced an “intellectual crisis” during his final year at university encouraged by a revolutionary history lecturer and the head of their students’ union (104). Under their influence, Odili changes from an aspiring student who wanted to establish a secure financial status to a political militant. However, the crisis amplifies as the mentor of a whole generation, the president of the union, turns from a “fire-eating” figure, critical of governmental corruption, into “an ice-cream-eating Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Labour and Production”, whose illicit money became public knowledge and calls for the incarceration of trade-unionists marked the front page of newspapers (104). This transformation, though ironic, marks the disappointment of a whole generation witnessing a fellow militant turn into “a classic example of the

corroding effect of privilege” (104). The fall of exemplary intellectual characters from idealism to advantage-seekers sacrifices generations of educated classes who could potentially bring change. By defusing the menace of the role models, despair inhabits masses of followers.

Within this anti-intellectual atmosphere, education, as practised and systemised in the novels, is limited to a powerful tool in the propagation of political ideals and preservation of political systems. Being the primal terrain of the intellectual’s role, it counters his threat when executed with a ‘stultifying’ perspective, that which perpetuates hierarchies and promotes inequality. In the Puritan Community, discipline was attained through the “rigid” methods of the “frown, the harsh rebuke, the frequent application of the rod, enjoined by Scriptural authority” not only as a “punishment for actual offenses, but as a wholesome regimen for the growth and promotion of all childish virtues” (73). Pedagogically, education is conducted through *The New England Primer* and *The Westminster Catechism*. The content is aligned with the restrictions of intellectual life. They teach primary literacy and theological basic notions. With this approach, education becomes a requirement only to literate one’s self as necessary to be acquainted with the religious foundation of the colony. It conforms to the instruction of a “vast mass of people who are able to read and nothing further; who are just, therefore, material for any kind of hysterical propaganda” (Russell 497). Beyond that, nothing needs to be explored. The same process of indoctrination is seen in Orwell’s novel with more complexity. One cannot expect a sort of a different education designed by the Ministry of Truth. Historically, the textbook that Winston consults, for instance, relates a propagandist version. It describes London before the “*glorious Revolution*” as “*a dark, dirty, miserable place*” ruled by the capitalists who enslaved the whole population already trapped is securing the basic needs and hegemonised through physical violence

(Orwell 79). Pedagogically aligned with the philosophy of the party, the same textbook fallaciously inculcates the denial of one's own tangible senses, refutes "the validity of experience" and "the very existence of external reality", advances commonsensical reasoning as the "heresy of heresies", to make 'two and two' actually and undeniably five (86). It is a pedagogical system which breeds ignorance and obedience.

The ministry of truth, which is the total opposite of its nomenclature, is founded on the cardinal, yet fallacious, slogans of the Party: 'War is Peace', 'Freedom is Slavery', and 'Ignorance is Strength'². The latter is foundational since it is accompanied by the incrimination of thought and knowledge. Through knowledge, intellectual activity disseminates which makes war propaganda less tenable, and freedom attainable. Ignorance is rhetorically constructed into a "virtuous ignorance" which confronts "dangerous knowledge" (Proctor 2). It is rhetorically made virtuous and acting against that made dangerous. To counter that, the party controls education and transforms it into an 'agnotological' machine for the fabrication of ignorance. Thus, the destruction of books by the Party becomes a 'strategic ploy' of agnotology, in which the past is obscured in 'lost knowledge'. The production of ignorance does not always entail radical refusal and suppression. As soft as agnotological education, scepticism and suspicion are tethered to rise of intellectual class of experts, pseudo-intellectuals, to counter the threat of the real intellectual. By offering their insights to the public or being serviceable to the political systems, they end up engineering ignorance in a way or another. By deceiving the public, they spread misinformation; by being serviceable to the system, they manufacture pseudo-knowledge to control the masses.

In Achebe, however, education loses this facet. Neither systemic nor opposition plans do include education in their power schemes. Achebe's novel deals with a

² The slogan is cited by Proctor as a famous quote inaugurating his book on Agnotology

situation that is too rotten that a solution of this sort is not offered. The discussion of education is limited to the anti-intellectual spirit which sees in educated people an aping body to the white man. Had education been relevantly capable of changing anything, Odili would not have left the profession of teaching. Even Andrew, Odili's friend and fellow colleague, does not show initiative via education.

The undermining of education in Achebe's novel erodes its function. In a context which values materiality and power, education is not required to secure that. Odili's father anticipated answer to his plan for further studies evinces the societal perception of education. He considers that Odili received "more than enough education", and "that all the important people in the country today" holding ministerial, parliamentary, or business positions "did not have half" of the education Odili received, urging him to quit "this foolish teaching" and get "a decent job in the government" to buy himself a car (29). With the anti-intellectual spirit that is socially disseminated, education is valued based on the power or monetary counterpart it offers. When it fails, it becomes secondary. Nanga openly declares that "Churchill never passed his school certificate" (22). This statement fallaciously implies that political success does not depend on education and intellectual merit. Churchill remains an isolated case with an average academic performance which he compensated once admitted in the Royal Military College. However, Nanga's reference is just an attempt to exclude competency and replace it with loyalty. Nanga's statement is not a vacuous proclamation. It reflects a systemic policy to gradually void education of value.

The inaccessibility and incapacity of the leading class to educational levels which equate or compete with younger generations is concealed by a historical fallacy. During the reception of the minister at Anata school, Nweze explains Nanga's good manners by "the sound education he had received when education *was* education" (11).

Nanga relates a conflict of generation which fallaciously matches former education levels of lower grades to higher ones, a classical *argumentum ad antiquitatem*. He audaciously claims that the standard six elementary certificates in his days were far more significant than a current Cambridge certificate. Nwege joins Nanga's delirium by amplifying his ego: "Cambridge? Who dash frog coat? You mean it is equal to B.A. today—if not more" (11). Nwege is oblivious to the fact that his declaration is self-insulting. As a responsible in the current educational system, he undermines the sector in which he performs a major role. The appeal to the past, though fallacious, allows Nanga, Nwege, and a whole generation with modest academic levels to establish an image of educated men. However, while sustaining their public image, they stain education with an irreversible stigma. The denigrating attitude is clearly shown in the value and position that education would confer. Peter receives enough education to be appointed in a post office or elementary teaching. However, that was prior to the time of narration. In spite of his education, he is a housekeeper to Odili. More cynical is the status of Nanga's secretary who holds an Oxfordian B.A. The prestigious academic level could only qualify to step in the role of running errands for a 'barely literate man'.

The success of the educational policy is incarnated in the conduct of children. Hawthorne portrays the puritan children as a replica of their parents. They entertain themselves with "grim fashions" of the Puritan world, mimicking church-going, Quakers and witch whipping, and shadow-fighting with Indians (74). Similarly, the same abuse Hester and Pearl receive from adults is equally found in the way young puritans treat them. The children "scorned them in their hearts, and not unfrequently reviled them with their tongues" (75). When they see the woman and the child together, the puritan children are adamant on pestering and abusing them both physically and verbally. In Orwell's novel, educational indoctrination restructures primal human

affection. The institution of family is deconstructed and replaced by loyalty to the Party. Through the instruction received at school and organisations, the Parsons children are “systemically” re-educated into “ungovernable little savages” that surprisingly “produced in them no tendency whatever to rebel against the discipline of the Party”, but rather a rage against the enemies of the Party (31). Parents are normally scared of their children for it was frequent that a ‘hero child’ is reported to have denounced a parent. Before the novel ends, Parson is reported by his little daughter. Through indoctrination, children turn into agents of the thought police.

The anti-intellectual facet of education is not an alarming revelation coming from a system that minutely invests in every possibility to prolong its longevity. However, the appalling fact is that which ties the counter-power to the same ‘circle of dependency’ rather than that of ‘emancipation’, equality, and power. Jacques Rancière’s iconic book, *The Ignorant Schoolmaster*, relates the exceptional teaching experience of Joseph Jacotot. In spite of the linguistic barrier, Jacotot, a French teacher, could favourably teach his Flemish students the French language. Though Rancière’s book is primarily concerned with education as a practice, many of his observations could be projected on the trajectories of the protagonists as intellectuals and their attitudes towards the masses in a possible context of revolution. Jacotot’s experience, or experiment, empowers students by unbinding their intellectual capacity. Jacotot’s students could learn and transcend the communicative impediments because they were primarily “emancipated”, freed from a dependency on the master and “obliged” to employ their own intelligence (15). The singularity of this experience necessitates one’s emancipation before the other. Liberating the other needs a prior liberation of the self, a firm consciousness and belief in “the true power of the human mind” which initiates “a circle of power homologous to the circle of powerlessness that ties the student to the

explicator of the old method” (15). However, the crisis of the intellectuals is defined by the sociopolitical rope of powerlessness to which they are tethered, and in turn, attach it to others. Rancière declares “Those excluded from the world of intelligence themselves subscribe to the verdict of their exclusion” (16). The attitudes of the intellectuals, which will be assessed as masters, position them within the same dynamics of the political systems they oppose. Even if their elitist attitudes display a feeling of superiority, which forms the foundation of the dependency circle, they innately harbour a belief of their incapacity and inferiority, a trait of the adhesion to ‘the verdict of exclusion’.

Both Winston and Odili express an inflated despair instead of a resolute spirit required to confront the political ‘ogres’ they face. Consequently, distrust shapes their attitude towards the crowd. The political powers they combat are intrinsically magnified that they cannot trust the crowd with a spontaneous action, an action based on egalitarian capacity to overturn political powers. There is a constant need for planning, instructing, supervising, and fathering the revolt. The superiority they display stems from an inner, dwarfed self-portrait. Winston declares to Julia that “In this game that we’re playing, we can’t win”, “We are the dead” (142). Victory is not envisaged in the face of a Party which controls everything. If there is any victory, Winston believes, it might “lay in the far future, long after you were dead, that from the moment of declaring war on the Party it was better to think of yourself as a corpse” (142). Similarly, Odili engages in political with a conviction of unsurmountable defeat. Contesting Nanga is only symbolic in a context of generalised corruption. With this attitude, both Winston and Odili are self-immersed in a circle of powerlessness with which they approach the concept of revolt.

Orwell develops the theme of education in a way that exceeds both Hawthorne and Achebe. The stultifying approach highlighted above is reflected in the opposition

sketched in the novel. Both Winston and the Brotherhood adopt comparable stultifying perspectives to those of the party.

Julia encapsulates significant ingredients of a revolutionary mind. Her intelligence is prominent in her character composition as a subject “far more acute than Winston, and far less susceptible to Party propaganda” (159). In terms of political convictions, she represents the opposite of Winston. In spite of her realisation of the eminent threat of being caught, she believes in the possibility of forging a private space of liberty when some fortune, cleverness, and courage are available. Unlike Winston’s pessimistic and deterministic view, Julia refuses to surrender to defeat as an unalterable condition of existence. She disengages from the inexorable feeling of death that Winston expresses. In her conception of life, more realism and focus on the present emanate. For her, it is a fully human body that she is engaged with intimately, fully “real”, “solid”, and “alive”, not “a skeleton”, (142). In addition, Julia displays astute evaluations of the situations she faces. To Party members, she is a girl of “an excellent character” and “an infallible mark of good reputation” (137). This outer reality perfectly conceals her opinions. In spite of the hatred she nurses against the party, she maintains an appearance of conformity as a troop-leader and a volunteer in the Anti-Sex League. Julia keeps a busy appearance of immersion within the collective activities of the Party as a “camouflage”, keeping “the small rules” to violate “the big ones” (136). Her intelligence leads to the conclusion that is contextually-pertinent: “Always yell with the crowd [...] It’s the only way to be safe” (129).

Sharper than her contextual awareness, Julia comprehends the inner workings of the party. It is Julia who introduces Winston to the purpose underneath the façade of repressive sexual puritanism. She explains to Winston that “sexual privation induced

hysteria, which was desirable because it could be transformed into war-fever and leader-worship” (139). While sexual satisfaction neutralises the fever about the Party’s leader and doctrine, the party imposes restrictions to preserve the capital of libido. Julia declares that the hysterical energy dedicated to the party “is simply sex gone sour”; ‘chastity’ ensures “political orthodoxy” (140). The preserved sexual instinct is a “driving force” for “the fear, the hatred, and the lunatic credulity” the party wants its adherents to accentuate (140). By doing that, the party turns a peril into an advantage. Moreover, Julia’s sceptical attitude proposes an equally perceptive analysis of war. She discredits war by considering it a move orchestrated by the party in order to generalise the feeling of fear. Her sharp political awareness of the context, which exceeds Winston’s, and intense hatred of the party represent a point of departure that should have been trusted. It must be her relation with him that led to her tragic end. Had she followed her earlier life, she would have never been caught. Yet Winston considers her inferior to him. Winston’s judgment of Julia is contradictory. The transgression Julia makes in spite of her reputation solidifies the view of her intelligence. However, Winston cannot trust her intelligence because of his dogmatic and elitist views.

Julia represents an individual experience of emancipation with capacitating traits that Winston fails to catch. Instead of treating her as an equally intellectual subject, his elitist and explanatory attitudes handicap the process of emancipation. He openly describes her openly an intellectually average person, “fond of using her hands” rather than mind, someone able to detail the novel composition methods at the Fiction Department without being “interested in the finished product” or reading in general (137). Although Julia does not conceal nor is ashamed of this fact, it does not prevent Winston from judging her. Moreover, whenever Julia’s political views are expressed, Winston’s narrative tone engages with explicative and elitist judgments. The general

passionate tone that is firmly linked to a feeling of inferiority clashes with significant, albeit short, censorious moments in which he assumes superiority. For him, Julia is a young, overly optimistic girl, ignorant of the intricacies of politics before the revolution. Her views are centred on individuality. Winston reduces this attitude to naive terms. Julia's hide and seek pattern to preserve her private life is trivialised by Winston. She advances "no general criticism" and is generally uninterested in the doctrine of the party "[e]xcept where it touched upon her own life" (138). Winston's final thoughts about Julia reveal his judgment. In his vague thoughts, Julia is joined to the post-revolution generation "knowing nothing else, accepting the Party as something unalterable, like the sky, not rebelling against its authority but simply evading it, as a rabbit dodges a dog" (138). Winston's figure of the master temporarily restores his initial idea about Julia. He joins her to the class of people upon whom the doctrine of the party is most effective: "the world-view of the Party imposed itself most successfully on people incapable of understanding it" (162). In his perception of Julia, Winston revokes her choice to focus on her private affairs without preoccupying herself with matters she did not see herself apt enough to contest.

Where Winston's judgment recedes, it is a matter of opinionated prospects rather than an emancipatory belief in Julia's equal intelligence. Winston approves Julia's behaviour and political stances only when aligned with his views and ambitions. For instance, the vulgarity with which accompanies her mention of the Party is judged "natural and healthy" only because it is symptomatic of radical defiance and rejection of the Party (130). Like vulgarity, Julia's past relationships with party members are approved by Winston. He rationalises this corrupt facet of the party "with a wild hope" that "the Party was rotten under the surface, its cult of strenuousness and self-denial simply a sham concealing iniquity" (132). Winston hopes that this basic instinct would

eradicate the party. In most cases, however, Julia is subject to Winston's censuring tone. The resurfacing of this idealist attitude is premised on the despair and magnified portrait of the party he harbours within himself. The studies which focus on gender dynamics in the Winston-Julia bond touch upon a sexist attitude in Winston's treatments (Erwin and Patai 257; Frank 2025; Connors 470). However, the relationship is more intricate than that. Though his relationship with Julia is structured around a visible feeling of inferiority, he still perceives her with "a pitying, protecting feeling" (133). The complexity of Winston's feeling defines the paradox of perception and attitude. What appears to be contradictory is Orwell's capacity to capture the oscillation of the human psyche. The feelings of inferiority that characterises Winston's libidinal attachment does not negate the superior position as a master explicator outside the realm of intimacy. In both directions, Winston fails to be equipped with a leading charisma and a sound revolutionary perspective. Winston values Julia as a woman. The moments he judges her do not stem from his masculinity, but rather from an urge of explanation. Both his esteem to Julia and his infrequent feeling of superiority represent obstacles in his journey as an intellectual.

Winston's experience further differs from that of Jacotot in the pedagogical instrument. Jacotot renounces the role of the master to emancipate his students through *Telemachus*. By sole reliance on a book that he hands to his students, Jacotot taught them, and yet "he had communicated nothing to them of his science" (Rancière, 13). Jacotot suppresses the master inside of him. In Jacotot's experience, the book symbolises totality, "everything is in *Télémaque*" (19). The totality is not the worldview the book professes, or supposedly does, like the absolutist narratives of truth in Goldstein's book or the attitudes of the Puritans towards the scriptural sources. Rather, it is in relational nature the book establishes and the circles it at once destroys and

establishes. Télémaque's materiality enables the students to learn on their own. It positions the student in a struggle with reading, the ordering the letters, and the extraction the meaning until he reaches the stage of autonomy and composition. The 'totality' of the book is premised on the established tie between the materiality of the book and the intelligence of the student, the "infinity is no longer the master's secret; it is the student's journey" (23-24). Within this totality, the student is emancipated. Learning is not exclusively held by the master; it initiates the student to the "circle of power" which eliminates "incapacity" (23). In fact, "The materiality of the book keeps two minds at an equal distance, whereas explication is the annihilation of one mind by another" (32). He abstains from imposing himself as to allow the students' intelligence to confront the book. Telemachus is certainly didactic if one wants to critically assess its content; it resembles in many aspects Goldstein's book, namely in the ideology it propagates. And yet its effects are rather emancipatory than restrictive.

The symbolicity which the book mediates works against the function it divulges in 1984. Even if Goldstein's book plays a promising role in a context where intellectual symbols are distanced, its essence remains a continuity of anti-intellectualism. Winston's perception displaces the significance of the book from symbolicity to a real necessity. Winston procures the book in order to understand and launch a revolt. The initiative itself bears significance and values education and intellectual activity. It resembles Jacotot's initial faith in a book. However, it represents a necessity in the way of revolt. Without it, Winston could never launch a revolution. Without dependence on a master (O'Brien who himself obeys Goldstein) and the materiality of the book, Winston feels invalid. This perception reverses the symbolic function of the book in Jacotot's experience and Ranciere's thought. Winston's reaction after reading establishes a hierarchal structure of intelligence. The book enunciates "nothing that was

new” but it “fascinated” and “reassured” Winston as “product of a mind similar to his own, but enormously more powerful, more systematic, less fear-ridden” (204). Winston submits to his own inferiority by admitting the superiority of Goldstein. The book does not emancipate but only assuages his feeling of loneliness. In fact, the issue of Goldstein’s monograph is not exclusive to Winston’s perception. The text does not initiate intelligence or trusts it; it instructs and divides minds according to a hierarchy of intelligence. It expresses judgements held against “average man” (190), “dumb masses” (213), and preaches an uncontested belief that humans are not “equal in their native talents and that functions had to be specialized in ways that favoured some individuals against others” (208). The assertion is pivotal. The book asserts the natural differences to conceal the inequality in intelligence. With the emancipation suspended through the stultifying reasoning, the book assumes a hierarchy of intelligence that cannot fulfil liberation from social and political hierarchies.

Conforming to authorial reticence about the Brotherhood, this latter is situated in a place of ambiguity which solidifies rather than invalidates the principle of the stultification. Treated as an autonomous opposition group, the Brotherhood shows how revolution fails to amount to liberation by replicating the same dynamics of those in power. And even if one considers the possibility of being a creation of the party, it further shows reliance on stultification. Even when the mechanisms of power and manipulation are exposed, Winston fails to be contextually aware of this possibility, let alone leading an efficient opposition power. Both hypothetical situations spot the locus of the problem, not the validity of the claim. If Winston remains disoriented, it proves that the book fails to emancipate. In spite of the evils stated, the book does not lead Winston to action, and it never did with people before him. If the Brotherhood exists; it obeys the same patterns of the dictatorial regime it denounces. Consequently, it is

contaminated with the same order of explication. If, however, it is a fabrication of the Party, it stands as a clear background against which counter-revolutionary forms are compared, reflecting similar patterns and mutating into ‘circles of dependency’ and ‘stultification’ rather than liberation.

Orwell lays bare the metaphor of stultification by relocating it from the symbolic field of education to the literal sites of torture. The parallelism between the dynamics of opposition, the method of execution of intellectuals, and the power systems are retrieved in the phase following Winston’s capture. The interrogations he goes through and the presence of O’Brien concretise Winston’s desire to be controlled by a stultifying master. It is worth noting that Room 101 is indeed a terrifying site of torture. The terror it represents is implied in the reaction of the prisoners when summoned to the room. However, the relevance of instruction is more prominent and decisive in Winston’s trajectory inside the interrogation room and Room 101. In fact, the less discussed nature of this phase significantly survives in popular culture more than the aspect of torture. 101 refers to instruction and initiation in any subject or field. Interestingly, Winston faces not only physical torture but mental and intellectual abuse that is premised on the principle of explanation. This draws a parallel between the relevance of explanatory foundation of those in charge and those who oppose. It is worth noting that in spite of the prominence of physical torture, intellectual abuse is that which marks Winston’s experience in the room leading to his end in the novel.

Prior to his admission to the room, Winston is subject to tedious interrogations. Physical torture, Winston discovers, is “preliminary” and marginally secondary (247). After this preliminary process, the frequency of physical torture decreases and becomes an intimidation in cases of disappointing answers by Winston. They gradually achieve

sessions without any reliance on it. Significantly, Winston's interrogators shift from tormentors to intellectuals who, instead of pain, rely on humiliation that resembles subjecting a schoolboy to punishment. With one-leg stand, his face slapped, ears wrung, and hair pulled, Winston is demeaned more than physically tortured. When O'Brien reappears, the climax in Winston's trajectory, that of 'perfecting' him, starts. O'Brien takes charge by wearing "the air of a doctor, a teacher, even a priest, anxious to explain and persuade rather than to punish" (252). Throughout the interrogation O'Brien cloaks himself in "the air of a teacher" (254), "a schoolmaster" (272), executing a "schoolmasterish manner" (290), and explaining "as didactically as ever" the different elements that contribute to Winston's rehabilitation (292). On the other hand, Winston appears as "a wayward but promising child" (254), "a promising pupil" (272), and at times reproached of being a "slow learner" (254), asked to perform repetition drills "like a school child" while O'Brien is seen "nodding his head with slow approval" (254). Even when inflicting partial pain on him, Winston detaches it from O'Brien and is seen clinging to a belief that O'Brien intervenes to 'cure' Winston whom he perceives and tirelessly convinces to be a "mentally deranged" subject with "a defective memory" (252). The treatment of Winston's non-conformity in pathological language reflects O'Brien perception of Winston's incapacity and justifies his intervention. Moreover, even when O'Brien accepts to answer Winston's questions, he strategically leaves the question on the Brotherhood unanswered. Though he answers his first two questions about Julia and Big Brother, O'Brien's silence about the existence of the Brotherhood works as a trace of continuous dependency in the stultifying system. Apart from the doubt it casts on Orwell's narrative, the unanswered question is a portion of truth/knowledge left to ensure Winston's dependency on the master. With this

assumption about Winston's inferiority, O'Brien fulfils the air he wears in his explanatory approach. It is instruction and persuasion that dominates this phase.

The prominence of stultification during this phase defines its nature. It goes beyond the establishment of O'Brien as master and Winston as a pupil. It fulfils the worldview of the party which holds that power over humans is "above all, [power] over the mind" (270). It is a 'relearning' phase in which Winston's "power of arguing and reasoning" is obliterated, turning gradually into "a mouth that uttered, a hand that signed, whatever was demanded of him" (249). The essence of Winston's "reintegration" reveals a process of stultification divided into three phases: "learning", "understanding", and "acceptance" (267). In this surplus of instruction, emancipation is not the goal but rather acceptance which generates obedience. O'Brien conceives Winston's incapacity as a failure to reach the "humility" and regulation of a "disciplined mind", a deviation from "the act of submission" to the worldview of the party which guarantees the "sanity" by experiencing outer reality and truth exceptionally via "the eyes of the party" (255). Put differently, this relearning and humility Winston is asked to abide by is but a deliberate belief in one's incapacity rather than intelligence. What further positions stultification as a primal strategy is the fact that the party is not invested in futile felonies that are constantly committed; it is not "the overt act" but "the thought" that catches the attention of the Party (259). The party does not only break its enemies but alters them. Neither "negative obedience" nor "abject submission" would be sources of gratification; the goal the party aspires to reach is deliberate submission out of "free will" (261). The dissenter is converted with his innermost thoughts held and remoulded, purged of heretical tendencies, and adopted to wholeheartedly embrace the party's camp before being eliminated.

During this phase, the same pattern recurs. O'Brien assaults Winston with series of questions which are followed by affirmative and explanatory statements that are instructive and corrective to Winston's case, and which radically contradict material evidence. The pattern circles around the arch-rival of Oceania, a story of three dissenters, and the 'two and two make five' principle. O'Brien instructs Winston to perceive the current enemy as the perpetual one in spite the frequent changes. Additionally, O'Brien dismantles the innocence of three party members, and even their existence, though he displays the picture of Jones, Aaronson, and Rutherford again in front of Winston before being thrown in the memory hole. He trains Winston into believing the story of be delusional even when based on material evidence. O'Brien's instruction aims at eradicating what is concrete and material by convincing Winston into seeing four fingers as five. Premised on the principle of stultification, the process invalidates intelligence and urges one to embrace the worldview of the master while suppressing tangible and verified reality. O'Brien's stultification surpasses persuasion; he is not interested in Winston being convinced but to actually and irrefutably see four fingers as five, and to firmly believe that the photograph as material evidence is illusory.

After rounds of stultification, Winston admits and accepts that Oceania is and has always been the eternal enemy; consciously refutes the material evidence he once held in his hands about the story of Jones, Aaronson, and Rutherford and admits being "a legend" and an invention of his own (263). In addition, he surrenders with total submission that two and two turn into five. The stultification made it possible for Winston to experience a moment "of luminous certainty" that O'Brien repaired a space of "emptiness" within him, that "two and two could have been three as easily as five" (264). Winston feels "oppressed" and conscious "of his own intellectual inferiority"

while O'Brien was "in all ways larger than himself" anticipating every argument that Winston made and neutralising it (262). The successful performance gradually succeeds in making Winston doubt himself and believe what the party preaches. Winston is stultified; the cognitive processing called for in learning and understanding is manoeuvred to engender acceptance, obedience, docility rather than liberation, scepticism, and emancipation.

Conclusion

The enigma of servility to political leadership is clarified through a libidinal approach. The crowd is innately driven towards submission to a leader who consumes their ego. In contrast, the intellectuals experience detachment from collective associations due to their attachment to feminine figures. In spite of this privilege, they fail to appeal to crowds because of their lack of prestige, oratory merits, and public image management. Even with their positions secured, leading figures supplement their assets with a systemic dissemination of anti-intellectual discourse and practices to neutralise the threat of the intellectual.

Chapter Three

Violence(s): The Multi-layered Fabrics of Crowd and Power

III- Chapter Three: Violence(s): The Multi-layered Fabrics of Crowd and Power

Introduction

Almost any discussion of crowds entails at least a reference to violence. The mythical image of many-headed monster is evocative of violence, engraving a sense of horror in which the collective body is inevitably violent. Jean Stoetzel attaches a regular, conventional, and ritualistic character of violence to crowd behaviour (231). Equally, Le Bon draws the profile the crowd possessed by “violence” and “ferocity” (32), forming flocks of “barbarians” (205). Though this image is largely incoherent in its sweeping treatment of crowds, it remains relatively accurate. The illusion of participatory politics and hegemony exercised against massive numbers of people in several political schemes leave the masses with one historical solution, resort to violence. The potency of violence to redress political action and restore justice, however, remains a subject to inspect. In addition, the discussion of violence in relation to crowds seems one-directional. The violent character of crowd obscures a proclivity to manipulation that is equally present among crowds. If crowds are seen as principal agitators of violent acts, they are equally subjected to tacit forms of violence. Thus, a study devoted to crowd should address violence, as exercised by and on crowds, in its visible manifestation and invisible plots and implications. Interestingly, the three novels are replete with violent instances which indicate a culture of violence rather than episodic and irregular manifestations. Violence penetrates deep into the social and political fabric that it becomes continuous, able to regenerate itself by being concealed into its own web. There is an attempt to maintain violence dormant and invisible at the heart of every visible manifestation.

The American Civil War was a ground for Hawthorne to closely inspect violence and the atrocities that humans are capable of. Though he was not in the front line, the distance allowed him to observe its effect as a civilian³. However, prior to the Civil War, Hawthorne himself was subjected to political violence. After the election of General Taylor, Hawthorne's office ends and is exposed to the rancour of the incoming administration. Hawthorne, an unwanted "Loco-foco Surveyor", was immediately replaced once the Whig Party took over (9). Hawthorne describes the inherently violent dynamics of the Spoils System as "a law of political warfare" (35), prioritising political partisanship to place the fate political opponents in a context of "bloodthirstiness that is developed in the hour of triumph", and exposing human "fierce and bitter spirit of malice and revenge" when possessing "the power of inflicting harm" (34). Hawthorne compares these political dynamics to the 'guillotine', with the receptiveness of the new holders of power to decapitate the heads of their rival. The victorious party relies on these practices to expand its territory of power, promotes interests and tenure, and enfeebles opponents. Public appointees were expelled because of "the whirlpool of political vicissitude" and turpitude (11). Political loyalty and affiliation grant ephemeral power to holders of office, and put political opponents in risky situations. The general scene typifying the public sector with incompetence is but a result of these dynamics. The Spoils System nourishes a mentality of cronyism. It is a loyalty-driven process that cultivates incompetence. In a compromised system, the appointees act in their interest and are rarely selected based on relevance to their occupational performance. The inefficient employees of the Custom House, as described by Hawthorne, perform their routine of bureaucratic duties, overreacting to minor issues while allowing significant affairs to pass unnoticed. The political violence Hawthorne was exposed to is a

³ See his essay "Chiefly About War Matters" where his ironic tone, like the one traced in the frame narrative, could be read as a technique to appease the psychological damage.

continuity of the sovereign rule of his ancestors. Though he did not experience Puritan violence first-hand, their massacres were public knowledge. The cruelty of their acts leads him to sever ties with at the level of name, and to wish for a new land for his progeny that would curb to the attachment to Salem.

Orwell's experience during the Spanish Civil War left a heavy impact. His battlefield experience as a volunteer against the Fascist regime of Franco surpasses the severe injury of the deadly bullet his neck receives. His experience in front line left him with a scar that would never heal which, deepened his disbelief in revolution and its fateful failure as implied in *1984* (Williams *Orwell* 59-61). By his immersion in war, Orwell tries the most direct and concrete way to revolt. However, he witnesses the failure of revolution and the rise of centralised dictatorial regimes and political violence with the participation and complicity of crowds. The despair and magnified portrait of Party in *1984* are inherited from this experience. He portrays how violence operates both explicitly and implicitly to secure grounds for political powers instead of subverting them.

Unlike Orwell, Achebe was never involved in armed conflicts as a soldier. However, the exposure to violence was inexorable during colonial rule. More importantly, in post-independence Nigeria, Achebe observed a deteriorating political scene which would influence the composition of *A Man of the People*. Between 1962 and 1966, Achebe witnesses disputed national censuses, political trials of treason, adjourned elections, regional conflicts fuelling separatist plans, the anarchy of mass violence, and the 1966 military coup. Achebe had closer grasp of the events since his function as a broadcaster gave him access to information. The conflict over censuses reflects the national fractures between the different ethnicities and regions leading later to the civil war. In *Arrow of God*, Achebe already anticipates the fracture by depicting

“the initial attempts to create warrant chiefs and indirect rule in the area”, seeds already planted by colonial administration (Ezenwa-Ohaeto 99). In ‘The Voter’, a short story Achebe published before *A Man of the Man People*, Achebe delves into the theme of “money politics” and “the dimming of noble principles” in the electoral process (106). *A Man of the People* combines the omens of the political violence that Achebe was observing. He structures a fine piece that anticipates everything that would later happen. Clark, Achebe’s friend, calls him ‘prophet’ for the predictive talent he exhibits in his novel, except the coup. The following day, Achebe attends to his office where he finds soldiers surrounding the building, “The last ‘prophecy’ in Achebe’s novel, completed about a year before the coup, had been fulfilled” (109). Like Hawthorne and Orwell, Achebe’s prophetic rendering attests to a deep understanding of the subject of violence and the mechanisms that operate amid violence and its types.

3.1 “Words, words, words”: Language, Control, and Violence

In his analysis of violence, Žižek differentiates between the “directly visible “subjective” violence, performed by a clearly identifiable agent” (*Violence* 1), and the “purely objective, systemic, anonymous” (*Violence* 13). The interplay between the visibility and invisibility, explicitness and implicitness, and directness and indirectness is traced in the realm of the symbolic. Language does not reconcile; it in fact twists, subjugates, deceives, and produces consent within a framework of discussion and participation. This violent facet of language deserves a separate treatment because it plays on the two poles that are relevant to this chapter: explicit and implicit violence. Linguistic violence departs from the normative view that considers “entry into language” as a testimony of “renunciation of violence” inherent to humans as ‘speaking animals’ (Žižek *Language* 1). Being chanted as a non-violent vehicle, language neutralises every attempt at measuring ‘the normal standard’ from which opposed

centres of visible and invisible violence emanate. It disarms subjects by inviting one into an outwardly pacifist territory, but essentially a violent one. In this way, language “involves unconditional violence” (2). In the Heideggerian sense of ‘essencing’, language shapes reality through its symbolic codes. Much the visible form of violence is mediated through language. This latter does more than explicitly harbour violence utterances. The structures of violence that are indirect and more detrimental are connected to the communicative facet of language. The illusion to inaugurate discussion and to promote tolerance and justice through language contradicts the linguistic implications that perpetuate hierarchy, subjugation, and conceals truth. Violence is indeed exercised through language or systemised to be disseminated through the premise of its dialogic and conciliatory frames. Achebe dismantles this linguistic illusion by locating the abuse of minister within the political contours of discussion. Apart from the apparent verbal violence the ministers receive, the dialogic nature of Achebe’s Parliament is compromised, announcing the parliamentary crisis of ceding “the revolutionary forces” of its origin (Benjamin 244). As Han argues, Parliament “reduces speech to command” (41). Inside the Parliament, the site in which political language and its pacifist nature is supposed to exist, the fate of the ministers is decided rather debated. Symbolically, they are subject to violence through language and in a setting which suggests reconciliation and dialogue.

Violence as a philosophical concept is linguistically problematic and relates the crisis that one confronts politically. It is a concept which exists in linguistic and cross-linguistic ‘networks’ of meanings as Barbara Cassin argues for the ‘untranslatable’ concepts of philosophy, those which “one keeps on (not) translating” because they are problematic, involving reliance of neologism or imposition of meaning, and symptomatic of situations in which “neither the words nor the conceptual networks can

simply be superimposed [across languages]” (xvii). Though not treated separately in Barbara Cassin’s Dictionary of ‘Untranslatables’, violence inevitably features among the concepts which cannot be converted into languages without assuming auxiliary nuances or relinquishing some shades of meaning. The semantic field of violence relates a vacillating concept aligned or opposed to the established order, constructive or destructive (Benjamin), hegemonic or emancipatory, physical or abstract, authorized or unauthorized / offensive or defensive / restrictive, restorative, policing, threatening (Raymond Williams *Keywords* 329-330). Before being linguistically mediated and manifested, is itself subject to the violence of language.

The crowd’s victims in the three texts are exposed to verbal abuse. Hester faces the rigidity of the puritan community with a barrage of brutal insults that disrepute her. Equally, both the party prisoners in Orwell’s novel and the ministers in Achebe’s text encounter the same fate. They are exposed to accusations of treason through language. Even the roars of meaningless ‘hoos and boos’ sent by the crowd relate linguistic abuse. They are not semantically empty interjections; they expose clusters of people to aggression, shame, and fear. Language is instrumentalised to force these subjects into facing public condemnation through humiliation and ridicule. While this explicitness of linguistic violence is significant indeed, a far more detrimental facet is tied to language when seen in the political context.

The Shakespearian motto of “Words, words, words” (66) is reflective of a linguistic and political reality relevant to the discussion at hand. When Polonius asks about Hamlet’s reading, the answer implies meaninglessness. Like the linguistic void Hamlet expresses, the use and abuse of political language is best indicated in the hackneyed word ‘Democracy’. Historically, the word was pejoratively employed. For the American Founding Fathers, ‘Democracy’ was a slur they associated with Athenian

chaos. They preferred being called Republicans instead. The word Democracy was rehabilitated as a 'political marketing for poor'. Andrew Jackson employed it to seduce voters against capitalist aristocracy. Jackson addressed people who have egalitarian proclivity to gain the election. This way the slur turned into a positive connotation. (Dupuis-Déri 322-323). This transformation relates the violence inherent to political language. Democracy is employed without a stable meaning, implying an empty political promise of justice which underscores the manipulative faculty of language. This imprecision is conducive for demagoguery and populism, for it grants the tool of execution (Anderson 65). Language deceives the masses into believing they are ruled for the best of their benefits, but in reality it perpetuates and consolidates ruling over them.

Language is the executive emissary of violence. This latter is exhibited through the medium of language under different shapes and for separate intents. Therefore, the communicative facet of language, that which mediates peace, reconciliation, and dialogue grants shapes to forms of abuse, manipulation, and domination. In its seemingly impartial use, language serves unconscious ends. Dormant within the tissues of social and political life, words that seem innocently designative and descriptive often solidify the Derridean 'violent hierarchy' by framing political existence into binaries of superiority and inferiority. The official nomenclatures like minister, reverend, honourable, and chief are indirectly defined based on the presence of a less revered mass to be administered and ruled over. Thus, language, in its simplest usage, reorders reality according to the hierarchical perspective of the political domain. Equally, language defines the process of othering (Han 37). It frames existence in antithetical binaries of inclusion and exclusion. The political systems of three novels, notably *1984* and *A Man of the People* fortify their existence through enmity with the 'other'. This

latter is born into language framing before reality. In fact, a degree of othering is vital to identity construction. The self dissolves into nothingness without the contours that define it as opposed to others. The inevitability of this othering becomes problematic when deployed by the political systems to fabricate constant threats among group members. The threat and the collective reaction to it turn into visible acts of violence only to conceal the objective violence at play.

The manipulation and subjugation of the masses are principally executed through language; leading figures, as has been shown in the previous chapter, do not resort to brutal and repressive violence, but rather rely on sweet words to cajole the masses. As noted by Agamben, the foundation of political life relies on the principle that “violence and politics are mutually exclusive”, being political is subject to “the principle that everything should be decided by the word and by persuasion, rather than by force or by violence” (*On the Limits of Violence* 104). This principle fades when the backbone of its validity is dismantled. Truth, a major element is revisiting Bakhtin’s carnival and the crisis of leadership, is the specific medium through which the non-violence of language is perceived. In this regard, Agamben focuses on the fact that the modern political scene is contaminated by lie instead of truth, a context in which “the association of language with nonviolence no longer holds up to scrutiny” (104). Instead, an “organized linguistic violence aimed at manipulating consciousness” emerges and exceeds by that a mutual act of persuasion between two humans into a massive act of “propaganda” (105). Unconsciously, and in spite of flagrant contradictions, people are lured into believing that Nanga is ‘A Man of the People’, Big Brother is a protector of the revolution, and Goldstein is a traitor. It is through language that conditioning takes place. The proverbs and slogans complicit with power and corruption are primarily linguistic.

The oratory merits of the leaders are traces of linguistic violence in which language obscures truth and harbours duplicity. During her public shaming, Dimmesdale hides behind his linguistic eloquence and asks Hester to expose her “fellow-sinner and fellow-sufferer” even if he descends from his “high place” to join her, for it would spare him the feelings of an eternal “guilty heart” and a concealment which adds “hypocrisy to sin” and deprives him of the “open triumph” which Hester could access by being publicly exposed while this sinner whom Hester hides perishes in regret (54). His address to Hester, pseudomorphic to an honest disclosure, is but a linguistic disguise which brings solace to his fear of exposure. His rhetorical evasive language is inherent to the violence of language itself. The series of signifiers he employs are closer to what Lévi-Strauss calls floating signifiers (63). Instead of confessing, he hides behind the barriers of language to deliver a “vague confession” which articulates “the very truth [...] into the veriest falsehood” (114). He uses a referential language that only Hester would decode while perceived in a radically different way by a crowd. In addition, the linguistic violence employed by Dimmesdale is paradoxically, and only partially, self-comforting. By subjecting the crowd to his strategic ambiguity, Dimmesdale maintains his anonymity and partly transcends his internal struggle by appeasing his conscience. Through language, he comforts himself and displaces the blame of hiding to Hester’s refusal to reveal Pearl’s father.

Orwell shares with Hawthorne and Achebe the rendering of linguistic violence, but he accentuates this dimension through the peculiar case of Newspeak. The system structuring this latter joins Han’s identification of violence in the “totalitarian over- or hypercoding” (112). The ultimate project of the Party in asserting radical control over its subjects is partly conducted through the constant linguistic modifications. The language policy and planning of the Party consists of “the destruction of language” (57),

a systematic pruning of language into a basic, elementary version which considers lexical diversity a pointless excess which generates ambiguity. The project of Newspeak is thus effectuated through a grammar of curtailment which permits linguistic transformations through minimal rules. Newspeak preserves convertible roots for the different grammatical classes, adding when necessary suffixation to adjectives and verbs, and relies on a peculiar regular system of inflexion. This results in an anomalous and stagnant shape of language that transcends polysemy, synonymy, antonymy and is consonant with the worldview of the party. Oddly, the over-codification is effectuated through a minimalist, approach to language. By simplifying it, language becomes more complex in deployment and intent.

Indeed, verbosity is neutralised but so is the human faculty of thought. The structural, minimalist, and destructive approach to language is politically oriented. Newspeak is never “ideologically neutral” (312); its linguistic repertoire is oriented towards meticulous monosemy and semantic exactitude which is principally structured to cleanse language of unfavourable expressions pertaining to “unorthodox meanings” (306). Newspeak transcends being a mere articulative frame for Ingsoc habitus; it radically renders “all other modes of thought impossible” (305). The restraints imposed on language extend to neutralise thought and consciousness. By abolishing the wording that would express undesired, ‘criminal’ acts, the Party renders “thoughtcrime literally impossible” (58), and “literary unthinkable” (305). Newspeak is “intended to impose a desirable mental attitude” (309). The neologisms of political discourse in Newspeak are specifically formulated to curb meaning more than expressing it. Their signification process broadened to enclose intrinsically series of words which could be contained in a single one. Therefore, conceptions “inimical” to the principles of Ingsoc take the shape of “a vague wordless form”, joining “condemned whole groups of heresies” (315). As a

preventive measure, the adherent of the Party is incapable of perpetrating several crimes since they are beyond the scope of his expression and imagination. Words which challenge Ingsoc like freedom, equality, justice, science, rationality, are all labelled derisively as ‘crimethink’, ‘oldthink’, ‘thoughtcrime’. In this way, party members only need to know, through binary designation, the permitted behaviours and the incriminated ones. The undesired concepts no longer exist once incorporated into a single word; “heretical thought” exists only in “the perception that it *was* heretical”, and words past this qualification become “nonexistent” (312). Once Newspeak conquers Oldspeak entirely, the Party asserts its radical control.

As the institutional language of Oceania, Newspeak is aligned with the submission to the party for “Orthodoxy means not thinking—not needing to think. Orthodoxy is unconsciousness” (59). The party wants subjects to deploy language in the way the nameless character whom Winston catches talking with a girl in the canteen. His speech is reduced to merely “a noise, a quack-quack-quacking” (60), “a noise uttered in unconsciousness” (60). In spite of not being able to detect the exact meaning of what he was saying, Winston could conclude that it was “pure orthodoxy, pure Ingsoc” (60). He loses human attributes by resembling “not a real human being but some kind of dummy” (60), whose speech is issued “from the larynx without involving the higher brain centres at all” (314). This kind of speech, which the party terms ‘DUCKSPEAK’, is purely physical, a mode of expression that is merely organic than intellectual. By “*Thoughtcrime does not entail death: thoughtcrime IS death*” (34), Orwell does not only display the inevitability of death the Party associates with transgressive ideas and acts. The meaning tethered to both language and symbolic, intellectual death is that of the restriction of thought through the assimilative Ingsoc principles embedded in language. Thoughtcrime signals the death of the Cartesian

subject, '*cogito, ergo sum*'. The absorption of the Ingsoc doctrine and the expansion of the domain of thoughtcrime through Newspeak disqualify the human as a thinking subject and announce his end.

Language is instrumentalised to enact, legitimise, and perpetuate violence. Its performative asset allows it to shape reality and sustain power. The inherent force of violence attached to language exerts control and materialise power. In its symbolic unfolding, language does not only offer a unique form of violence. It is a terrain in which the visible and invisible operate. The political is inevitably tied to language as Han argues, "[s]paces of power are spaces of language", and to counter power is counter its language first (70). Language for Orwell is connected to thought; its decline marks a decline in thought as well. Even if the observation is harsh, it makes the process "reversible". Remedying language, for Orwell, liberates thoughts, and consequently, leads the way towards "political regeneration" (*English* 350). Thus, the revision of language turns into a necessary political initiative. Orwell insists on change in linguistic habit to guarantee political change though detractors of change minimise this orientation.

3.2 The State of Exception: Crisis-Driven Rule and the Rise of *Homo Sacer*

In the analysis of violence, Žižek observes an 'SOS call' inherent to the visibility of subjective violence which blurs systemic hidden violence by fabricating series of crises (*Violence* 10-11). It generates a context he describes as "the manipulation of a paranoid *ochlos* or multitude: it is the frightening rallying of frightened people" (41). The framework of crisis transcends the analysis of isolated cases into a general mentality of governance that Agamben calls the 'State of Exception'. It derives necessity from discernible agents to chant the '*necessitas legem*

non habet’ motto. By positioning necessity as “the primary source of law” (Agamben 17), the State of Exception relies on this foundational maxim that legitimises its suspension of law and the appropriation of a sovereign status (24). The legitimising pretext of necessity is but the metamorphosis of the State of Exception into and exigency, a situation mischievously offered and naively received as an inexorable political reality. The State of Exception creates an “ambiguous and uncertain zone” in which the extra-legal becomes law (29-30). This subjective facet is in fact a sort of violence declared against the ruled. It is a manipulative scheme which magnifies and distorts facts for the sake of expanding sovereign rule.

The puritan society, though preceding Agamben’s discussion of the State of Exception, is principally founded on the same perils of necessity. At the core of its theological and political foundations, crisis is induced by the ‘Original Sin’ and the oppressive context in England to inspire the sense of exceptionalism, electiveness, and contingency measures to govern the nascent state. The Winthropian “infant theocracy” is grounded on a “sweeping prophecy of doom” in which divine testing monitors the conduct of the ‘elect’ against digression and inclination to earthly pleasures that entail divine wrath, applied more severely “among those whom the Lord favored” if they ever fail their holy errand (Berkovitch 3-4). The disruption of the holy errand faces a god who “writes his severe truths with the blood of his disobedient subjects” (7). The master texts of the puritan culture express “a deep disquietude” which anticipates the failure of the errand into the New World (Miller 2), and which become interpretative frames for the “distresses” they face (Miller 7). The tradition of the jeremiad mourns and decries the transgressions of the people and postulates divine retribution as an outcome for these digressions. It is a narrative that preaches submission to the commands of god and avoidance of temptations. This foundational narrative of the Puritan culture is structured

on an alarming call that maintains a strategic expression of angst. However, the essence of this strategic deployment of distress seems to be the grounding of the State of Exception. The American revision of the tradition of jeremiad did not diminish “the threat of divine retribution” but rather “asserted it with a ferocity unparalleled in the European pulpit” (8). They celebrated it as “corrective” rather than “destructive”; it was a self-fulfilling prophecy that validates divine promise (8). Thus, even with their modifications, they maintained the necessity, and to a strategic end, normalised its manifestation. It employed the European rhetorical tradition of “anxiety”, “fear”, and “trembling” not only to inculcate “acceptance of fixed social norms”, but to make “anxiety its end as well as its means” (23). By positioning the crisis as the norm, the establishment of the State of Exception becomes achievable.

Hawthorne’s novel is set in the transition between the first and second generation making the context relevant to the threat more apparent in the comparison between the founders and the descendants. The novel coincides with the “decay of godliness” spotted by Miller (7). The symptoms of this regression are seen in the penchant towards extravagance both stressed in the novel and highlighted by Miller. In addition, sex represents a major digression that the novel centres on and is equally indicated by Miller. The digression of the second generation made the Winthropian ‘city upon a hill’ towards which all eyes fixed, dissolve, and with it, the divine wrath to be afflicted magnified. In this way, the model of reform and governance attached the puritan errand turns into a model of punishment (Miller 11-12). The omnipresence of the crisis in Hawthorne’s text is retrieved in the depiction of a community largely concerned with punishment. To counter the threat of transgression, the puritan deemed punishment central to their governance. Early in the narrative, Hawthorne refers to the historical significance of the prison. The puritan ‘utopian’ foundation deemed it

important “to allot a portion of the virgin soil [...] as the site of a prison” (39). Thus, the violence of punishment occupies a cardinal place in the puritan culture. The frequency of discipline among puritans is retrieved in the worn-out description of the prison. In spite of being a nascent building, the prison is described as ‘weather-stained’, with a rusty door, looking “more antique than anything else in the new world” (39). Hawthorne contextualises the work by further referring to Ann Hutchinson to bridge the gap between the actual and fictional. The narrator imagines the ‘rosebush’ to have grown under her tread as she was admitted into the prison. This reference highlights the centrality of violence and punishment for both generations.

In Orwell’s *1984* the Party secures the alarming call by fabricating crises internally and externally. The internal threat posed by the Brotherhood justifies the emergence of the State of Exception. Goldstein appears as a ‘principle figure’ during the Two Minutes Hate. He descends from an equally important position as that Big Brother, to a “renegade and backslider”, a “primal traitor”, and “earliest defiler of the Party’s purity” leading an opposition movement of criminals and heretics (18). On daily basis, Party members are exposed to this demonic narrative which amplifies the menace. This narrative is also tied to the external threat. Goldstein’s conspiracy is believed to be safeguarded by foreign forces. In addition, Winston describes the spirit of the world the Party creates as dominated by “fear, hatred, and pain” (37). Time was beyond his recall when Oceania was not engaged into war. As Winston reflects, the Party holds people in a “literally continuous” war (40), with no evidence which relates changes in enemy or ally, for “[t]he enemy of the moment always represented absolute evil” (41). The insignificance of subject of enmity announces the central point of the external threat. During the Hate Week, bombing was staged in every direction and in a frequency that exceeds the usual as to materialise the external threat and boost the

hatred. To visually appeal to crowds, the Party exhibits a gigantic portrait of a Eurasian soldier heavily armed out-shadowing even the portrait of Big Brother. The success of this strategy is seen in its effect on proles who, “normally apathetic about the war”, engage into “periodical frenzies of patriotism” (155). Suddenly and unquestionably, Oceania was declared to be in war with Eastasia not Eurasia. The party orator breaks partway through his speech with “the feral roars of rage” of the crowd while “[h]ate continued exactly as before, except that the target had been changed” (186). This scene represents the essence of warfare. It is not the enemy which matters but rather the State of War, the conflict it generates, and the necessity it postulates.

The endless wars between the three superstates animate the necessity required for the establishment and justification of the State of Exception. As Julia suspects, the war was nonexistent, a mere “sham” meant “just to keep people frightened” (159). The continuous war is often announced to be brought to an end with proclaimed fictive victories to accord credibility to the narrative. In reality, the permanent warfare between the three superstates rarely violates the established geographical limits; it is an undeclared agreement which justifies the state of exception while preserving “the heartland of each super-state” and manoeuvring the conflict to marginal areas (192). It is a war that is indecisive by nature, of parties which are “too evenly matched” and economically “self-contained” to be conquered by one another (191). Even if the three superstates possess the atomic bomb, they refrain from employing it. Its instrumentalisation would entail the end of hierarchical society, the source of power of the ruling class. Thus, they ceased using it but still produce it, like many armaments, while “the art of war remained almost stationary” (199). Armed conflicts do not bring any conclusive resolution. A concrete assault with the annihilating effect is beyond imagination. However, even if the war is indecisive, “All members of the Inner Party

believe in this coming conquest as an article of faith” (197). This holds them in a perpetual expectation of a moment that would never be realised.

Achebe’s sense of crisis is recollected from the context he observed in the composition of *A Man of the People*. The years preceding the Nigerian Civil War allowed Achebe to observe political, regional, and ethnic tensions that threatened national unity. The coup at the end of the novel exhibits the most literal and realistic emergence of State of Exception. The verdict is justified by the violence that erupts. However, throughout the text, crises are announced. The approach of the general election and the struggle between the Progressive Alliance Party and P. O. P. coincides with the international financial crisis in the global business of coffee. In addition, the corrupt government he depicts legitimises its rule by reiterating how foreign powers conspire against the nation. The reader is reminded of how the ousted ministers are depicted as “conspirators and traitors” allied “with foreign saboteurs to destroy the new nation” (3). This indicates that crisis is not always an outcome of political unrest but can also exist in a form of strategy. The government offers the haunting spectre of foreign enemies to concretise threat and justify the alarming emergency of national security. Achebe relates a case which testifies against the pacifist nature of politics to portray it as a realm that is inherently violence. The necessity through which law is suspended, a whole cabinet dismissed, officials jailed and citizens killed, accumulates, symbolically, through minor necessities of election. The electoral period stands as a “critical moment” (3), and “a life and death fight” (96). In Achebe’s narrative. Securing votes from peasants amid this challenge becomes a necessity, while relegating sponsoring of these planters means jeopardizing election. Thus, it is the electoral frame, challenged by those threats, which gives rise to the exceptional measures of governance. Symbolically, the

very medium of pacifist politics, renunciation of violent conquest, and resort to democratic means which becomes the principal instigator of exception.

The political atmosphere of crisis and necessity broadens the domain of power. The emergence of the State of Exception highlights “a zone of irreducible indistinction” (Agamben 9). Within its frontiers, law is suspended while simultaneously maintained. In this way, “it is impossible to distinguish transgression of the law from execution of the law” (57). This loss of structure in law is for Agamben the zone of indecision that grants sovereignty. Instead of a clear legal background that monitors and judges conduct, the ruling class becomes the absolute embodiment of legal, judicial, and executive powers. Both Hawthorne and Achebe portray systems which thrive on crisis to blur the branches of power. Orwell, however, seems to portray crisis in accordance with dystopian world he creates. Without reliance on it, the Party is already sovereign, holding absolute power over its subjects.

In spite of predating Agamben’s State of Exception, the dynamics of the puritan culture resemble the essence of Sovereignty. In the Puritan “church-state, theology was wedded to politics and politics to the progress of the kingdom of God” (Berkovitch xiv). This archetype of sovereign governance advances Puritanism as a totalising doctrine that monopolises power. Hawthorne’s reflection on his ancestors reveals the early foundation of the puritan culture. It is a culture founded on the “Bible” and the “sword”, a combination that allowed Hawthorne’s lineal ascendants to assume roles of “war and peace” and occupy military, legal, political, and religious positions of power (10). The violence performed by the puritans, as “bitter persecutor[s]” (10), against the Quakers and during the witch-hunt, renders a culture immersed in bloody and unholy practices disguised as godly. The combination of the Bible and the sword defines a culture which oscillates between visible, physical violence and manipulative discursive one. The

foundation of puritanism is evidently based on a subjective, physical, violence but largely nourished by and nourishing an objective, implicit violence. In addition, the multiple tasks occupied by those ancestors announce the blurred zone upon which the culture is founded. The amalgamation of the religious, judicial, and political is the very medium through which law is suspended. It is not seen as such because the State of Exception, by suspending law, becomes the incarnation of it. The idea of the church-state itself is significant to the state of exception and reflected in Hawthorne's text in the intertwinement of law and religion. It is a culture in which "religion and law were almost identical" (Hawthorne 41). At the core of puritan culture, the scriptural source was the basis of their exegetical, hermeneutical, and pragmatic practices. Just like his predecessors, "the exigencies" the "new country had transformed Governor Bellingham into a soldier, as well as a statesman and ruler" (Hawthorne 83). The puritan rule expands as to decide on matters of higher and public legislative significance, concerns about Hester and her child, or the ironic property of a certain pig leading to a dispute and legislative revision (79). In his approximation of the term, Agamben finds the 'State of War' the closest to his theory. Had Agamben enlarged the scope of his discussion beyond the European frame, he would have derived a sense of necessity and sovereignty from the establishment of Puritanism

The rise of sovereignty and suspension of law in Achebe's novel is clearly illustrated in the military takeover. The critical phase that follows the publication of corruption incidents justifies the intervention of the military. The atmosphere of violence amplifies the threat to establish sovereign rule. However, this explicit example is preceded by another instance which Odili relates. The accusation of the ministers with treason animates the crowd to the extent that the "whole country was behind the leader" (3-4). Odili relates that the Union of Students met for an "emergency session" to

pass “a vote of confidence” in the Prime Minister and appeal for a “detention law to deal with the miscreants” (3-4). This heralds the intervention of the extra-legal through legal means, a situation applying to the sovereignty of the State of Exception. The vote of confidence grants the minister an absolute power. Equally, the request for that punitive law is illegal. It demands of an executive figure the duties legally exclusive to the legislative. Equally, during the electoral campaigns of one sees reliance on extra-legal physical violence. Nanga relies on ‘armed’ mercenaries to neutralise his political opponents. The suspension of law, the coup, and the presence of extra-legal practices expand the domain of power.

The concept of *homo sacer*, or the scared man, explains the logic of the State of Exception. The figure “who *may be killed and yet not sacrificed*”, meaning life that he simultaneously within law and outside it (Agamben *Homo Sacer* 8). Like the nature of the State of Exception which nullifies law while maintaining in a form of sovereignty, the practice exercised on *homo sacer* does not locate him outside law. He is included in law in the “capacity to be killed” (8). It is a practise of ‘ban’ which situates him in an ambivalent locus. He is neither outside not inside law but rather “abandoned by it, that is, exposed and threatened on the threshold in which life and law, outside and inside, become indistinguishable” (28-29). In the acme of sovereign gesture, this figure is bound to law only if the form ending his life. He is subjected to the “sovereign sphere” by an act which can neither be classified as “sacrifice” nor “homicide” (82-83). The image of *homo sacer* depicts him with his rights violated by being slain without incrimination. He is rescued only “in perpetual flight or a foreign land”, and continuously “exposed to an unconditioned threat of death” (183-184). The State of Exception ends the contracting that secures a protective state. Subjects are all exposed to the threat of nature and law again.

Hester, Hawthorne's *homo sacer*, is a subject through which sovereignty is exhorted. Her transgression annuls her civil status to expose her to multiple infractions of her rights. This symbolism of Hester's punishment confers her legal and social death as a subject. The violation of the private sphere includes/excludes Hester in/out of the legal sphere. The biblical foundation of governance among puritans nourishes the concept of sovereignty. Her punishment is decided by a sovereign body which could have pronounced death according to the biblical sources that govern the colony. However, Hester is spared death, a gesture that is more sovereign than capital punishment.

In addition, Hester's case does not nullify law. On the contrary, it subjects her to it while deprived of all her civic right. The magistrates decide to place her under public gaze and condemn her to "a mark of shame" to be worn for the rest of her life (51). Even public shaming is equally biblical. However, if Hester's punishment has basis in the scriptural source, its extension to a daily penalty is not. Although the beadle sets a temporal frame to her public punishment, Hester faces a daily penalty that persists and extends beyond the scaffold to validate her emergence as a *homo sacer*. Hester is not solely publicly shamed but socially dead, ostracised, with "the effect of a spell" that extracts her from "the ordinary relations with humanity" and encloses her "in a sphere by herself" (44). Her punishment extends beyond the legal frame to a daily retribution which confirms the violation of her civic right. Moreover, the authority of the church is also seen is disqualifying Hester as a mother. Judging from the nature of her sin, the church steps into private spheres such as parenting.

Equally, the location of Hester's lonely cottage reflects her status. It is located on a deserted site, on "the outskirts of the town [...] not in close vicinity to any other habitation", putting Hester, already "without a friend on earth", far from "social

activity” and “shut out from the sphere of human charities” (65). The location and description situates Hester closer to the forest, the symbol of bare life, than the city. Her proximity to wilderness, pushed and ostracised from social life, might suggest her exemption from the application of law. Yet it is the site which marks the legal zone of the State of Exception. Even in this reclusive site, Hester is subject to the same law which banishes her. It is only “by licence of the magistrates” and their “inquisitorial watch over her” that Hester is granted permission to dwell there (65). Added to the idea that she is reclined to a peripheral zone of the colony, like those Indians and sinners who inhabit the forest, it has never recorded that her work was worn was brides. It resembles how she, though gradually integrated, she cannot be sacrificed. The gradual and relative social acceptance does not fully reintegrate her. In spite of the requests she receives for her handmade crafts, by nature of her sin, banishment, and the sacredness of the marriage institution, the society deems her skill contaminating to the scared conjugal bond. Though gradually incorporated, her status remains that of an outsider. Although the magistrates do not end her life, they facilitate her legal and social death. The sovereignty of the church is seen in its capacity to end or restore life. However, it penetrates deeper to manifest in arbitrary selection of penalties and intervention in the private sphere left to the elect to resolve.

The Sovereignty which supresses the status of the individuals is equally found in Orwell’s novel. The novel opens with the party’s supreme right to revoke privacy by prying into people’s intimate life through police patrols. By gradual violation of intimacy, the Party reaches the stage of inquiring into the most private and secretive parts of its subjects, thinking. With the assistance of telescreens, sensitive to the lowest whispers, and spectrally omnipresent with it “never-sleeping ear” (172), the party defines a perimeter of motion to remain constantly within the area of command.

Unaware when they are surveilled or not, people “ had to live—did live, from habit that became instinct—in the assumption that every sound you made was overheard, and, except in darkness, every movement scrutinized” (10). Thus, well conduct, even in the facial expression, became a recommended measure when facing the telescreen as entailed in the FACECRIME. The sovereign violation of privacy entails the suppression of OWNLIFE. The party rules over subjects who are not supposed to have ‘spare time’; subjects constantly immersed in “communal recreation” against any “taste for solitude” or “individualism and eccentricity” (88). The party holds them in total control restricting mobility by imposing prior permission for long travels. In addition, the purges and vaporisations of the party refer to the legal status being effaced and the sovereignty amplified. The party holds the supreme right to exterminate subjects not from life but from existence. Every vaporised person turns into an ‘UNPERSON’ once effaced from the records of the party. The party imposes these sovereign measures to generate subjects utterly inoffensive. Winston believes that even with these measures one could “outwit” the party for “all their cleverness” fails to reach the discovery of what one is thinking (172). He believes that the torture that one undergoes could be contested if one chooses “not to stay alive but to stay human” (172). These idealist thoughts are prior to facing the firm hand of the party. However, the novel ends with Winston’s feelings being radically altered. Once his threat neutralised, Winston turns into a non-subject that everyone treats carelessly.

In addition, the arbitrariness of law in Orwell’s novel is representative of the notion of sovereignty. It holds subjects in a position of uncertainty which intensifies submission to the will of the state. They are subjected to a situation where “law is all the more pervasive for its total lack of content”, a law “in force without signifying”, where “the most innocent gesture or the smallest forgetfulness can have most extreme

consequences” (*Homo Sacer* 52). There were crimes which were forbidden but loosely watched like going into proles’ shops or frequenting prostitutes. Apart from the pragmatism attached to flexibility of such crimes, which could not be radically eliminated, they grant the party the right to inflict or spare penalty whenever it decides to. Other crimes, like the possession of a diary, though “not illegal” by codified law, it was “punished by death, or at least by twenty five years in a forced-labour camp” (14). The suspension of law and the annulment of civic status legalise the physical violence exerted on subjects. In Orwell's novel, torture is normalised. It reaches the stages of being accepted by the tortured subject. Inside the interrogation room, both Ampleforth and Parsons intimate to Winston admit being guilty of the crimes accused of, and therefore, justify their own subjection to torture. The idea is that the sovereignty of the party needs no law to exert its power and deprive people of their natural rights. In this way, subjects remain docile and indecisive between serious offenses deserving death and those which are not. *1984* depicts a form of sovereignty in which the whole population is turned into classes of *homines sacri*.

In *A Man of the People*, the abuse of the ministers strips them of their legal status. Even if they are framed through baseless accusations, they are not judged through a legal procedure properly executed to incriminate the alleged conspirers. Instead, they are publicly shamed and ridiculed. Inside the parliament, calls for their hanging propagate. This does not unfold as an empty threat. Their emergence as *homines sacri* exposes them to actual physical violence. Mobs ruin the car of the minister of Finance and assault his house while another one “had been pulled out of his car, beaten insensible, and dragged along the road for fifty yards, then tied hand and foot, gagged and left by the roadside” (4). The state of exception, apart from the coup at the end, is shown is less extreme application than Orwell’s novel, but nonetheless more

symbolic. In 1984, the constitutional order is abolished while in Achebe the suspension of law is positioned within its zone of application. The parliament turns into a pillory. This heralds the disintegration of the legislative structure and the rise of the executive force.

The sense invincibility that Le Bon highlights as an outcome of the birth of the group neutralizes law and legal measures. Instead of decent legal treatment, punishment and penalty become rituals attended by the public and orchestrated to satisfy it. The centrality of people in legal affairs brings about inconsistency in the execution of law and punishment. The absence of proper logical reasoning and pervasiveness of emotions shape the commands domains that require logic rather than zeal. The crowd is not limited to the subjective violence generative of the State of Exception. The inclusion of the public is a systemic redirection of the violent character of the State of Exception to a subjective agent while hiding the mechanisms of the sovereign state. The crowd participates in the abusive process which suppresses *homo sacer*. The public emerges as relevantly entangled in dispossessing other subjects of civic and legal rights while simultaneously exposed to the same peril.

In Hawthorne's novel, the "sentence of a legal tribunal" validates "the verdict of public sentiment" (41). Hester's case is judged from the realm of emotions rather than reason. The legal nature of the process demands attentive and careful treatment. However, Hester is judged in the colony "where iniquity is searched out, and punished in the sight of rulers and people" (50). Instead of a decent legal treatment that preserves the dignity of the convicted, the beadle places Hester in the spot where everyone has access to her shame. It is a place where violence is ritualistically voyeurist. This transforms a process of supposedly legal nature and religious/moral dimension into a spectacle that condemns Hester to the spot of 'public shame'. The subject feels denuded

in front of massive eyes. The relevance of public voyeurism is manifested in the scaffold being a significant instrument of the “penal machine” (45). Historically, it has been as efficient as the French “guillotine” in fostering civic conduct (45). It was designed firmly maintain the offender’s head to public scrutiny and deny him the chance to conceal his face as an “ideal of ignominy” (46). This positions the crowd into active participants in state violence. The shame, though contested by the puritans as lenient, experiences “an agony” feeling “as if her heart had been flung into the street for them all to spurn and trample upon” (45). As Hester walks from the prison door to the spot of shame, the distance was actually shorter but internally made longer by the cruel public attending her trial. The public is not included in the penal system only. Power is seemingly validated and renovated with the same reliance on the public. The cyclical electoral process of the Governor is ritualised “at the hands of the people” (176), with the procession passing “before the people’s eye” (179), to announce “the political year of the colony” (179). Thus, the central role the crowd occupies in power dynamics is limited to the validation of the system which will oppress them. With the sovereign rule, the individuals forming rationale for Hester’s shaming and electoral appointment are not excluded from its ruthless logic. They are potential *homines sacri* to be subjugated to the same ordeals in case of transgression.

The public is equally included in a major party practice. The public executions are significant because of the crowd. In this way, the crowd becomes participant in dispossessing the Eurasian prisoners of their rights. By being convicts, they are already penalised. However, the essence of their punishment is more performative than legal processes. The exhibitionist treatment of the Eurasian prisoners nullifies the legal dimension to their punishment. In one scene, Winston catches an escort of trucks “with wooden-faced guards armed with sub-machine guns standing upright in each corner”

accompanying “little yellow men in shabby greenish uniforms [...] jammed close together” and exposed to the shouting of the crowd (122). The force displayed is incongruous with the description of the prisoners. The party stages a whole parade for inoffensive subjects only to impress the public. In addition, the narrator remarks that with the climactic “great orgasm” of the Hate Week reaching stages of “delirium”, the crowd would have been “unquestionably” capable of dismembering the Eurasian prisoners destined to public hanging to pieces (184-185). This does not stand as a fanatical fantasy mediated through the spirit of the moment. The scene ends with the crowd avenging the murders by burning the house of an old couple “suspected of being of foreign extraction” which made them suffocate to death (156). The crowd engages in an act which violates the status of this couple. Hester’s shame and the punitive measures of public executions and great purges metamorphose from legal sentences into emotional exhibitions. Such events deactivate human compassion and nullify the sense of reasoning that equips one with rational reflections. Instead, these ritualistic spectacles substitute standards of the humanity with an air of sadism. These instances indicate the savagery and sadist attitude of the crowd that permeates the ‘legal’ punishment.

Systemic violence operates passively on the foundational basis of subjective violence. The crowd is a participatory agent in this process. It animates violence, augments its impact while the repercussions are systematically schemed by an observant leading body holding the strings outside the perimeters of chaos. As far as the vicious union of power and violence is concerned, the crowd is limited to the participation in subjective violence. Political powers make of multitudes guinea pigs for manipulative schemes while synchronously exposing the same threat they fabricate.

The three novels reveal different stages in the application of the State of Exception. Hawthorne's novel predates the concept to offer a rendering of sovereignty

which the State of Exception aims to establish. Achebe's novel remains a portrayal of a frequent and more realistic political case which operates back and forth, between law and lawless settings. As for Orwell, he proposes a radical case; fiction allows him to portray a 'permanent State of Exception' more extreme than Agamben's analysis of modern politics. In Hawthorne and Orwell, the crux of State of Exception is taken to an extreme. There is no law to be suspended but rather an extended establishment of sovereign rule based on fear and crisis. It is the norm rather than an exception subject to normative measures. These two novels succeed in neutralising a long legal tradition and start anew. The puritans depart from both monarchical rule and established churches on the same basis of necessity claimed for corruption. The party, similarly, breaks away from the pre-revolution and start a new legal order.

However, with the practices of sovereignty within the three political systems, The Foucauldian and Deleuzian societies against which sovereign rule is defined become irrelevant. In spite of the 'disciplinary' and 'control measures' through which killing is aborted, none of the novels ends before an actual death is committed. Apart from the social death of Hester, the concluding narrative remarks report the execution of Mrs. Hibbins for accusations of witchcraft. Obviously, Orwell's text, which receives much debate about its depiction of a Disciplinary/Control Society, is replete with instances of murder subjecting enemies as well as innocent citizens to the threat of death. Achebe's novel does not end without prior reference to death. Max's investigation of corruption and inflation of ballots by Chief Koko's wife prove fatal for him. Hence, the form of governance that defines rule in the three novels apply the concept of sovereignty in its most literal manifestations. Foucauldian and Deleuzian societies operate in moments of peace and normalcy. When threat emanates, sovereignty is restored. Therefore, if a system nurtures itself on threats, the relevant

point to discuss is the State of Exception. Other measures of discipline or control become secondary to the manifestation of sovereignty. The political being inherently violent is not metaphorical. Even if it establishes tacit forms of control and discipline, it preserves the most literal and visible form of violence, the ‘statist right to kill’.

3.3 An Autopsy of Impotence: Law-Making/Preserving Motion and the Imperative of Abnegation in Revolutionary Violence

In his critique of violence, Benjamin offers three conceptions ascribed to the character of violence. He posits as potent what he terms ‘Divine Violence’ for its “law-destroying” nature (249). Violence in the three texts is constrained by a flagrant absence of the law-destroying ethos. The puritan violence visible in the historical massacres of Indians, religious dissenters, and the heroine remains defensive of their rule and ideals. They safeguard the culture from its disintegration. The violence exercised on Hester, like Hutchinson and a long list of victims before, protects the ‘purity’ chanted by the system. Equally, the violence shown in torture, public executions, purges, and bombing of innocent children and women in 1984 secures the ground of rigid rule and eliminate dissent. Similarly, the optimism attached to the violence of theft, strikes, burnings, and political turmoil preceding the end of Achebe’s novel inaugurates a tighter rule. While Odili and his friends hope that the atmosphere would end the “seven years of lethargy” (96), it ends announcing a coup instead of rebirth. Those instances of violence are charged with the protective facet of law-preserving instead of the destructive nature of Benjaminian ‘Divine Violence’.

The political systems practise and licence only a violence that is either ‘law-preserving’ or ‘law-making’. For instance, Benjamin refers to the paradox of allowing strikes in order to counter larger forms of violence (245). This way, when some violence is allowed, it remains protective of the state rather than disruptive. Even in its

most flagrant opposition to the interest of the state, violence is permitted when it cannot imperil rule. As seen in the three texts, crowds are not incriminated when performing a violence which justifies the crisis necessary for the State of Exception. Intervention and state policing operate only when violence acquires a dimension that cannot be contained otherwise, “violence, when not in the hands of the law, threatens law” (239). Like in the coup offering closure to Achebe’s text, the military interferes when the danger of mob violence becomes a threat to the system itself. Legal violence functions either as law-making or law-preserving (241). In the State of Exception, legality is suppressed but with the same function preserved. Thus, the very State of Exception is a sort of law-preserving violence.

In the instances highlighted so far, none could amount to bring change because of a logical connection to power. The systemic violence cannot work against itself, and sharp as they are, the political systems use even the violence which could possibly threaten their existence to their own advantage. In fact, such potential threats are even fabricated to function the same way as state violence. Violence can be disguised in pretence of revolution. Lack of adequate organisation and contextual awareness perpetuates political systems instead of disturbing them.

In Orwell’s novel, Goldstein and his followers will perpetually exist to “be defeated, discredited, ridiculed, spat upon and yet they will always survive” (274). The performative “drama” O’Brien plays with Winston will reiterate only to appoint a subject for violence and place the “heretic” at the “mercy” of the party (274). Violence and the pretence of revolution then grants the party the “world of victory after victory, triumph after triumph after triumph: an endless pressing, pressing, pressing upon the nerve of power” it wants to create (274). Thus, opposition when not thought adequately is just impotent and does more good than harm to the system.

The same can be said about Odili's party. Its irrelevance to revolutionary change is implied in the law-making nature of the project. Max informs Odili that "one of the junior ministers in the Government was behind" their nascent party (79). While Odili and his idealist colleagues naively plan a political change, the party's secret leader intends superficial rebranding, a change in names and rise to superior positions rather than political mentality. Therefore, in these manifestations of violence and opposition projects, one could only expect a type of violence which preserves law or inaugurates it. This is the problematic situation in which both crowds and potential leaders are held. The never-ending state of war, the haunting bogey of the traitor, and the alarming voices of subjective violence serve the political regimes in guaranteeing the feeling on dependency upon their protection against the symptoms of violence. However, beneath these constant cries for protection lies an intricate web of objective violence that does more harm than the subjective one.

Three authorial voices emerge with regards to the crowd's judgments and action. Hawthorne and Orwell express a certain attitude suggestive of sound assessment and radical posture. Hawthorne attaches to the "uninstructed multitude", when following "the intuitions of its great and warm heart", as in the case of their suspicion towards Dimmesdale, an "unerring" capacity to detect truth (Hawthorne 100). Similarly, Orwell repeatedly expresses his 'hope in proles'. However, both render situations defying the reliability of their projected assumptions. Hawthorne's romantic hope in humans is countered by the profound distance between his crowd and truth, in spite of the incessant disclosure of the latter in the narrative. Equally, the "discontent" of proles, even when manifested, "lead[s] nowhere" (Orwell 78). It remains subjective and hides other detrimental forms of violence. While the system enacts its power schemes, "the dumb mass" is absorbed in fierce debates about lottery, "protected by its very stupidity"

(Hitchens 53). While Hawthorne and Orwell are initially optimistic, Achebe's voice differs in its invariable pessimism regarding crowds. He expresses distrust that is traceable throughout the narrative. Odili's perception of the "vast tumult" of the "silly, ignorant villagers" hosting Nanga's visit, and his wish "for a miracle, for a voice of thunder" to eradicate political subjugation is expressive (Achebe 2). Achebe comprehends perfectly that mass mobility and complicity perpetuate political rule. The miraculous force that Odili wishes for to halt this vicious cycle is only that of an external, law-destroying character. Collective action in the three novels does not substantially reverse any form of systemic arrangement. They neither alter the dynamics of the system in charge, nor do they succeed in inflicting a punishment that liberates and redeems the victims. Comparably, the forms of violence directed against or performed subjectively by explicit actors do not neutralise the corrupt regime governing the nation. While the radical posture of crowds suggests a 'law-destroying' orientation, its essence remains preserving and legitimising to systemic rule.

The historical impotence of violence is also tied to the principle of abnegation. Revolutionary violence hinges on the primal "criterion" of "self-negation and self-sacrifice" (Agamben *Limits* 108). It cannot operate alongside self-centred aspirations. When negation is not attained, violence stages a "fundamental contradiction", where "violent revolts against the dominant class do not bring about revolution" (108). Instead of a historical rupture, absence of negation entails continuity even with the eruption of chaotic violence. Disrupting continuity and initiating a new historical phase is only attained for "a revolutionary class that experiences its own negation in the negation of the ruling class" (108). The law-preserving and law-making nature of the violence that permeates the novels is indeed reflective of systemic stratagem. Yet it is also indicative

of the pervasive self-centredness. Continuity persists and the incapacity to create a new temporal order becomes insurmountable in spite chaos.

The negation of the self which represents the strength of revolutionary violence is absent in the novels. Violence, however how mighty it manifests itself, fails to circumvent continuity and create *a novus ordo saeculorum*. Like the proles' discontent which leads nowhere, and the symbolic "sudden access to freedom" expected to launch "a wild rampage and loss of life and property" with the dancer's machete (Achebe 92-93), violence in the novels is trapped in the function law-preserving/making rather than change and regeneration. Agamben's reference to negation in revolutionary violence cannot be reached with the dominance ego-centred leadership and popular self-interest. The similar dynamic drawn between the opposition that the protagonists intend to enact and the systems they combat is further widened. The central flaw for the intellectuals in occupying their primal role of education is sketched in their failure to extinguish their self-centred feeling of superiority. By extension, the political in the case of Winston and Odili mingles with the personal. The presence of the self is a determining factor in their political engagement. In a context of strategic revolutionary planning, the analogy of pedagogy and revolution gains shape. Even if Winston seems to be despaired, his vision and focus on the future in his diary and his talks with Julia show an interest in holding power or seeing the impact of his action. He unconsciously and naively salivates for public recognition and admiration more than the destruction of the Party. O'Brien who shows perfect familiarity with Winston's thought deconstructs this desire. He informs Winston during his interrogation that no "posterity will vindicate" him as they will never hear of him when "lifted clean out from the stream of history" (260). Similarly, political action in Achebe's novel is oriented towards the post-revolutionary phase. The

party launched by the Odili and his colleagues position themselves as future appointees to rule by assuming themselves as ‘vanguards’.

Among the elements that stand next to the protagonists’ sexual desires, one finds the political dimension ascribed to the relationships experienced by these characters. The female figures represent either a source of dissatisfaction from which a political engagement emanates, or seemingly opportune schemes of revenge disguised in political activism. From a psychological perspective, the political ‘commitment’ of the protagonists, though championed by many, is but a repercussion of cessation in libidinal associations revealed in critiques towards power systems. Freud highlights that being in love distinguishes “the loved object” with “freedom from criticism” (73). The opposite is implied in the political engagement of the characters. While the formerly loved characters, Katherine and Elsie, are subject to this estimation, their conduct results in a cessation of libidinal charges felt towards them. Their fate determines entry into the political field. The disenchantment, and therefore interruption of libido, is associated with political figures and system. However, even if it favours detachment, it emits judgments that are emotionally charged and self-centred rather politically pertinent. This obstacle towards a union with the rest of the crowd represents a distraction to these two characters to lead, in spite of their capacitating traits, a counter-revolution adequately. Despite their attempts, they fail to attract the crowd and form counter-power which they can lead. The narcissistic drive of their ego sublimates into political activism.

The first female whom Winston idealises constitutes the genesis of his political views. His mother stands in total opposition to what the party incarnates. Her sacrifice represents a burden that defines his detachment and reaction to the system that abolishes what his mother incarnates. To Winston, his mother’s tragic death and sacrifice belong

“to the ancient time, to a time when there was still privacy, love, and friendship, and when the members of a family stood by one another without needing to know the reason” (37). Her “conception of loyalty”, “private and unalterable” is no longer possible in the time he lives in, a time of no noble emotions but dread, hostility and terror imposed by the party (37). This puts Winston in a quest to restore or regain the values of the olden times. He seeks a feminine figure who shares these values against a system responsible for the purges of his family and abolishment of olden moral code.

Consequently, Winston’s compensatory plans in seeking feminine figures entail a reactionary political dimension. In fact, sexuality, an inevitable element to Winston’s gaze, is explicitly combatted by the Party. After relating the shameful episode with the prostitute, Winston reveals his conception of intimacy. Alongside the inner compensation he seeks in intimacy, Winston aspires “to break down that wall of virtue” to position sexuality as “rebellion” and “thoughtcrime” (74). This rebellion manifests itself in deconstructing the collectivity. The sexual act goes against the everlasting unity of the group. Winston considers sexuality a revolting and incriminating element against the Party. Winston’s self-interest and absence of negation of the self is retrieved in the nuanced relationship with Julia. Julia does not only come as a feminine figure who quenches his emotional thirst. He sees in his tie with her a realisation of his long awaited rebellion. The emotional ambivalence felt towards Julia is linked to Winston’s political perception. He initially hates her because he sees in her a swallower of the party’s doctrine, a replica of his wife. As soon as she confesses her love, Winston thinks, with certainty, that the paper secretly given by the girl “must have some kind of political meaning” (114), a message from the Brotherhood which confirms his hypothesis. This is not totally wrong, and though the message was not sent by the secret organisation, the words “*I love you*” scribbled on the paper are politically

“incriminating” and defy the doctrine of the party (115). Strangely, when Julia confesses having had multiple affairs before him with party members, Winston’s “heart leapt” of joy instead of jealousy or disappointment (132), fantasising that this “animal instinct” is the very “force that would tear the Party to pieces” (133). Winston’s dreamy ambition relates his political conception of sexuality. Contentious towards the party’s schemes, Winston deems sexuality a destructive method to political organisation. Thus, Winston and Julia’s “embrace had been a battle, the climax a victory. It was a blow struck against the Party. It was a political act” (133). Julia represents a continuity of his compensation when Katherine, the resemblance of his mother, does not fulfil his compensatory plans. Julia rationalises and sublimates his political activism. However, this does not surpass the stage of being poetically and symbolically appealing. Winston’s self-interest amplifies to exclude not only the collective but even the subject of his love.

The crux of Winston’s convoluted perception of Julia appears in his hesitation when O’Brien lists the sacrifices entailed in adhering to the Brotherhood. They both mechanically face O’Brien’s suggestions with an affirmative ‘yes’. They accept possibilities of death, mass murder, treason, corruption, atrocious crimes, loss of identity, and suicide. Their disposition to execute unethical acts ‘for the sake of revolt’ is further tested by one final condition. When O’Brien mentions separation from one another, Julia instantly refuses while Winston experiences reluctance. This moment of hesitation contrasts Julia’s genuine attachment to Winston’s self-centred perception. It is an instance which foreshadows Winston’s betrayal of Julia. While he appears to be emotionally devoted to her, she only stands as a compensatory figure and catalyst for his political thoughts. When they are first caught, Winston claims feeling every pain she was receiving while none of the guards approached him. However, inside the sites of

torture, when the abuse touches upon him too, he rarely thought of her knowing that she was facing comparable or even worse torments by the party: “He felt no love for her, and he hardly even wondered what was happening to her” (236). His betrayal of Julia concretises the intensity of his self-centeredness. The survival instinct conquers his ideals and love. Though he suffers this betrayal severely, he is still accountable for it. Alone, she does not resist the self-centredness, and his betrayal indicates the fragility of his political commitment. Although he appears despaired, Winston clings to life.

In addition, Winston’s retrospective meditations are reflective of the same egocentric aspiration. The party’s systemic suppression of the historicity of the past preoccupies Winston. However, the nostalgia for the past indicates a personal longing rather than political dissatisfaction. Though the alarming suppression of history, portrayed as an unprecedented aberration, conceals this nostalgia, one captures Winston in appreciative, pensive, and often lamenting moments of a lost past repossessed via seemingly trivial items and artefacts. Next to the intimacy it offers, the ‘paradisiac’ dimension of Mr. Charrington’s room is derived from its capacity to pacify Winston’s wrath and bring solace to his nostalgia for the past. It represents a site of ‘phenomenological’ significance. The room is decoratively furnished with a carpeted floor, lightly adorned walls, a wingchair facing the fireplace, an antique clock, and a large bed restoring Winston’s “nostalgia” and “ancestral memory” (102). It induces an acute sense of comforting familiarity, privacy, and security. It “was a world, a pocket of the past where extinct animals could walk” (156). Within this room, as well as the shop, Winston reconnects with the ‘extinct’ relics of the past. This temporal overlap allows Winston to re-experience his past in anamnestic episodes of mundane activities.

Similarly, Winston's diary⁴, a symbol of resistance in the novel for its incriminating status, is initially bought without any "conscious" cause that implies political intent, but rather for its attractive "smooth creamy paper, a little yellowed by age" suggesting belonging to an "older" time (13). Each item Winston associates with "the vanished, romantic past" (176), represents what Lacan calls *objet petit a*. Winston extends his desire for the abolished past through the accessories available to him. Since the 'Real Past' he longs for is inaccessible, he anchors himself by procuring 'real café', 'real sugar', and a 'real woman' not a party comrade. He essays to re-experience a life of normalcy which he chases and is constantly evasive with the threat of the party.

The gleaming spherical paperweight that catches Winston's attention at Charrington's shop stands as a symbolic representation of a past preserved from party manipulation. Winston establishes a channel to the past through artefact. The radiance of the antique becomes minor compared to its belongingness to a time distinct from the present. Indeed, the timeworn object persists as "a little chunk of history" that the party has "forgotten to alter" (152). A material testimony that "[a]nything old, and for that matter anything beautiful, was always vaguely suspect" (101). However, the relational tie established with the past remains overly personal. Although Winston's statements confine the reader to a conclusion of public dissatisfaction with the present and erasure of history, his allegorical imagination of the paperweight is reclusive and private. The temporal overlap Winston experiences through the paperweight announces the same preoccupation with the self. Winston fantasises about a protective dimension to the antique. He perceives its surface as the "arch of the sky" wrapping Winston, Julia, and all the items of the past eternally "at the heart of the crystal" (153). Winston extends the

⁴ Apart from its symbolic perception, the diary is partly an attempt at healing. Considering writing therapeutic reveals Winston's self-interest in the act.

protective feeling of the room to the paperweight. His gaze into its depths suggests the fantasy of getting enclosed “inside that glassy world, and that once inside it time could be arrested” (157). Winston’s chimeric plans are rather escapist rather than confrontational. Self-preoccupation disarms Winston in a reclusive corner. He envisions the paperweight as a protective shell which preserves his personal desires, and thus, he is swayed by the same vice he reproaches Julia for, that of being concerned of one’s self.

Winston’s positioning in time does not suggest a destructive act but rather an introverted attitude. In his meeting with O’Brien, Winston raises a glass not to the dismantling of the Thought Police, the demise of Big Brother, or humanity and future, as suggested by O’Brien, but rather to the past. This is an open admission that the past is what drives him. Upon leaving, Winston no political queries occupy his mind but rather an image of his mother’s room, the room he rents, and the paperweight he finds there. Though Winston’s retrospections are partly political, they remain largely inner longings for an abolished past driven by personal recollections and restructuring of the protagonist’s childhood. The personal, individual, sentimental, and intimate prevail over and dim the political.

In Achebe’s novel, the negation of the self is equally unattained and disrupted by self-interest. Achebe describes a country engrossed in self-seeking; a place where “the general feeling in the country” espouses the idea that “the mainspring of political action was personal gain” (109). In line with the general feeling of the country, Nweke concretises this example. His political activism is driven by a quest for self-interest. He complains about his loyalty to P. O. P. which “had not been rewarded with the usual prize-appointment to some public corporation or other” (6), and is tirelessly organising Nanga’s reception holding on firmly to this hope. Amid this spirit, any action or

rebellion is destined to realise this aspiration. General and public concerns are devoured by personal growth and profit. Although Odili tries to limit the projection of this feeling to the masses rather than “the high-minded thinking of fellows like Max” and him, irony shows the named characters are the ones who will most likely exhibit their self-interest. The disdain expressed towards crowds, though valid and justified when examined from their profile, mirrors an attempt to conceal the intellectuals’ failure to lead efficient action. The failure is projected onto the masses instead of being addressed. The hatred of the crowds displaces the blame from the self to the other. It expresses the paradox and dissonance between political idealism, reality, and self-centeredness. Though engrossed in personal matters, they refuse to accept it as fact and instead cling to their idealism. In Achebe’s text, the excess of the personal consumes the most violent instance of counter-power action. Eunice murders Koko to avenge the death of Max.

Odili’s political engagement, though promising, represents a personal scheme of revenge. Ezenwa-Ohaeto argues that Odili couples “political conviction with private vengeance” (109). His political commitment is shadowed by the personal. Following the betrayal, Odili experiences an alteration in his libidinal energy. The dissociation of Elsie from Odili’s ego alters her position in his esteem. The cessation of libidinal charges transforms the formerly idealised subject, and by extension Nanga, into “distant”, “casual acquaintances” that he can comfortably talk about (71). In Max’s house one sees Nanga called “corrupt, empty-headed, illiterate capitalist” by Max but profoundly shared by Odili (70). Gradually, the comfort Odili feels escalates into political criticism. After recalling the humiliating episode and his incapacity to act in front of “a minister bloated by the flatulence of ill-gotten wealth, living in a big mansion built with public money, riding in a Cadillac and watched over by a one-eyed, hired thug” (72). Though Odili negates Elsie’s significance, he engages in a quest to restore his “manhood” by

making Nanga “pay for his insult in full measure” after being treated “as no man had a right to treat another” (73). There is a degree of shame expressed by Odili regarding Elsie. He amends the story he tells Max to preserve his dignity, and feels heavily anxious when his story is retold by Max to his friends. The critical attitude Odili develops acts as a defence mechanism to recollect his dignity and justify his inaction.

This criticism soon mutates into a sharper political denunciation. Odili confronts Nanga with his formerly dormant political views. He threatens Nanga to report the scandal to the media and amplifies his critical tone to centre on Nanga’s inadequacy to his ministerial status. The political criticism that Odili develops, although existent before, signals a movement from passivity to active engagement. Yet this transformation remains too personal. The engagement in C.P.C. is linked to a scheme of revenge rather than a well-thought political militancy. Odili is instantly drawn to the idea of an opposition party led by intellectuals, but it nonetheless represents “a second string to [his] bow when [he] came to deal with Nanga” (74-75). Though disguised in political activism, Odili’s engagement in opposition politics is fuelled by retaliation intent.

Edna accelerates this obsessive plan where the emotional and the political continue to intersect. Odili’s entry into the political realm, his antagonism with Nanga, the preoccupation with Edna, and the insecurities he feels are all interlinked. The first letter Odili writes to Edna principally addresses his intention to dissuade her from marrying Nanga. Following the letter, the nucleus of Odili’s visit to her village, though disguised in political campaigning, directly sustains the plea of the letter. Odili insists on convincing her not to marry Nanga, a move fuelled by romantic attachment than political ideology. The obsessive attachment Odili develops is revealed after his quarrel with Edna’s father. Odili grows self-aware of the situation he had been evading:

I knew then that I wanted Edna now (if not all along) for her own sake first and foremost and only very remotely as part of a general scheme of revenge. I had started off telling myself that I was going for her in order to hurt Chief Nanga; now I would gladly chop off Chief Nanga's head so as to get her (103).

This self-reflective analysis poses a query for Odili: “How important was my political activity in its own right?” (103). Odili finds himself in a situation where his vengeance, political commitment, and Edna are unresolved. He is aware that neither his mere love nor advantageous education and youth are sufficient “to wrench her from a minister” standing as “nothing beside wealth and position and the authority of a greedy father” (103). Therefore, he needed to reinforce his status. Even if it is quasi impossible to win Nanga’s seat, Odili considers it indispensable to contest him, and bring to light his corruption to at least prevent his reappointment as a minister.

Considering the letter exchange with Edna a sign of reciprocal attachment, Odili feels naively motivated to start his “offensive against Chief Nanga” (106). The fact that he ends his reading with a decision proves the entangling of the political and personal, yet not enough to engage in a political battle. However, when Edna confronts him with her “incoherent accusations” (123), his political motivation loses substance. He considers it a second victory for Nanga which annihilates Odili’s “twin hopes of a beautiful life with Edna and of a new era of cleanliness in the politics” (123). The political action becomes “futile” which has “always been a little nebulous —until Edna came along” (123). By losing her, Odili loses commitment to politics. Odili’s politics are rooted in the private. The personal connects with the political, with the excess of the former on the latter. After realising her loss, his ‘reformist’ plan dissipates. Even when their bond is regained, the spectre of Nanga still chases. In order to finalise the engagement, Odili needs to pay the sum of money offered by Nanga as a bride price and

payment of Edna's education as the tradition stipulates. Odili confesses that his acceptance to pay the required sum is not out of respect and interest in tradition, but rather an urge to dissociate himself from the shadow of Nanga. The end of the novel resonates with Odili's interest. He emerges partially triumphant by reclaiming the object of his love. However, the triumph of Odili is personal rather than political.

The absence of abnegation puts the protagonists in comparable horizons to the megalomaniac figures they contest. Instead of creating a new order, they end up replicating and preserving the worldview they combat. Winston's self-centredness, displayed in his perception of Goldstein's book, confirms the comparability to Big Brother. After reading the book, Winston replicates the same self-centred reasoning of the Party leader. He perceives himself a protector of forbidden truths, a declaration not quite different from the narcissist Big Brother who qualifies as the sole guardian of revolution. Similarly, Odili's failure to reach abnegation and to separate the public from the private prevents him from incarnating the role a public hero or "a fit reformer" (Hossain 63). This incapacity to incarnate the role of a reformer is significantly tied to his failure to negate himself. He becomes comparable to Nanga as both "failures from the very inception due to their concentration on their self-interest" (Hossain 64). Odili's "vindictive disposition" is "subjective", and therefore, the opposition action he launches fails (63). Both Winston and Odili cannot surmount the personal rage they feel against a system and lead a depersonalised fight. Their experiences incapacitate them to reach a level of political maturity. The endings of the novels relate an alignment with the excessive ego of the protagonists. The narrative focus in both Winston and Odili dismantles the public disguise of their engagement. Both Orwell and Achebe devote significant narrative spaces to their protagonists as denouements of the conflictual nature of their trajectories. The endings, though relatively different, declare the final

verdict on the engagement that tricks the reader into believing and hoping for a public concern. It is a final declaration on the failure of Winston and Odili, to dissociate their ego and interests, and to adequately lead a political cause. The final pages of *1984* focus on Winston utterly destroyed, altered, carrying the heavy weight of his betrayal to Julia. As for Odili, his ending contradicts his initial public engagement and concerns. He emerges victorious in getting closer to Edna while the country is politically chaotic.

Even if there is no prospect of counter-power in *The Scarlet Letter*, Chillingworth is afflicted with the same self-interest. Chillingworth stands unparalleled to mainstream puritan conception of the intellectual. However, he is constrained by the personal revenge he intends to perform. His deviation from the normative background of puritan culture equips him with capacitating traits of a revolutionary figure. The debilitating obsession which taints his scheme of revenge obscures his enlightened profile. He concentrates his frustration on the harm he intends to inflict on Dimmesdale, the one he suspects to be his wife's lover. To Dimmesdale, Hester was a source of emotional comfort to a "cheerless", "lonely" life which he wished to "kindle" with "a household fire" (60). The transgression committed by Hester and the minister represents a profound disillusionment to Chillingworth. He dedicates himself, "earnestly and unreservedly", to unearthing the secret Hester successfully hides from the public and the magistrates, but would fail in front of a man who engages into "the inquest with other senses than they possess" (60). The senses that Chillingworth refers to are the obsessive traits emanating from his fixation. He decides to dwell in the same place that Hester, the object of his love, and her lover, the object of his revenge occupy. His obsession is described narratively as "a new purpose", "dark" and "guilty" and possessing "force enough to engage the full strength of his faculties" (93). He manipulates Dimmesdale by embodying the role of a confidante while executing his ill-intentioned plan. As a

man who dedicated his life to “pursuit and systematic exercise of revenge” (201), Dimmesdale’s death represents the end of his trajectory. His energetic deportment fades and so does he from public view in the narrative. The act of transgression brings an end to the comforting estate that their conjugal bond offered. In response, he is determined to a relentless search for the man who disorganised the unified lucidity of his life.

Although the attachment of the characters to women facilitates detachment from the crowd and initiates political reflections, it does not suffice to contest the power systems which the characters combat. The protagonists’ political engagement remains too personal to amount to a serious reactionary wave. It represents an obstacle to these characters instead of their aptitude to become leaders. Self-interest and centeredness neutralise violence and any form of action to depart from the law-destroying nature and revolutionary spirit that both Benjamin and Agamben envisage. It can plausibly be argued that such strategic thinking which projects onto post-revolutionary periods is necessary. However, failure to dethrone the system and enthrone, even through self-appointment, debunks this argument. A hypothetical situation stipulates that a heavier and more radical strike at the established systems would have hit if negation was attained and ego was deflated momentarily. The law destroying nature of violence aimed at dictatorships needs more than just anthems of sacrifice and deploring. Sacrifice necessary for revolution is born in the initial relinquish of basic, human penchants towards power and thirst to rule. To reclaim justice, the self needs to be disclaimed. The novels exhibit instances where the will to power, albeit literal and premature than Nietzsche’s version which entails overcoming the self, consumes the will to revolt.

3.4 Virtuous Non-Violence and Vicious Adaptability

When violent counter-action is disturbed by the pervasiveness of systemic power, its pacifist counterpart is immediately recalled. Throughout the three narratives, the violence enacted by crowds could not amount to be sufficiently disruptive. It is consumed by a larger power scheme that strategically disciplines it into a visible violence that prolongs its tenure. Even the participatory dynamics of ritualised politics and intellectual militancy remain corroborative of systemic rule. In the assessment of counter-power strategies, Žižek suggests resistance to the pragmatism of active immersion that meets the call for urgency. For Žižek, “pseudoactivity” is more dangerous than “passivity” (217). This secures a basis to dismantle crisis-driven systemic violence. Building on Saramago’s *Seeing*, Žižek considers abstention from voting a strategy to “effectively dissolve the government-not only in the limited sense of overthrowing the existing government, but more radically”, by moving beyond “intra-political negation” to a refusal of the “very frame of decision” (216). The same could have been possibly reached by the crowd or the protagonists by placing themselves outside the contours of power. Ruling would be adjourned if the ruled decide to step out of the dichotomy. In their absence, the ruler fades and ruling discontinues.

Žižek’s politics of abstinence are closer to Fitz-Henry’s politics of withdrawal from public sphere. Opposed to the “discursive excess” of the carnival (1), silence operates as a “strategic refusal to participate in the dominant narratives and frameworks that reinforce violent institutions” (2). Thus, contrary to the superficial participation in the carnivalesque and the promise to disturb from within, which proved to be inefficient as discussed in chapter one, silence challenges the licenced and manipulative forms of participatory politics. Though it inspires inaction and resignation, it is a repurposed passivity to counter action susceptible to manipulation as is the case of many violent

scenes and that of the dynamics of the carnivalesque. Thus, silence can be politicised. The 'performative silence' breaks the cycle which replicates the logic of the self-same power structures one reacts to, making the act of subversion mere 'noise' modelled on the 'normative' scheme of dominant powers (3). Silence is an alternative which rejects the "domain of normative politics" and its "signifying systems" (11). It is an "ontological puncturing" of "yet un-mobilized audiences to put down roots" (11-12). It counters the demands of "extraordinary disruptions" and "dramatic mode of the carnivalesque" by the simplicity and grandeur of withdrawal (12). It is a symbolic gesture of "stillness" in the face of excessive mobility (12). It is not the festivity of the carnival that is neutralised through silence, but rather the participatory urge that it secures. Engagement, as seen throughout the thesis, proved inadequate to revolutionary plans. Silence, though in need of other supportive schemes, marks a withdrawal from the linguistic realm of violence. It symbolises renunciation in the belief of the reconciliatory faculty of language and communication, and represents a counter-violence based on disengagement rather than participation.

If one compares the failure of the protagonists/crowd in assembling a capital of meaningful action to Hester's reclined reaction, the virtue of passivity unfolds. It is indeed Hester's disengagement and absence of confrontation which mark her trajectory. This equips her with a symbolic triumph over the puritan order. Hester embraces her fate; she accepts the punishment inflicted on her. Hester "did not flee" (65), and yet she could survive within a colony that subjugated her, and gradually reconquered herself to emerge partially triumphant at the end. Through dissociation from the conflict, Hester could surmount her punishment by repurposing her inaction rather confrontation. Her success is that of denuding a large political doctrine for a vast readership. The portrayal of the puritan system is much dependent on Hester's suffering. However, her

‘revolutionary’ abstinence remains symbolic. It is too private to have a decisive public impact. The partial in her case is not a problem of method but rather of purpose. Hester relies on her non-confrontation approach as a sole and exclusive strategy of revolt.

Like violence, non-violence has its limits. Non-violence is often put in a dichotomous semantic field against violence, which “disempower[s] and delegitimize[s]” any critical evaluation of it (Gelderloos 3). For Gelderloos, revolution is “a social upheaval with widespread transformative effects” (4). Thus, any form of action that does not amount to this transformation can be suspected. By relocating the debate to the means of revolution, threat to power is minimised. Pacifist ideology, and not strategy, celebrates “shared commitment to nonviolence” rather than “shared commitment to a revolutionary goal” (5). The ideology of pacifism dilutes nonviolence into counter-violence rather than counter-power. It is restrictive in envisioning other possibilities beyond nonviolence, or the capacity of pairing both orientations. At its inception, it defines itself incompatible and irreconcilable with violence. In addition, when violence shows impotence, its binary opposite reclaims the spot to be chanted as the only alternative. There is a “historical manipulation” in exclusively basing the success on pacifism rather than a “whole spectrum of tactics” (7). To augment its effectiveness, it is often justified by historical moments like the decolonisation of India, Civil Rights movements, and Anti-War protests. However, doubts start to hover around the effectiveness of pacifism to bring about any victory on its own when history shows that the most pacifist actions included a degree of violence. These movements succeeded, across times and countries, because they existed alongside violent and armed militancy. In abstinence and silence highlighted above, suspicion of manipulation into believing the systemic narrative is minimised though not fully transcended if relied on the sole strategy. In the corpus, the solitary non-violent act remains partial and only

symbolic because of Hester's reliance on it as an exclusive strategy. Even Orwell, according to Williams, views pacifism as a soft option which will generate the same thing again and again (Williams *Orwell* 61-62). However, he fails to see the call for violence as equally susceptible to manipulation, best incarnated in his disillusioning experience in Spain. To transcend the stage of the symbolic, which only appeases instead of radically subverting, is to embrace all the available resources to the revolution.

Gelderloos calls for an action that relies on a 'Diversity of Tactics'. Being open to this call is to embrace a myriad of strategies available to counter-power instead of sole reliance on either violence or nonviolence since both proved inefficient or only symbolically partial in the corpus. The political powers of the three novels are protean, adaptable, and self-replenishing. They display restorative acuteness to adjust to the different situations they face. The adaptability of political systems is inherent to the tactics of longevity. To preserve its existence, expand its power, and delay its destruction, the system organises itself in the most contradictory manners. In Hawthorne's novel, the leading clergy does not find any shame in deciding about topics as high as faith and transgression while intruding in pig disputes or paternal affairs. In Orwell's case, the party tacitly allows acts that go against its principle of chastity. Unable to eradicate the instinct, they adapt and allow prostitution. In Achebe's novel, the political power does not find it threatening to abolish the representative government as to contain the wrath of the masses.

In addition, Weber speaks of a process in which the "non-everyday character" of charismatic authority and its "ephemeral" nature are transcended to become "permanent" through a turn towards rationalisation or tradition or both through "routinisation" (378-379). The political systems of the three novels establish

bureaucratic and hierarchical traditions to codify the charismatic authority. The fragility of charismatic leadership receives normative measures to be solidified. In this way, any sort of challenge is eliminated, for even if belief in the leader decreases, which is unlikely given the profile of the crowd, the tradition appointed, ritualised, and institutionalised becomes hard to eradicate. This shift is made to secure the same charismatic rule by codifying its practices. The essence of rule is charismatic while the frame of ritualised politics the three systems engage in is the basis through which the charismatic is rationalised. This process exhibits the same adaptability potential of political power.

Countering such adaptable systems with a one-dimensional strategy is erroneous. The systems are self-regenerative. They base their rule on a mentality of ongoing crisis. The survival of fallacious narratives of distress and necessity is a proof of their success in maintaining threat resourceful. Therefore, sole reliance on violence will only magnify the source these systems thrive on. Equally, the pacifist action of raising awareness amid threat is meaningless. It remains relatively liable to be ideologically consumed into passivity. More critically, counter-education is inoffensive in structures saturated with anti-intellectual and stultifying worldviews. It is even plausible that it would be countered by a comparably tacit and peaceful strategy led by the pseudo-intellectuals and experts.

Alongside these general traits of adaptability, each novel presents specific examples that exhibit political resilience. In *The Scarlet Letter*, the corrective version of the magistrates contains the compromise offered by Dimmesdale's confession. The revisionist narrative replenishes the rule of the church against Dimmesdale's exposure. By insisting on his piety, they blur the truth that would question and discredit their church. They polish his image to prevent attachment of his sin to the institution. In

Orwell's *1984*, the constant historical changes and falsifications indicate constant political repositioning. The party preserves its image and that of Big Brother by fabricating a past congruent with the present. In addition, if one accepts the theory of the Brotherhood being a creation of party, the brotherhood shows exactly the adaptability of the system to different situations and early planning to eliminate dissidents. In absence of concrete and material threats to the system, the party creates its own counter-force in order to anticipate action. In addition, had the party been unconcerned to counter-revolution, it would not have been inclined to create such a frame. It is proof enough that action, planning, organisation, and violence represent a threat to the system. If the brotherhood's existence is debatable, the party's adaptability measures are not. They function in a preventive way. By radically altering its captured enemies before executing them, the party prevents that "the dead to rise up" (260). They are denied the status of 'martyrdom' to be glorified and vindicated among people which multiplies rebels out of admiration.

In assessing the acts of violence drawn in the novels, one scene emerges charged with the illusion of positive implications. Eunice's shooting of Koko marks the end of a corrupt regime. It displays proximity to 'Divine Violence'. It is a solitary act, dissociated from political ends, and is neither law-making nor law-preserving. However, the impotence is not shown in the act itself but rather in the absence of a ground that sweeps and annihilates the system. This latter soon adapts to adopt the act for a law-preserving dimension. Max is declared "Hero of the Revolution" and Eunice is acquitted (140). The critique that one directs at nonviolence remains relevant to violence too. This latter cannot be adopted alone without the risk of being discursively and physically countered by systemic strategies. The solitary act is not preceded by a sound revolutionary education that forms a human reservoir to protect the revolution.

Consequently, it is not followed by actions that further destabilise the regime. Without investment in education and strategic plotting and preparation, acts of radical and violent nature will be easily countered and recuperated by political powers. Gelderloos's metaphor of the protective facet of nonviolence applies to every strategy which functions in exclusive, absolutist, one-dimensional manner.

Conclusion

The crowd's most explicit form of action, violence, is consumed by the implicit aggressiveness of the political realm. Political discourse is a nest in which the pair of objective/systemic and subjective violence is born. In the act of execution, the State of Exception represents a crisis-based form of rule holding crowds in a perpetual climate of threat. This justifies the rise of sovereignty perfectly incarnated in the state's suppression of the legal status of *homo sacer*. In addition, the impotence of violent action is tied to the absence of a law-destroying facet. It is further widened by self-driven characters who display capacitating traits of revolt. Even non-violence, which remains a strategy of subverting systems, is annulled when facing vicious political adaptability. The only route towards revolution seems to lie in the commitment to diversify counter-action.

General Conclusion

General Conclusion

The distancing of crowds from the realm of critical literary readings is motivated by the disdain expressed towards them in intellectual discourse. Rarely given attention to, and even when a crowd is depicted, it is always with a heavy discursive echo that results in general negative portrayals in fiction. In addition, their analysis in critical works is marked by a repetitive focus on social classes. This research tried to offer a humble attempt at accessing the crowd from a different perspective. Given their low profile, the disdain might not have been transcended, but its employment to justify the neglect of crowds in literary readings is contested. Throughout the thesis, the collective body is prioritised to reflect on insights of its psychological predispositions and power structures.

One of the major critical orientations of the thesis focuses on the intersection between Crowd Psychology and Carnivalistic/Grotesque writing in Hawthorne's *The Scarlet Letter*, Orwell's *1984*, and Achebe's *A Man of the People*. A remarkable resort to these styles is noticed as a partial mood that envelops fiction whenever a crowd enters the scene. Instances of theoretical group psychology are best novelised with an authorial reliance on carnivalistic and grotesque modes of expression. The traits that accompany the birth of a crowd are imbedded in the basic assumptions of the aforementioned modes of writing. However, their liberating potential is questioned. In revisiting Bakhtin, one confronts a continuity of hierarchical structure, manipulation, and blindness to truth in the three texts. This might convey a meaning that is not intended. The position of this research does not amount to a radical revisionist stance against his theory. Bakhtin's Carnavalesque and Grotesque proved efficient in offering a

method which refreshes one's perception against the hypnotic forces of the unconscious. The emancipatory in Bakhtin's thesis is located in the dimension of affect.

Furthermore, in examining the psychology of crowds, a trait that reigns supreme is their proclivity to servility. This poses a query about the success of mediocre leadership and failure of intellectuals. Being deaf to logic, the intellectuals seen in the novels fail to attract the crowd into a potential revolutionary plan because they remain idealist. In addition, while the libidinal ties of the group metamorphoses into a cessation of narcissistic features, the libidinal energy of the intellectuals preserves its original shape. The intellectual figures to whom the role of change is attached are engrossed in self-interest and self-love, under the pretence of political visions. Even with modest intellectual profile, other leading figures appeal to crowds because they succeed in crafting manipulative schemes. They display prestigious background, oratory skills, and anti-intellectual manoeuvring which neutralise the threat of the intellectual. They emerge victorious in their leadership because they outperform the intellectuals in this regard.

Violence, with its plural manifestations, represents another major point addressed in the thesis. The involvement of crowds in staging violent scenes and their subjugation to tacit forms of violence reveal the cardinal point of impotence. Crowds fail to liberate themselves from political powers because of the invisible force of systemic violence. Their action, in spite of the enormity it might suggest, remains overly subjective. Political systems precluded the stage of violent upheaval because they could stage an alarming narrative which justifies the sovereignty of the state and annihilated the civic rights of the *homo sacer*. Equally responsible, crowds or intellectual figures capable of revolutionary action are consumed by self-interest, a point that radically opposes the law-destroying nature of revolutionary violence. The

only available roadmap towards revolution consists of the multiplication of tactics which crowds and even intellectuals could not reach.

The projection of some major concepts of Crowd Psychology and other theoretical stances are limited to the context of the corpus studied. The interpretation remains relative compared to other fictional works which sketch triumphant masses over political systems. The examination of this orientation remains a subject of interest which might reveal this triumph as a reality fictionalised in those works, or a mere ambitious portrayal which further places the crowd in a historical spectrum of disdain, impotent action, and manipulation. In addition, such an assessment of triumphant crowds would be more apt in revising or declaring a verdict on whether accounts of Crowd Psychology are accurate or apologetic and complicit with power systems.

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المخلص

لقد تبني الخطاب الفردي المشكل للفلسفة الغربية أحكاما سلبية على الجماعات، مما أدى إلى تعدي هذه النظرة إلى الأدب و القراءات الأدبية ، مؤديا بذلك إلى استبعادهم من الحقل المعرفي للنقد الأدبي. تعبر هذه الدراسة عن اهتمام في ثنائية الجماهير و السلطة كما تمثلت في أعمال الحرف القرمزي لناتانيال هوثورن ، 1984 لجورج أورويل ، و رجل الشعب لتشيونوا أنتشيببي. تحاول الدراسة إعطاء الأولوية للجماهير في التحليل من خلال مزج نزعاتهم النفسية مع ميدان السلطة. يوضح التحليل في هذه الدراسة أنه رغم قدرة الأسلوب الكرنفالي و الغريب من تصوير نفسية الجماهير أدبيا ، فإنه يعجز على دعم نظرة باختين التحررية. إضافة إلى ذلك ، نظرا للطبيعة الخاضعة للجماهير و كفاءة السلطة حتى الهزيمة في جذبهم ، فإن المثقف يواجه أزمة في قيادة الجماهير و توجيهها نحو حركة تحريرية. أخيرا ، تقود تشابكات ميدان العنف الجماهير إلى التعرض المستمر للسيطرة أين يتم إعادة توجيه حركتهم الأكثر تطرفا إلى تأمين أسس السلطة عوضا عن تشكيل سلطة مضادة.

الكلمات المفتاحية: نفسية الجماهير ، الكرنفالية ، الغريب ، السلطة ، المثقف ، القيادة ، العنف